REESE   LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Deceived  FEB- . -10- 1-894       >  l89    - 


I 

*A 


Accessions  No&ttTTY....      Class  No. >/ 


INTRODUCTION  AND   NOTES 


•TO   THK- 


BOOK 


oiozmiRcrs 


TUSCULAN  DISPUTATIONS 


-BY- 


FRANK  SMALLEY,  A.  M.;  PH.  D. 

PROFESSOR    OF    THE    LATIN    LANGUAGE    AND    LITERATURE 
IN  THE 

SYRACUSE   UNIVERSITY. 


SYRACUSE,  N.  Y. 

T.  W.  DTJBSTON, 
1892. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

Preface 3 

Introduction 5 

I.    The  Tusculan  Disputations  .r 5 

II.     Argument  of  Book  V 7 

III.     A  Brief  View  of  Greek  and  Roman  Ethical  Philosophy 11 

(a)  Socrates 11 

(b)  The  Cynics,  (Antisthenes  and  Diogenes) 12 

(c)  The  Cyrenaics,  (Aristippus  and  Theodorus) 13 

(d)  Plato 15 

(e)  The  Academies 18 

(1)  The  Old  Academy,  (Speusippus,  Xenocrates,  Polemo,  etc.)  18 

(2)  The  Middle  Academy,  (Arcesilaus  and  Carneades) 18 

(3)  The  New  Academy,  (Philo  and  Antiochus) 19 

(f)  Aristotle 20 

(g)  The  Peripatetics,  (Theophrastus,  Aristo,  Callipho,  etc.) 21 

(h)    The  Stoics,  (Zeno,  Aristo  of  Chios,  Diogenes  of  Babylon, 

Panaetius,  etc.) 22 

(i)    The  Epicureans,  (Epicurus,  Metrodorus,  etc.) 28 

(j)    Relations  of  Epicureanism  to  Stoicism 33 

(k)    The  Eclectics,  (Cicero) 34 

Notes  on  the  text. .  36 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 


The  Introduction  and  annotations  here  presented  are  advance 
sheets.  They  are  printed  now  because  needed  for  immediate  use. 
The  plan  is  to  extend  the  latter  to  other  portions  of  the  text,  and 
briefly  to  extend  and  adapt  the  former  to  the  same.  Some  Latin 
text  of  the  Disputations,  as  Teubner's  or  Harper's,  will  be  used  in 
the  class. 

No  scholar  can  feel  any  degree  of  confidence  or  any  assurance  of 
competence  to  present  a  commentary  on  this  composition  of  Cicero 
without  first  devoting  much  thoughtful  study  to  the  great  German 
editors,  whose  works  have  done  so  much  to  furnish  a  correct  text 
and  a  clear  exposition  of  the  sometimes  obscure  passages,  elucidat- 
ing the  author's  thought.  Reference  is  made  especially  to  the  works 
of  Wolf,  Moser  and  Kiihner.  Use  has  been  constantly  made  of  the 
edition  of  Heine,  and  especially  of  Tischer's  (Sorof)  last  (eighth),  on 
whose  text  the  notes  are  based.  Independent  additions  have  been 
made  where  it  was  deemed  that  the  interest  of  a  clear  exposition 
demanded;  especially  is  this  true  of  comments  of  a  biographical  and 
philosophical  character. 

A  few  grammatical  references  have  been  inserted.  The  design  in 
reading  this  Latin  should  not  be  so  much  the  study  of  the  language 
as  of  the  thought ;  and  the  student  should  have  little  need  of  gram- 
matical instruction,  but  be  able  to  give  his  attention  almost  exclu- 
sively to  the  style,  the  elevated  tone,  the  general  line  of  thought  and 
the  philosophical  questions  discussed.  As  a  necessary  preparation 
for  understanding  the  philosophy,  the  introduction  has  been  pre- 
pared ;  for,  the  reader  who  has  not  previously  devoted  some  atten- 
tion to  ancient  philosophy,  would,  when  introduced  thus,  "/«  medias 
res"  be  quite  incapable  of  comprehending  the  author.  He  must 
first  fix  in  mind  the  ethical  teachings  of  this  philosophy,  the  discus- 
sion of  which  constitutes  the  substance  of  the  work,  and  with  which 
the  author  assumes  that  his  reader  has  a  reasonable  familiarity.  Such 


preparation,  moreover,  is  especially  important  in  this  case;  first,  be- 
cause this  book  is  the  last  of  a  series,  the  writer  naturally  assuming 
that  the  books  have  been  perused  in  order;  second,  because  the 
work,  as  a  whole,  followed  in  time  of  composition  other  philosophical 
writings  of  the  author  to  which  it  stands  related,  as  the  practical  to 
the  theoretical.  In  the  five  books  De  Finibus  Bonorum  et  Malorum 
he  had  treated  of  the  foundation  of  ethics,  the  doctrine  of  the  high- 
est good  and  of  evil ;  the  Tusculanae  Dispulationes  followed,  in  which 
he  showed  what  things  are  necessary  to  the  greatest  happiness  in  life. 

If  we  were  to  specify  narrowly  the  knowledge  most  indispensable 
to  the  student  at  the  outset,  it  would  be  this:  the  ethical  views  of 
Aristotle,  of  the  Old  Academy,  of  the  Stoics  and  of  the  Epicureans, 
of  Carneades  of  the  Middle  Academy,  of  Antiochus  of  the  New 
Academy,  and  of  Cicero  himself.  See  INTRODUCTION;  (and  for 
Cicero),  III.  THE  ECLECTICS. 

The  helps  made  use  of  in  preparing  the  commentary  are  suffi- 
ciently indicated  above.  In  the  philosophical  introduction  the 
more  important  works  consulted  are  as  follows  :  History  of  Philo- 
sophy, Dr.  F.  Ueberweg,  translated  by  Morris,  vol.  i ;  A  Sketch  of 
Ancient  Philosophy,  J.  B.  Mayor;  A  Brief  History  of  Greek  Philo- 
sophy, Burt ;  Christianity  and  Greek  Philosophy,  Cocker ;  A  Short 
History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  Marshall;  Lives  and  Opinions  of 
Eminent  Philosophers,  Diogenes  Laertius,  translated  by  Yonge; 
Stoics,  Epicureans,  and  Sceptics,  Zeller,  translated  by  Reichel. 

FRANK  SMALLEY. 
SYRACUSE  UNIVERSITY, 
September,  1892. 


(UNIVERSITY 


INTRODUCTION. 


I.     THE  TUSCULAN  DISPUTATIONS. 

Cicero  tells  us  in  the  first  book  that  the  five  books  of  the  Tusculan 
Disputations  are  the  record  of  the  five  days  discussion  of  philo- 
sophic questions  at  his  Tusculan  villa  (whence  the  name),  each  book 
representing  the  discussion  of  a  day.  The  questions  considered  have 
a  practical  application  to  life,  and  the  treatise  is  a  contribution  to 
moral  philosophy.  It  was  begun  in  the  year  45  B.  C.  and  finished 
the  following  year.  The  form  of  each  book  is  that  of  a  dialogue — 
not  as  in  his  other  works,  between  equals — but  one  of  his  pupils  or 
friends  suggests  a  thesis  and  briefly  attempts  to  maintain  it,  after 
which  Cicero,  having  refuted  his  views,  proceeds  almost  without 
interruption  to  discuss  the  topic  at  length.  The  popular  method  of 
presentation,  the  easy  flow  of  thought,  and  above  all  the  elevated 
and  noble  moral  tone  combine  to  delight  the  reader.  However  it 
must  be  admitted  that  there  is  a  weakness  in  his  arguments  and  a 
lack  of  keenness  in  his  logic  compared  with  the  dialectic  of  Plato 
which  is  his  model.  "  The  Tusculan  Disputations  is  a  work  of  des- 
pair. When  Cicero  wrote  them,  Italy  was  given  over  to  Caesar  and 
the  host  of  tribunes  and  centurions  who  had  conquered  license  in 
his  train.  Everything  but  good  conscience  seemed  lost  beyond 
recovery;  and  Cicero  strove  to  convince  himself,  in  convincing  the 
young  yet  uncorrupted  by  the  world,  that  to  keep  a  good  conscience 
through  everything  is  enough,  and  more  than  enough;  that  to  know 
this  is  our  main  concern;  and  that  glory  and  success  and  all  exter- 
nals are  so  secondary  that  the  inquiry  as  to  whether  they  add  any- 
thing more  or  less  to  virtue  only  serves  curiosity,  if,  indeed,  it  does 
not  lower  courage.  Even  the  style  is  affected  by  the  reckless  earn- 
estness of  the  writer,  and  becomes  more  animated  and  pathetic,  and 
at  the  same  time  less  pure."  The  above  quotation  from  Simcox 
states  the  circumstances  under  which  the  work  was  composed  and 
partially  sets  forth  the  object  the  author  had  in  view.  More  specif- 


ically,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  great  object  was  to  assure  himself 
and  his  readers  that  amidst  all  the  evils  of  life  (I  use  the  expression 
in  its  popular  sense)  there  is  one  secure  refuge — namely,  virtue,  and 
that  virtue  insures  happiness  under  all  circumstances.  Man  has  thus 
in  his  own  power  all  that  is  necessary  for  happiness. 

The  first  book  speaks  of  the  proper  attitude  toward  death,  holding 
that  it  is  not  an  evil,  and  is  to  be  looked  upon  with  indifference  if 
not  actually  regarded  as  a  blessing ;  the  second  book  teaches  us  that 
bodily  pain,  although  an  evil,  can  be  overcome  by  the  exercise  of 
reason  and  self-control ;  the  third  book  refutes  the  proposition  that 
the  wise  man  is  subject  to  grief  or  sorrow.  Cicero  says:  "  Your 
question  was  concerning  a  wise  man,  with  whom  nothing  can  have 
the  appearance  of  evil,  that  is  not  dishonorable ;  or  at  least  anything 
else  would  seem  so  small  an  evil,  that  by  his  wisdom  he  would  so 
overmatch  it,  as  to  make  it  wholly  disappear."  The  fourth  book  has 
reference  to  other  emotions  or  passions  of  the  mind,  the  thesis  being 
thus  stated:  "Non  omni  animi  perturbations  sapiens  potest  vacare" 
This  is  refuted  on  the  Stoic  principle  that  no  man  can  be  called 
virtuous  who  has  not  gotten  rid  of  all  emotions  or  passions,  or  the 
beliefs  which  give  rise  to  these  irrational  impulses.  "  But  certainly 
the  most  effectual  cure  is  to  be  achieved  by  showing  that  all  per- 
turbations are  of  themselves  vicious,  and  have  nothing  natural  or 
necessary  in  them."  The  fifth  book  maintains  that  virtue  in  itself 
is  sufficient  to  insure  a  happy  life,  which  is  related  to  the  thesis  of 
the  preceding  books  as  the  universal  to  the  particular,  the  contain- 
ing to  the  contained.  It  is  a  comprehensive  statement  of  a  general 
proposition  involving  all  the  questions  that  were  proposed,  discussed 
and  settled  in  harmony  with  it  in  the  preceding  books.  This  book 
is  justly  regarded  as  the  most  pleasing  and  attractive  of  the  five. 


II.     ARGUMENT  OF  BOOK  V. 

The  first  four  chapters  are  introductory.  Reference  is  made  to 
the  opinion  of  Brutus  that  virtue  is  sufficient  of  itself  to  insure  a 
happy  life — a  truth  of  the  highest  importance,  but  one  which  the 
infirmity  of  human  nature  leads  him  sometimes  to  distrust,  until,  by 
reflection  on  the  power  of  virtue,  he  corrects  his  judgment,  (i).  Philo- 
sophy here  must  be  our  guide;  whereupon  he  breaks  into  an  enthu- 
siastic panegyric  of  philosophy,  which  is  praised  as  of  the  utmost 
service  to  men,  but  which  is  even  maligned  by  some  who  do  not 
realize  its  value  and  antiquity,  (2).  A  brief  summary  of  the  earliest 
philosophy,  especially  of  the  wise  men  of  antiquity,  follows — extend- 
ing down  to  Pythagoras  who  invented  the  term  philosopeer,  whom 
he  (Pythagoras)  compared  to  the  spectators  at  the  Grecian  games, 
thus  earnestly  contemplating  nature,  (3).  Philosophy  before  the 
time  of  Socrates  was  mostly  natural  philosophy.  Socrates  applied 
it  to  life  and  morals.  Many  sects  followed.  The  Socratic  method 
will  be  pursued,  (4)  The  Auditor  says  that  virtue  does  not  seem  to 
him  sufficient  to  insure  a  happy  life,  and  maintains  that  thesis  by 
declaring  that,  while  virtue  may  exist  under  torture  and  on  the  rack, 
happiness  cannot,  (5).  Reference  is  made  by  M.  (Magister?)  to  the 
conclusions  of  the  preceding  books  which  quite  seem  to  settle  the 
question ;  for  if  virtue  has  fortune  in  her  power,  and  is  beyond  the 
reach  of  fear  and  anxiety,  desire  and  vain  joy,  it  must  insure  happi- 
ness, (6).  A.  is  convinced  of  his  error;  notwithstanding,  M.  pro- 
ceeds, saying  that,  while  mathematicians  prove  a  point  and  then 
leave  it,  philosophers  are  accustomed  to  discuss  such  points  separ- 
ately; and  this  is  a  very  important  point,  for  philosophy  promises  to 
make  man  forever  happy,  (7).  The  inconsistency  of  the  Academics, 
especially  of  Antiochus,  is  pointed  out,  who  holds  that  virtue  of 
itself  can  make  happy  but  not  perfectly  happy;  that  things  are  esti- 
mated from  there  predominant  constituent;  and  that  there  are  three 
classes  of  evils,  and  that  one  can  be  happy  even  under  evil,  (8).  The 
Peripatetics  (Theophrastus)  reason  consistently,  but  from  wrong 


8 

premises.  They  hold  to  three  kinds  of  goods  (and  corresponding 
evils)  and  that  evil  may  befall  a  good  man,  destroying  happiness. 
Epicurus  is  blamed  for  commending  temperance  and  at  the  same 
time  making  pleasure  the  chief  good,  and  for  defying  fortune  while 
regarding  pain  as  the  sole  or  greatest  evil,  (9).  Happiness  must  be 
absolute  enjoyment  of  good  without  any  evil ;  so  virtue,  as  indis- 
pensable to  happiness,  must  be  the  only  good.  Otherwise  the  evils 
corresponding  to  goods — as  pain,  poverty,  etc.,  might  befall  the  good 
or  wise  man,  and  if  regarded  as  evils  be  inconsistent  with  happiness. 
Aristotle  and  the  Academics  cannot  be  permitted  to  say  that  a  wise 
man  is  always  happy  and  at  the  same  time  hold  their  view  of  evils, 
nor  can  Epicurus  with  his  view  of  pain,  (10).  Cicero  had  endeavored 
to  show  in  the  fourth  book  de  Finibus,  that  the  difference  between 
the  Stoics  and  the  Peripatetics  on  this  subject  is  one  of  words  only, 
and  justifies  his  inconsistency  on  the  ground  of  adherence  to  the 
Academy.  The  question  here  is,  admitting  that  virtue  is  the  only 
good,  is  it  alone  sufficient  for  a  happy  life,  (n).  And  this  doctrine 
is  due  to  Plato  and  before  him  to  Socrates.  Plato  in  the  speech  of 
Pericles  says  that  the  happy  man  is  unaffected  by  externals,  has  con- 
trol of  his  passions,  and  is  entirely  dependent  on  himself,  (12). 
Beginning  with  nature  it  is  shown  that  every  creature  (plant  or 
animal)  is  designed  to  reach  its  perfect  development,  the  animal  in 
a  higher  sphere  than  the  plant,  and  man,  endowed  with  reason,  in 
the  highest  sphere — that  of  reason  which  is  identical  with  virtue ; 
and,  as  whatever  lacks  nothing  is  happy,  virtue  in  man  implies  hap- 
piness. Brutus,  Aristotle  and  the  Old  Academy  believe  this,  (13). 
But  Cicero  holds  more,  namely,  that  it  implies  complete  happiness. 
Those  who  make  three  classes  of  goods  must  be  in  doubt,  as  being 
dependent  on  unreliable  goods.  The  happy  man  must  be  free  from 
all  apprehension  of  the  loss  of  that  which  makes  happy,  and  of  all 
fear.  Courage  that  admits  any  fear  is  not  true  courage.  Add  to 
courage  self-control,  and  what  can  be  wanting  to  happiness  ?  (14). 
The  wise  man  regards  grief  and  fear  as  arising  from  imagined  evils, 
and  pleasure  and  desire  from  imagined  goods — and  all  opposed  to 
reason.  He  is  happy  because  unaffected  by  them.  The  true  good 
produces  joy,  and  is  honorable,  (i.  e.  morally  good).  The  honorable 
alone  is  good,  so  that  honesty  (moral  goodness)  alone  makes  a 
happy  life.  These  cannot  be  goods  of  which  one  may  have  an 


abundance,  as  of  wealth,  honors,  etc.,  and  yet  be  unhappy.  Take 
away  the  morally  good  (honestum)  and  you  take  away  happi- 
ness. The  honorable  is  again  defined  as  the  only  good;  if  not  such, 
many  other  things  are  entitled  to  be  called  goods,  (15).  Nothing 
external  can  be  called  a  good  in  the  true  sense.  The  Stoics  give  the 
designation  preferred  to  some  of  the  so-called  goods  of  others,  but 
do  not,  as  others  do,  regard  them  as  essential  to  happiness,  or  to  the 
greatest  happiness.  An  argument  from  Socrates  is  introduced  which 
is  based  on  the  harmony  of  a  man's  life  with  his  mental  disposition. 
If  his  disposition  is  morally  good  his  life  will  be  the  same  and  there- 
fore happy.  Then  follows  a  resume  of  arguments  witli  the  con- 
clusion that  a  happy  life  is  consequent  on  virtue,  (16).  A  com- 
parison between  a  happy  antf  an  unhappy  life  is  made  and  leads  to 
the  result  that  only  the  happy  life  can  have  a  praiseworthy  char- 
acter, and  must  therefore  be  virtuous.  Finally  the  conclusion  is 
reached  by  a  comparison  of  vice  with  virtue,  that  as  the  former  ren- 
ders life  miserable,  the  latter  must  render  it  happy,  (17).  The  reality 
of  the  Stoic's  proof  is  again  briefly  summarized,  (18);  and  for  the 
confirmation  of  the  same  a  number  of  examples  of  virtuous  and  of 
wicked  statesmen  are  presented,  (19,  20,  21,  22,  23-);  also  several 
philosophers  are  mentioned,  and  finally  the  activity  and  the  happi- 
ness of  the  wise  man  is  pictured  in  detail,  (-23,  24,  25).  Then  fol- 
lows a  refutation  of  the  objections  which  seem  to  have  some  force 
against  the  Stoic  view  that  virtue  is  able  to  produce  a  happy  life, 
and  since  the  view  that  pain  is  an  evil  is  the  strongest  argument  that 
threatens  the  proof  of  that  proposition,  Cicero  reminds  us  that  even 
Epicurus  asserts  that  he  can  be  happy  in  spite  of  the  most  intense 
sufferings,  and  a  number  of  facts  and  illustrations  to  the  same  affect 
are  cited,  (26,  27,  28,  29-).  Cicero  takes  advantage  of  his  agnosticism 
to  show  a  spirit  of  fair  dealing  with  all  views  and  to  show  that,  how- 
ever they  differ,  virtue  is  still  able  to  insure  a  happy  life.  Various 
opinions  of  the  good  are  enumerated  and  some  of  them  discussed. 
He  comes  back  again  to  the  question  of  pain,  and,  in  connection 
with  it,  of  death;  pain  cannot  destroy  happiness  for  the  Peripatetics 
or  even  the  Epicureans,  (-29,  30,  31).  Poverty — twin  of  pain — is 
next  discussed  and  Epicurus  commended.  He  shows  how  easily 
poverty  is  endured  by  others  as  well  as  by  the  Stoics,  (32,  34,  35). 
And  amid  these  illustrations  are  set  forth  the  practical  directions  of 


F 


10 


Epicurus  concerning  the  striving  for  pleasure,  (33).  Obscurity  also 
and  unpopularity  cannot  prevent  a  wise  man  from  being  happy,  (36); 
nor  can  banishment,  (37).  The  same  is  true  of  all  griefs  and  anxie- 
ties, of  blindness,  and  deafness,  which  afflictions  are  not  to  be  con- 
sidered in  comparison  with  the  many  pleasures  of  life  which  are  at 
the  command  of  the  wise  man.  But  let  all  these  misfortunes  meet 
in  one  person,  together  with  acute  bodily  pain,  still  he  may  escape 
by  a  voluntary  death,  (38,  39,  40).  If  those  philosophers  who  hold 
the  honorable  and  laudable  as  of  no  value  can  maintain  that  the  wise 
man  is  always  happy,  what  must  be  the  case  with  philosophers  who 
derive  from  Socrates  and  Plato  ?  All  come  so  near  together  on  this 
question  that  Cicero  expresses  his  gratification  that  it  is  thus  satis- 
factorily solved,  and  he  closes  with  the  remark  that  he  can  best  alle- 
viate his  own  afflictions  by  devoting  his  leisure  to  philosophical  study 
and  composition,  (41). 

For  a  less  detailed  analysis,  see  Klotz's  Argumentum  in  the  Teub- 
ner  text  or  in  Harper's. 


III.     A  BRIEF  VIEW  OF  GREEK  AND  ROMAN  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  earliest  philosophy  was  a  natural  philosophy.  It  concerned 
itself  with  the  problem  of  nature  and  the  universe,  and  the  individual 
was  lost  sight  of  in  the  study  of  the  universal.  It  was  not  until  the 
Sophists  appeared  that  thought  was  directed  to  man  instead  of 
nature,  and  philosophy  became  subjective.  The  Sophists  were  not 
philosophers  in  the  highest  sense.  They  were  rhetoricians  and  gram- 
marians and  teachers  of  youth,  the  professors  of  the  "  higher  educa- 
tion," and  of  u  practical  "  philosophy.  However,  they  did  speculate 
on  the  nature  of  human  volition  and  thought,  and  thus  prepared  the 
way  for  a  profounder  study  of  man,  for  ethics  and  a  better  dialectic. 
There  was  need  of  a  great  genius  to  rescue  philosophy  from  the 
chaos  into  which  it  had  fallen  by  the  study  of  nature  and  the  per- 
versions of  the  Sophists,  to  take  up  and  extend  the  principle  of  sub- 
jectivism introduced  by  the  latter,  and  to  consider  man  in  his  uni- 
versal as  well  as  his  individual  nature;  to  maintain  the  certainty  of 
moral  distinctions,  and  establish  a  scientific  method  for  detecting 
error  and  determining  truth;  in  a  word,  to  recognize,  through  the 
laws  of  thinking  and  moral  willing,  the  relation  of  man  to  the  objec- 
tive world.  Such  a  genius  appeared  in  Socrates,  and  although  he 
wrote  no  treatise,  and  did  not  profess  to  teach,  but  simply  to  stimu- 
late thought  by  means  of  keen  questioning,  he  marks  an  era  in 
philosophy. 

(a)      ETHICAL    TEACHINGS   OF    SOCRATES. 

SOCRATES  was  the  father  of  moral  philosophy.  It  is  true  there 
had  been  some  ethical  speculations  by  the  natural  philosophers,  par- 
ticularly by  Anaxagoras,  by  Democritus,  and  by  the  Sophists,  but  it 
was  left  for  Socrates  to  investigate  the  law  of  conduct.  He  did  not 
build  up  a  system  of  ethics,  his  efforts  being  limited  to  testing  men 
and  leading  them  to  rigorous  self-examination.  "  The  fundamental 

conception    of  Socrates   was the  inseparable  union  of 

theoretical  insight  with  practical  moral  excellence."  And  so  virtue 
is  knowledge,  and  vice  is  ignorance.  No  man  willingly  sins,  but 
only  as  the  result  of  ignorance,  for  every  man  desires  happiness  and 
the  only  road  to  happiness  is  through  virtue,  while  knowledge 
(scientific  knowledge,  wisdom)  is  the  sole  condition  to  virtue.  "  To 


12 

do  wrong  wittingly  is  better  than  to  do  right  ignorantly.  Character 
and  deliberate  choice,  consequently,  were  not  regarded  by  Socrates 
as  elements  of  virtue."  Virtue  is  the  necessary  result  of  knowledge, 
If  a  man  is  virtuous  he  is  realizing  what  is  best  and  truest  in  himself, 
he  is  fulfilling  what  is  best  and  truest  without  himself;  he  "has  come 
to  a  knowledge  evidencing  itself  in  works  expressive  of  the  law  that 
is  in  him,  as  he  is  in  it."  "  Therefore  the  law  of  virtuous  growth  is 
expressed  in  the  maxim  'know  thyself;  that  is,  realize  thyself;  by 
obedience  and  self-control  come  to  your  full  stature."  Virtue  can 
be  taught,  because  knowledge  can  be  acquired,  and  further,  because 
of  this  unity  of  virtue  and  knowledge  the  virtues  are  one,  having  a 
common  essence  in  wisdom.  Thus  temperance,  friendship,  courage, 
justice  and  piety  are  only  different  expressions  of  wisdom.  The 
Good  is  the  highest  object  of  knowledge.  It  is  a  condition  like  the 
gods  to  have  no  wants,  and  the  less  one  wants  the  nearer  he  comes 
to  this  ideal.  External  goods  confer  no  advantage.  Socrates  re- 
garded physical  speculation  as  unprofitable  and  even  impious,  but 
pious  conduct  was  the  just  due  of  Deity,  because  of  his  care  for  men 
and  his  manifested  wisdom.  He  believed  in  an  omnipotent  and 
invisible  Supreme  Being  who  rules  the  universe. 

The  greatest  of  the  disciples  of  Socrates  was  Plato.  There  were, 
however,  several  others  termed  the  Lesser  Socratics,  who  founded 
schools,  each  mainly  characterized  by  some  particular  feature  of  the 
Sbcratic  teachings.  Of  these,  two  treated  chiefly  of  ethical  questions, 
namely,  the  Cynic  and  the  Cyrenaic  Schools. 

(b)       THE    CYNICS.       SEE    IX.    26,    NOTE. 

ANTISTHENES,  the  founder  of  the  Cynic  school,  had  been  a  pupil 
of  Gorgias  the  Sophist,  before  coming  to  Socrates.  It  is  a  question 
whether  the  name  of  the  school  was  derived  from  a  gymnasium — 
The  Cynosarges — where  Antistheries  taught,  or  from  xvwxoz,  dog- 
gish, from  their  churlish  manners.  The  Cynics  were  the  ascetics  of 
philosophy,  and  they  magnified  the  Socratic  principle  of  self-control 
and  superiority  to  appetite.  Virtue  is  the  only  good,  vice  the  only 
evil.  Everything  else  is  indifferent.  "Virtue  is  wisdom  and  the 
wise  man  is  always  perfectly  happy  because  he  is  self-sufficient  and 
has  no  wants,  no  ties  and  no  weaknesses."  The  Cynic  aimed  at 
liberty  through  self-denial.  He  did  not  however  despise  all  pleas- 


13 

ures  as  Anthisthenes  shows  in  these  remarks,  "when  I  wish  a  treat  I 
do  not  go  and  buy  it  at  great  cost  in  the  market  place;  I  find  iny 
storehouse  of  pleasures  in  the  soul;"  and,  "follow  the  pleasures  that 
come  after  pains,  not  those  which  bring  pains  in  their  train."  He 
sought  to  train  body  and  mind  so  as  to  attain  independence,  and  so 
that  the  very  refusal  of  pleasure  would  be  itself  a  pleasure.  Virtue 
was  declared  to  be  teachable  and  when  once  acquired  could  never 
be  lost.  Believing  civilization  corrupt  he  sought  to  return  to  a  state 
of  nature,  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  world  in  distinction  from  exist- 
ing society.  His  ideal  is  then  expressed  in  the  words,  liberty,  free- 
speech  and  independence.  This  resulted  in  boorishness,  indecency, 
shabbiness  of  dress,  insolence,  and  ostentatious  asceticism.  Hegel 
truly  says,  "  The  Cynics  excluded  themselves  from  the  sphere  in 
which  is  true  freedom."  The  most  famous  of  the  Cynics  was  Dio- 
genes of  Sinope.  He  is  described  as  "conceited,  scurrilous,  witty,  a 
caricature  of  Socrates,  sleeping  in  porticoes,  coarsely  and  scantily 
clad,  living  on  the  rudest  fare,  drinking  water  from  the  palm  of  his 
hand,  violating  all  rules  of  decency,  railing  at  whatever  and  whom- 
ever he  whimsically  conceived  a  dislike  to  ;  an  admired,  privileged 
*  Dog'  indeed."  All  this  excess  came  from  the  exaggeration  of  prin- 
ciples in  themselves  good,  the  superiority  of  man  to  his  environment, 
simplicity  of  life,  frankness  and  sincerity  in  speech. 
Stoicism  with  its  mental  culture  was  indebted  to  cynicism. 

(c)       THE    CYRENAICS. 

ARISTIPPUS  of  Cyrene  founded  the  Cyrenaic  School.  Although  of 
a  luxurious  city  and  possessed  of  wealth  and  fond  of  good  living,  he 
was  attracted  by  Socrates  and  became  his  disciple.  His  means  and 
social  condition  naturally  affected  his  views.  The  Socratic  doctrine 
of  self-control  was  capable  of  interpretations  that  might  lead  to  very 
diverse  results  in  the  practical  conduct  of  life.  Antisthenes  and  the 
Cynics,  as  we  have  seen,  interpreted  and  applied  it  in  practice  with 
the  result  of  taking  pleasure  in  the  very  denial  of  pleasure  and  in  a 
severely  ascetic  mode  of  life.  And  to  some  extent  they  had  the 
example  of  Socrates  to  plead  in  favor  of  their  practice.  On  the 
other  hand  Socrates  did  sometimes  go  to  great  lengths  in  convivial 
indulgence,  never,  however,  losing  self-control.  Pleasure  and  self- 
control,  with  the  emphasis  on  the  first,  was  the  fundamental  ethical 


14 

principle  of  Aristippus.  "  The  Socratic  element  in  the  doctrine  of 
Aristippus  appears  in  the  principle  of  self-determination  directed  by 
knowledge,  and  in  the  control  of  pleasure  as  a  thing  to  be  acquired 
through  knowledge  and  culture." 

The  Cyrenaics  first  gave  prominence  to  a  phrase  much  used  later, 
namely,  the  end  of  existence,  meaning  by  it  that  which  is  good  in  and 
for  itself,  and  not  as  a  means  to  anything  else,  and  in  fact,  "  sums  up 
the  good  in  existence."  With  them  the  end  oi  life  is  pleasure;  hence 
the  term  Hedonism  (from  -fjdovr],  pleasure)  often  applied  to  the  school. 
The  pleasure  meant  is  the  pleasure  of  each  moment,  with  little  regard 
for  the  past  or  the  future,  the  present  only  being  in  our  power. 
Virtue, — the  good, — and  pleasure  are  identical.  The  wise  man  is 
therefore  the  man  who  enjoys  pleasure  but  keeps  it  under  his  con- 
trol; but  wisdom — intellectual  culture — is  essential  to  this  enjoy- 
ment. The  sage  is  subject  to  grief  and  fear.  He  is  not  always 
happy.  All  pleasures  as  such  are  good  and  equally  desirable, 
whether  arising  from  a  good  or  bad  cause  or  source.  "  Duration 
and  degree  determines  their  worth."  Pleasure  is  defined  as  a  gentle 
motion,  "  a  tranquil  activity  of  the  being,  like  the  gently  heaving  sea, 
midway  between  violent  motion  which  was  pain  and  absolute  calm 
which  was  insensibility."  It  was  not  mere  absence  of  pain,  but 
something  positive. 

The  criterion  of  truth  for  each  man  is  his  feeling  of  the  moment. 
There  is  therefore  no  common  criterion  of  good  or  truth.  Although 
we  may  use  the  same  words  the  thing  indicated  will  vary  with  each 
man.  This  is  like  the  teaching  of  the  Sophist  Protagoras. 

Aristippus  is  said  to  have  been  much  at  the  courts  of  the  Dionysii 
— the  elder  and  the  younger, — at  Syracuse,  and  to  have  met  Plato  at 
both.  Arete,  the  daughter  of  Aristippus,  was  among  his  prominent 
disciples,  and  her  son,  the  younger  Aristippus,  was  of  great  service  to 
the  school  by  giving  it  systematic  form.  Modification  of  the  doc- 
trines came  through  the  discovery  of  their  incompatibility.  For 
what  consistency  is  there  in  holding  that  the  pleasure  of  the  moment 
is  the  highest  good,  and  at  the  same  time  that  the  wise  man  controls 
pleasure  and  is  not  controlled  by  it  ?  Too  much  scope  is  thus  given 
to  external  circumstances,  too  little  to  wisdom.  Nearly  a  century 
after  Aristippus,  therefore,  Theodorus,  the  Atheist,  substituted  for 
the  passing  pleasure,  which  he  held  to  be  indifferent,*"  a  calm  and 


cheerful  frame  of  mind."  See  I.  XLIII.  102;  V.  XL.  117.  Euhem- 
erus,  the  Rationalist,  taught  that  "  belief  in  the  existence  of  gods, 
began  with  the  veneration  of  distinguished  men."  Hegesias,  con- 
vinced that  there  is  more  pain  than  pleasure  in  life,  held  that  the 
highest  good  is  to  avoid  trouble;  "he  despaired  of  positive  happiness 
and  considered  life  to  be  intrinsically  valueless,"  which  comes  near 
to  the  conclusions  of  the  Cynics.  I.  XXXIV.  83. 

(d)     PLATO. 

PLATO.  The  Platonic  Ethics  are  so  related  to  his  Theory  of 
Ideas  that  a  brief  statement  of  that  theory  is  necessary.  Aristotle 
states  that  Plato's  mind  was  influenced,  first,  by  the  Heraclitean 
doctrine  of  the  constant  flux*br  flow  of  things  in  the  Universe  and 
the  conclusion  from  this  that  there  can  be  no  absolute  knowledge; 
and  second,  by  Socrates'  perpetually  searching  for  definition,  and,  in 
his  ethical  inquiries,  always  seeking  for  universals.  Plato  accepted 
the  view  that  there  must  be  conceptions  that  are  ever  invariable  and 
he  reasoned  that  these  could  not  belong  to  the  objects  of  sense,  be- 
cause these  are  constantly  changing,  but  to  another  kind  of  existence. 
Thus  he  conceives  "of  universals  as  forms  or  ideas  of  real  existences." 
Any  concrete  object,  for  example,  as  a  book,  affords  us  a  passing 
sensation  merely,  but  we  may  rise  by  abstraction  to  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  ideal  of  book  which  is  a  universal.  [It  was  with  reference 
to  this  doctrine  that  Antisthenes  remarked,  "O  Plato,  I  see  horses, 
but  no  horseness."  Whereupon  Plato  replied  that  it  was  because 
he  had  no  eye  for  it.]  "If  we  approach  the  Ideal  from  below,  from 
the  concrete  particulars,  it  takes  the  form  of  the  class,  the  common 
name,  the  definition,  the  concept,  the  Idea;  but  this  is  an  incomplete 
view  of  it.  The  Ideal  exists  apart  from,  and  prior  to,  all  concrete 
embodiment.  It  is  the  eternal  archetype  of  which  the  sensible 
objects  are  the  copies.  It  is  because  the  soul  in  its  pre-existent 
state  is  already  familiar  with  this  archetype,  that  it  is  capable  of 
being  reminded  of  it  when  it  sees  its  shadow  in  the  phenomenal 
existences  which  make  up  the  world  of  sense."  The  highest  of  all 
the  Ideas  is  the  Idea  of  the  Good — which  he  identifies  with  God,  the 
first  great  Cause,  the  Supreme  Intelligence.  Further,  he  says,  "The 
soul  is  that  which  most  partakes  of  the  Divine."  It  is  by  virtue  of 
this  that  we  are  capable  of  knowledge.  This  participation  in  the 


i6 

divine  Idea  is  the  connection  between  the  divine  and  the  human 
reason  and  provides  man  with  the  primordial  laws  of  thought  and 
reason.  But  these  Ideas  are  regarded  by  Plato  as  the  archetypes, 
as  "  the  eternal  patterns  to  which  the  artificer  of  the  world  looks  in 
framing  the  world."  Phenomenal  objects  participate  in  Ideas,  and 
thus  in  some  sense  picture  the  world  of  reason.  Ideas  are  noumenal 
entities  corresponding  to  types  or  classes  of  phenomenal  existencies. 
The  idea  of  the  Beautiful,  for  example,  Plato  terms  the  Beautiful 
per  se,  in  distinction  from  beautiful  objects,  and  says  it  is  not  simply 
a  conception,  but  exists  as  a  substance  of  and  by  itself;  and  all 
beautiful  objects  participate  in  it. 

But  all  of  Plato's  philosophy  has  an  ethical  character  and  a  prac- 
tical purpose  as  might  be  expected  of  a  disciple  of  Socrates.  This  is 
seen  in  his  conception  of  the  Idea  of  the  Good  as  the  highest  of  all, 
instead  of  the  Idea  of  Being;  but  the  former  may  be  thought  quite 
as  universal  as  the  latter,  since  every  truly  existent  object  is  neces- 
sarily good.  He  views  perfect  Wisdom  as  identical  with  perfect 
Goodness,  which  is  God,  and  makes  the  highest  good  for  man — the 
summum  bonum — the  supreme  end  of  life, — consist  in  the  greatest 
possible  likeness  to  God.  And  this  likeness  "is  affected  by  that 
yearning  after  the  ideal  which  we  know  by  the  name  of  Love."  God 
is  thus  the  absolutely  good  and  the  cause  and  end  of  all  knowledge. 
"  The  possession  of  the  good  is  happiness.  Happiness  depends  on 
culture  and  justice  or  on  the  possession  of  moral  beauty  and  good- 
ness." In  the  Philebus  Plato  speaks  of  the  Good  as  including 
measure,  beauty,  and  symmetry  as  well  as  "mind,"  "pleasure,"  and 
"  causality." 

Virtue  is  the  fitness  of  the  soul  for  its  proper  duties.  Justice  is 
the  universal  virtue,  and  "  perfect  virtue  arises  when  wisdom,  cour- 
age and  temperance,  (the  other  three  cardinal  virtues),  are  bound 
together  by  justice."  In  the  Republic  he  states  "  that  the  best  and 
justest  man  is  also  the  happiest,  and  that  this  is  he  who  is  the  most 
royal  master  of  himself;  and  that  the  worst  and  most  unjust  man  is 
also  the  most  miserable  and  that  "this  is  he  who  is  the  greatest  tyrant 
of  himself  and  of  his  state." 

It  may  be  well  to  insert  here  a  few  words  on  the  nature  of  the  soul. 

The  soul  is  conceived  by  Plato  to  be  threefold,  the  immortal,  divine, 
rational  part  having  its  seat  in  the  head,  is  united  to  the  mortal  part 


consisting  of  two  portions,  the  courageous,  which  is  located  in  the 
heart,  and  the  appetitive  (desire),  whose  location  is  in  the  lower  part 
of  the  trunk. 

The  indulgence  of  desires  brings  neither  virtue  nor  happiness. 
They  must  be  restrained  to  secure  such  a  result.  Pleasure  results 
from  the  preservation  of  an  inward  harmony,  pain  from  the  lack  of 
harmony. 

The  following  additional  statements  of  Plato's  views  are  from  Dio- 
genes Laertius  :  "There  are  three  classes  of  goods,  viz.  those  of  the 
mind,  those  of  the  body,  and  those  that  are  wholly  external.  The 
four  cardinal  principles  may  be  named  as  of  the  first  class,  health  and 
strength  of  the  second,  friends  and  wealth  of  the  third."  "A  per- 
fectly happy  man  is  one  whose  happiness  consists  of  wisdom  in 
counsel,  a  good  condition  of  the  sensations  and  health  of  body, 
good  fortune,  good  reputation  and  riches."  "  There  are  evils  cor- 
responding to  the  goods  and  a  third  class  which  are  neutral  or  in- 
different." "  On  the  subject  of  good  and  evil,  these  were  his  senti- 
ments:  that  the  end  was  to  become  like  God;  and  that  virtue  was 
sufficient  of  herself  for  happiness,  but  nevertheless  required  the 
advantages  of  the  body  as  instruments  to  work  with;  such  as  health, 
strength,  the  integrity  of  the  senses,  and  things  of  that  kind;  and 
also  external  advantages,  such  as  riches,  and  noble  birth,  and  glory. 
Still  that  the  wise  man  would  be  not  the  less  happy,  even  if  desti- 
tute of  these  auxiliary  circumstances;  for  he  would  enjoy  the  consti- 
tution of  his  country,  and  would  marry,  and  would  not  transgress 
the  established  laws,  and  that  he  would  legislate  for  his  country,  as 
well  as  he  could  under  existing  circumstances,  unless  he  saw  affairs 
in  an  unmanageable  condition,  in  consequence  of  the  excessive 

factiousness  of  the  people And  he  was  the  first  person 

who  defined  the  notion  of  the  honorable,  as  that  which  borders  on 
the  praiseworthy,  and  the  logical,  and  the  useful,  and  the  becoming, 
and  the  expedient,  all  which  things  are  combined  with  that  which  is 
suitable  to,  and  in  accordance  with,  nature." 

(e)       THE    ACADEMIES. 

These  are  distinguished  as  the  Old,  Middle,  and  New  or  Reformed 
Academies,  embracing  five  schools,  viz:  the  Old,  the  first  school; 
the  Middle,  the  second  and  third  schools;  and  the  New,  the  fourth 


i8 

and  fifth  schools.  This  is  the  distinction  made  by  the  later  writers. 
Cicero  recognized  only  the  Old  and  the  New  Academy,  the  latter 
corresponding  to  what  is  here  termed  the  Middle  Academy,  but 
including  Philo.  Antiochus  himself  claimed  to  be  a  true  representa- 
tive of  the  Old  Academy.  Zeller  knows  the  school  of  Arcesilaus 
and  Carneades  as  the  New  Academy.  And  thus  Cicero  may  be 
classed,  in  so  far  as  he  accepts  the  doctrine  of  the  Academy,  as 
belonging  either  to  the  Middle,  or  to  the  New  Academy. 

(i)      The  Old  Academy.     See  X.  30,  Note. 

Speusippus,  Plato's  nephew,  was  his  uncle's  successor  at  the  head 
of  the  Academy.  He  was  followed  by  Xenocrates,  he  by  Polemo, 
and  he  by  Crates.  Other  names  are  Heraclides  of  Pontus,  Hermo- 
dorus  and  Grantor,  to  whose  writings  Cicero  is  indebted  in  his  Con- 
solatio  and  his  Tusculan  Disputations.  Without  treating  of  the 
special  characteristics  of  individual  views,  it  may  be  stated  that  in 
general  the  ethical  theory  of  the  Old  Academy  does  not  depart 
widely  from  that  of  Plato.  While  virtue  is  held  to  be  the  highest 
good  it  requires  the  addition  of  external  goods  to  make  life  agree- 
able, that  is,  to  produce  a  happy  life.  "Follow  nature"  was  a  pre- 
cept of  Xenocrates,  Speusippus  and  Polemo,  was  the  practice  of  the 
Cynics,  and  was  adopted  as  a  Stoic  maxim  but  was  not  uniformly 
interpreted. 

(2)     The  Middle  Academy. 

This  was  sceptical  and  is  discussed  by  Zeller  under  the  head  of 
the  Sceptics.  The  leading  minds  were  Arcesilaus  and  Carneades, 
founders  respectively  of  the  second  and  third  Academic  schools.  In 
respect  to  cognition  they  held  that  knowledge  is  not  attainable  and 
that  probability  is  the  utmost  advance  that  can  be  made  in  the 
direction  of  knowledge.  They  professed  to  follow  the  example  of 
Socrates,  but  complained  that  he  approached  too  near  to  dogmatism 
when  he  said  that  he  knew  that  he  knew  nothing.  Carneades  held 
that  probability  is  of  several  degrees.  "The  lowest  degree  of 
probability  arises  when  a  notion  produces  by  itself  an  impression 
of  truth,  without  being  taken  in  connection  with  other  notions.  The 
next  higher  degree  is  when  that  impression  is  confirmed  by  the 
agreement  of  all  notions  which  are  related  to  it.  The  third  and 


19 

highest  degree  is  when  an  investigation  of  all  these  notions  results 
in  producing  the  same  corroboration  for  all.  In  the  first  case  a 
notion  is  called  probable;  in  the  second  probable  and  undisputed; 
in  the  third,  probable,  undisputed  and  tested."  His  ethical  views 
were  tinctured  by  his  scepticism.  To  understand  his  position  one 
should  first  note  carefully  the  Stoic  views  which  he  combats.  He 
could  not  "  allow  scientific  certainty  to  any  of  the  various  opinions 
respecting  the  nature  and  aim  of  moral  action;  and  in  this  point  he 
attacked  the  Stoics  with  steady  home-thrusts.  Their  inconsistency 
in  calling  the  choice  of  what  is  natural  the  highest  business  of 
morality,  and  yet  not  allowing  to  that  which  is  according  to  nature 
a  place  among  goods,  was  so  trenchantly  exposed  by  him  that  Anti- 
pater  is  said  to  have  been  brought  to  admit  that  not  the  objects  to 
which  choice  is  directed,  but  the  actual  choice  itself  is  a  good." 

"The  real  meaning  of  Carneades  can  only  be  that  virtue  consists 
in  an  activity  directed  towards  the  possession  of  what  is  according 
to  nature,  and  hence  that  it  cannot  as  the  highest  Good  be  separated 
from  accordance  with  nature.  For  the  same  reason,  virtue  supplies 
all  that  is  requisite  for  happiness." 

(3)     The  New  Academy. 

This  was  an  eclectic  school  and  notes  a  return  to  dogmatism. 
Philo  of  Larissa  and  Antiochus  of  Ascalon,  his  pupil,  to  both  of 
whom  Cicero  had  listened,  were  the  founders  respectively  of  the 
fourth  and  fifth  schools.  Both  revert  to  Plato  and  hold  that  truth 
is  attainable.  Antiochus  endeavored  to  show  that  the  principal 
doctrines  of  the  Stoics  are  to  be  found  in  Plato  and  that  there  is 
essential  agreement  between  these  and  Aristotle  as  well. 

Ethics.  "  Starting  with  the  Stoic  prima  naturae,  but  enlarging 
their  scope  so  as  to  take  in  not  only  all  that  belongs  to  self-preserva- 
tion, but  the  rudiments  of  virtue  and  knowledge  also,  and  defining 
the  Summum  Bonum  as  a  life  in  accordance  with  the  perfect  nature 
of  man,  Antiochus  includes  under  this,  not  only  the  perfection  of 
reason,  but  all  bodily  and  external  good.  Virtue  in  itself  suffices  for 
happiness,  as  the  Stoics  said,  but  not  for  the  highest  happiness;  here 
we  must  borrow  a  little  from  the  Peripatetics;  though  they  err  in 
allowing  too  much  weight  to  external  goods,  as  the  Stoics  err  in  the 
opposite  direction." 


2O 
(f)       ARISTOTLE.       SEE  X.  30,  NOTE. 

Our  purpose  requires  only  a  brief  settlement  of  Aristotle's  ethical 
views.  He  rejects  Plato's  idea  of  the  absolute  Good — the  cause  of 
all  existence  and  all  knowledge — and  says,  "If  there  is  any  one  good, 
universal  and  generic,  or  transcendental  and  absolute,  it  obviously 
never  can  be  realized  nor  possessed  by  man  ;  whereas  something  of 
this  latter  kind  is  what  we  are  inquiring  after."  What  he  seeks  to 
know  is  what  is  good  for  man.  Now  the  chief  good  is  identical  with 
"  the  final  and  perfect  end  of  all  action."  The  peculiar  work  or  end 
of  man  is  rational  activity,  because  man  is  a  rational  creature,  and 
such  activity  is  in  harmony  with  his  nature. 

Virtue  is  not  exactly  knowledge  or  science  as  Socrates  taught,  it 
is  rather  an  art  and  is  to  be  attained  by  exercise.  So  man  attains 
good  not  through  knowledge,  but  through  exercise  and  habit.  Aris- 
totle means  by  habit  a  fixed  and  definite  power  or  tendency  of  the 
soul,  a  natural  instinct,  not  simply  a  mode  of  action.  Men  realize 
the  good  through  nature,  reason  and  habit ;  for  we  must  practice 
moral  acts  in  order  to  be  virtuous  as  the  musician  practices  music  in 
order  to  become  skilled. 

The  end  of  the  activity  of  man, — which  is  his  highest  good,  the 
realization  of  the  soul's  peculiar  excellence, — is  happiness,  which 
depends  on  the  continuous  virtuous  and  rational  activity  of  the  soul. 
"Happiness  is  a  perfect  practical  activity  in  a  perfect  life."  But 
complete  happiness  cannot  result  from  virtue  alone ;  it  requires  be- 
sides the  goods  of  the  soul,  the  goods  of  the  body,  as  health, 
strength,  etc.,  external  goods,  as  wealth,  friends,  etc.;  and  pleasures 
as  well.  Vice,  however,  is  sufficient  to  cause  unhappiness  even  if 
bodily  and  external  goods  are  present  in  the  highest  degree. 

Pleasure  is  the  blossom  and  natural  culmination  of  activity.  To 
determine  the  moral  quality  of  pleasure  the  perfect  man  must  be 
the  standard.  That  is  true  pleasure  which  is  pleasure  to  him.  All 
virtues  are  either  intellectual,  resulting  chiefly  from  instruction,  or 
ethical  resulting  from  habit.  The  former  refers  to  the  reason  rightly 
developing  its  own  activities,  and  consists  of  reason,  science,  art  and 
practical  intelligence.  The  ethical  virtues  refer  to  the  subjection 
of  the  lower  functions  to  reason,  and  are  courage,  temperance, 
liberality  and  magnificence,  high-mindedness  and  love  of  honor, 


21 

mildness,  truthfulness,  urbanity  and  friendship  and  justice.  "  Jus- 
tice is  the  most  perfect  virtue  because  it  is  the  perfect  exercise  of 
all  virtue."  The  function  of  the  reason  in  connection  with  the 
desires  is  to  determine  the  mean,  i.  <?.,  the  right  proportion.  For 
example,  courage  is  a  mean  between  fearing  and  daring,  temperance 
between  pleasures  and  pains,  etc. 

We  may  now  give  Aristotle's  definition  of  virtue:  "Virtue  is  habit 
characterized  by  deliberate  choice,  in  the  mean  relative  to  ourselves, 
which  is  fixed  or  determined  by  reason  and  as  the  prudent  man 
would  determine  it."  He  defines  "  deliberative  choice"  as  "  calcu- 
lating choice  exercised  in  regard  to  things  contingent  and  within 
our  power  to  do;"  and  prudence  involved  in  the  expression  "the 
prudent  man,"  as  "moral  irfsight  and  tendency  to  right  action  that 
are  begotten  of  experience  in  acting  justly,  temperately,"  etc. 

(g)       THE    PERIPATETICS. 

Some  of  the  most  eminent  followers  of  Aristotle  were  Theophras- 
tus  of  Lesbus,  Eudemus  of  Rhodes,  Aristoxenus  the  Musician,  and 
Dicotarchus.  We  may  name  also  as  later  Peripatetics  Aristo,  Hiero- 
nymus,  Critolaus,  Diodorus,  Callipho.  See  notes  ix.  24  and  25. 
Theophrastus  was,  for  the  most  part,  faithful  to  the  teachings  of  his 
master,  giving  his  theories,  however,  a  naturalistic  interpretation. 
In  ethics  he  taught  that  external  goods  are  essential  to  perfect 
happiness  and  to  the  cultivation  of  virtue.  The  Stoics  often  re- 
proached him  with  approving  the  poetic  maxim,  vitam  regit  fortuna 
non  sapientia;  See  ix.  25;  but  he  probably  applied  this  only  to 
man's  external  life.  He  thought  that  virtue  is  worthy  to  be  sought 
on  its  own  account,  and  that  in  its  absence  external  goods  are 
valueless;  also  that  one  is  permitted  and  even  required  to  deviate 
slightly  from  the  rules  of  morals,  when  such  deviation  results  in 
securing  a  great  good  to  a  friend  or  warding  off  from  him  a  great 
evil.  For  the  views  Aristoxenus  see  i.  x.  20  ;  of  Dic&archus  I.  x.  21 ; 
xxxi.  77. 

(h)     THE  STOICS.     See  XII.  34. 

The  founder  of  the  school  was  Zeno  of  Citium.  He  was  succeeded 
by  Cleanthes  and  he  by  Chrysippus,  who  is  regarded  as  the  second 
founder  of  the  school.  Other  Stoics  were  Aristo  of  Chios,  Diogenes 
the  Babylonian,  Antipater  of  Tarsus,  Panaetius  of  Rhodes,  who  was 


22 

.the  principal  teacher  of  the  doctrines  at  Rome,  Posidonius  of  Rhodes, 
a  teacher  of  Cicero,  Seneca  the  younger,  and  the  Emperor  Marcus 
Aurelius.  The  Stoics  introduced  little  if  anything  that  was  new 
into  philosophy,  their  Logic  being  a  modification  of  that  of  Aristotle, 
their  Physics  Heraclitean  and  their  Ethics  the  Cynic  Ethics 
elevated.  They  regarded  themselves  as  followers  of  Socrates. 

In  presenting  the  chief  ethical  views  of  the  school  it  will  be  best 
to  quote  from  Zeller  even  at  the  expense  of  space.  "  The  enquiry 
into  the  destiny  and  end  of  man  turns  with  the  Stoics,  as  it  did  with 
all  moral  philosophers  since  the  time  of  Socrates,  about  the  funda- 
mental conception  of  the  good,  and  the  ingredients  necessary  to 
make  up  the  highest  good  or  happiness.  Happiness,  they  consider, 
can  only  be  sought  in  rational  activity  or  virtue.  Speaking  more 
explicitly,  the  primary  impulse  of  every  being  is  towards  self-pres- 
ervation and  self-gratification.  It  follows  that  every  being  pursues 
those  things  which  are  most  suited  to  its  nature,  and  that  such 
things  only  have  for  it  a  value.  Hence  the  highest  good — the  end- 
in-chief,  or  happiness — can  only  be  found  in  what  is  conformable  to 
nature.  Nothing  can  be  conformable  to  nature  for  any  individual 
thing,  unless  it  be  in  harmony  with  the  law  of  the  universe,  or  with 
the  universal  reason  of  the  world ;  nor,  in  the  case  of  a  conscious 
and  reasonable  being,  unless  it  proceeds  from  a  recognition  of  this 
general  law — in  short,  from  rational  intelligence.  In  every  enquiry 
into  what  is  conformable  to  nature,  all  turns  upon  agreement  with 
the  essential  constitution  of  the  being,  and  this  essential  constitution 
consists,  in  the  case  of  a  man,  simply  in  reason.". . . . 

"  In  every  case  the  meaning  is  that  the  life  of  the  individual  approxi- 
mates to  or  falls  short  of  the  goal  of  happiness,  exactly  in  proportion  as 
it  approaches  to  or  departs  from  the  universal  law  of  the  world  and 
the  particular  rational  nature  of  man.  In  a  word,  a  rational  life,  an 
agreement  with  the  general  course  of  the  world,  constitutes  virtue. 
The  principle  of  the  Stoic  morality  might  therefore  be  briefly  ex- 
pressed in  the  sentence:  Only  virtue  is  good,  and  happiness  consists 

exclusively  in  virtue." "A  view  of  life  is  here  presented  to  us  in 

which  happiness  coincides  with  virtue,  the  good  and  the  useful  with 
duty  and  reason.  There  is  neither  any  good  independently  of 
virtue,  nor  is  there  in  virtue  and  for  virtue  any  evil. 

The  Stoics  accordingly  refused  to  admit  the  ordinary  distinction 


23 

sanctioned  by  popular  opinion  and  the  majority  of  philosophers, 
between  various  kinds  and  degrees  of  good  ;  nor  would  they  allow 
bodily  advantages  and  external  circumstances  to  be  included  among 
good  things,  together  with  mental  and  moral  qualities.  A  certain 
difference  between  goods  they  did  not  indeed  deny,  and  various 
kinds  are  mentioned  by  them  in  their  formal  division  of  goods.  But 
these  differences  amount,  in  the  end,  to  no  more  than  this,  that 
whilst  some  goods  are  good  and  useful  in  themselves,  others  are 
only  subsidiary  to  them.  The  existence  of  several  equally  primary 
goods  appears  to  the  Stoics  to  be  at  variance  with  the  conception  of 
the  good.  That  only  is  a  good,  according  to  their  view,  which  has 
an  unconditional  value.  That  which  has  a  value  only  in  comparison 
with  something  else,  or  as  leading  to  something  else,  does  not  de- 
serve to  be  called  a  good.  The  difference  between  what  is  good 
and  what  is  not  good  is  not  only  a  difference  of  degree,  but  also  one 
of  kind  ;  and  what  is  not  a  goodfler  se  can  never  be  a  good  under 
any  circumstances.  The  same  remarks  apply  to  evil.  That  which 
is  not  in  itself  an  evil  can  never  become  so  from  its  relation  to 
something  else.  Hence  only  that  which  is  absolutely  good,  or 
virtue,  can  be  considered  a  good  ;  and  only  that  which  is  absolutely 
bad,  or  vice,  can  be  considered  an  evil.  All  other  things,  however 
great  their  influence  may  be  on  our  state,  belong  to  a  class  of  things 
neither  good  nor  evil,  but  indifferent.  Neither  health,  nor  riches, 
nor  honor,  nor  even  life  itself,  is  a  good  ;  and  just  as  little  are  the 
opposite  states — poverty,  sickness,  disgrace  and  death — evils.  Both 
are  in  themselves  indifferent,  a  material  which  may  either  be  em- 
ployed for  good  or  else  for  evil. 

The  Academicians  and  Peripatetics  were  most  vigorously  attacked 
by  the  Stoics  for  including  among  goods  external  things  which  are 
dependent  on  chance.  For  how  can  that  be  a  good  under  any 
circumstances,  which  bears  no  relation  to  man's  moral  nature,  and 
is  even  frequently  obtained  at  the  cost  of  morality  ?  If  virtue  ren- 
ders a  man  happy,  it  must  render  him  perfectly  happy  in  himself, 
since  no  one  can  be  happy  who  is  not  happy  altogether.  Were  any- 
thing which  is  not  in  man's  power  allowed  to  influence  his  happi- 
ness, it  would  detract  from  the  absolute  worth  of  virtue,  and  man 
would  never  be  able  to  attain  to  that  imperturbable  serenity  of 
mind  without  which  no  happiness  is  conceivable. 


24 

Least  of  all  can  pleasure  be  considered  a  good,  or  be  regarded,  as 
it  was  by  Epicurus,  as  the  ultimate  and  highest  object  in  life.  He 
who  places  pleasure  on  the  throne  makes  a  slave  of  virtue  ;  he  who 
considers  pleasure  a  good  ignores  the  real  conception  of  the  good 
and  the  peculiar  value  of  virtue  ;  he  appeals  to  feelings,  rather  than 
to  actions ;  he  requires  reasonable  creatures  to  pursue  what  is 
unreasonable,  and  souls  nearly  allied  to  God  to  go  after  the  enjoy- 
ments of  the  lower  animals.  Pleasure  must  never  be  the  object  of 
pursuit,  not  even  in  the  sense  that  true  pleasure  is  invariably  in- 
volved in  virtue.  That  it  no  doubt  is.". ..."  The  only  point  on  which 
the  Stoics  are  not  unanimous  is  whether  every  pleasure  is  contrary 
to  nature,  as  the  stern  Cleanthes,  in  the  spirit  of  Cynicism,  asserted, 
or  whether  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  natural  and  desirable  pleasure. 
Virtue,  on  the  other  hand,  needs  no  extraneous  additions,  but  con- 
tains in  itself  all  the  conditions  of  happiness." "  And  so  uncondi- 
tional is  this  self- sufficiency  of  virtue,  that  the  happiness  which  it 
affords  is  not  increased  by  length  of  time.  Rational  self-control  is 
here  recognized  as  the  only  good;  thereby  man  makes  himself 
independent  of  all  external  circumstances,  absolutely  free,  and  in- 
wardly satisfied. 

The  happiness  of  the  virtuous  man — and  this  is  a  very  marked 
feature  in  Stoicism — is  thus  more  negative  than  positive.  It  consists 
in  independence  and  peace  of  mind  rather  than  in  the  enjoyment 
which  moral  conduct  brings  with  it." 

The  cardinal  virtues  are  four  in  number,  viz.:  practical  wisdom, 
courage,  temperance  and  justice,  and  represent  the  principal  aspects 
of  the  one  honestum  or  decorum.  Man  must  overcome  his  emotions 
or  passions  {perturbationes)  in  order  to  be  virtuous.  "  The  Peripa- 
tetic notion,  that  certain  emotions  are  in  accordance  with  nature, 
was  flatly  denied  by  the  Stoics."  Emotions  are  impulses  that  over- 
step natural  limits,  "disturbances  of  mental  health."  Hence  a 
Stoic  demands  their  entire  suppression,  and  only  then  can  virtue 
exist.  The  principal  emotions  are  pleasure  and  pain,  hope  and 
fear.  The  first  two  are  false  beliefs  of  present  good  or  evil,  the  last 
false  beliefs  of  future  good  or  evil. 

"  The  teaching  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  requiring  emotions  to  be 
regulated,  but  not  uprooted,  was  attacked  in  the  most  vigorous 
manner  by  these  philosophers.  A  moderate  evil,  they  say,  always 


25 

remains  an  evil.  What  is  faulty  and  opposed  to  reason,  ought  never 
to  be  tolerated  not  even  in  the  smallest  degree."  The  wise  man 
must  have  no  emotion.  "Pain  he  may  feel,  but,  not  regarding  it 
as  an  evil,  he  will  suffer  no  affliction,  and  know  no  fear.  He  may 
be  slandered  and  ill-treated,  but  he  cannot  be  injured  or  degraded. 
Being  untouched  by  honor  and  dishonor  he  has  no  vanity.  To 
anger  he  never  yields,  nor  needs  this  irrational  impulse,  not  even 
for  valor  and  the  championship  of  right.  But  he  also  feels  no  pity, 
and  exercises  no  indulgence." 

"Virtue  contains  in  itself  two  elements — one  practical  the  other 
speculative.  At  the  root,  and  as  a  condition  of  all  rational  conduct, 
lies,  according  to  the  Stoics,  jight  knowledge.  On  this  point  they 
are  at  one  with  the  well-known  Socratic  doctrine,  and  with  the 
teachings  of  the  Cynics  and  Megarians.  Natural  virtue,  or  virtue 
acquired  only  by  exercise  they  reject  altogether.  After  the  manner 
of  Socrates,  they  define  virtue  as  knowledge,  vice  as  ignorance,  and 
insist  on  the  necessity  of  learning  virtue.  Even  the  avowed  enemy 
of  all  speculative  inquiry,  Aristo  of  Chios,  was  on  this  point  at  one 
with  the  rest  of  the  school. 

However  closely  the  Stoics  cling  to  the  idea  that  all  virtue  is 
based  on  knowledge,  and  is  in  itself  nothing  else  but  knowledge, 
they  are  not  content  with  knowledge,  or  with  placing  knowledge 
above  practical  activity,  as  Plato  and  Aristotle  had  done.  As  we 
have  seen  already,  knowledge  with  them  was  only  a  means  towards 
rational  conduct." 

"  From  what  has  been  said,  it  follows  that  there  can  be  but  one 
thoroughgoing  moral  distinction  for  all  mankind,  the  distinction 
between  the  virtuous  and  the  vicious ;  and  that  within  each  of 
these  classes  there  can  be  no  difference  in  degree.  He  who  possesses 
virtue  possesses  it  whole  and  entire ;  he  who  lacks  it  lacks  it  alto- 
gether ;  and  whether  he  is  near  or  far  from  possessing  it  is  a  matter 

of  no  moment." "  The  whole  of  mankind  are  thus  divided  by  the 

Stoics  into  two  classes — those  who  are  wise  and  those  who  are  fool- 
ish ;  and  these  two  classes  are  treated  by  them  as  mutually  exclu- 
sive, each  one  being  complete  in  itself.  Among  the  wise  no  folly, 
among  the  foolish  no  wisdom  of  any  kind,  is  possible.  The  wise 
man  is  absolutely  free  from  faults  and  mistakes  :  all  that  he  does  is 
right ;  in  him  all  virtues  center ;  he  has  a  right  opinion  on  every 


26 

subject  and  never  a  wrong  one,  nor,  indeed,  ever  what  is  merely  an 
opinion.  The  bad  man,  on  the  contrary,  can  do  nothing  aright ;  he 
has  every  kind  of  vice  ;  he  has  no  right  knowledge,  and  is  altogether 
rude,  violent,  cruel  and  ungrateful.". .  .  ."The  wise  man  only  is  free, 
because  he  only  uses  his  will  to  control  himself  ;  he  only  is  beauti- 
ful, because  only  virtue  is  beautiful  and  attractive  ;  he  only  is  rich 
and  happy,  because  goods  of  the  soul  are  the  most  valuable,  true 
riches  consisting  in  being  independent  of  wants.  Nay  more,  he  is 
absolutely  rich,  since  he  who  has  a  right  view  of  everything  has 
everything  in  his  intellectual  treasury,  and  he  who  makes  the  right 
use  of  everything  bears  to  everything  the  relation  of  owner.  The 
wise  only  know  how  to  obey,  and  they  also  only  know  how  to  gov- 
ern ;  they  only  are  therefore  kings,  generals,  pilots  ;  they  only  are 
orators,  poets  and  prophets  ;  and  since  their  view  of  the  Gods  and 
their  worship  of  the  Gods  is  the  true  one,  only  amongst  them  can 
true  piety  be  found — they  are  the  only  priests  and  friends  of  heaven  ; 
all  foolish  men,  on  the  contrary,  are  impious,  profane  and  enemies 
of  the  Gods.  Only  the  wise  man  is  capable  of  feeling  gratitude, 
love  and  friendship,  he  only  is  capable  of  receiving  a  benefit,  noth- 
ing being  of  use  or  advantage  to  the  foolish  man.  To  sum  up,  the 
wise  man  is  absolutely  perfect,  absolutely  free  from  passion  and 
want,  absolutely  happy ;  as  the  Stoics  conclusively  assert,  he  in  no 
way  falls  short  of  the  happiness  of  Zeus,  since  time,  the  only  point 
in  which  he  differs  from  Zeus,  does  not  augment  happiness  at  all. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  foolish  man  is  altogether  foolish,  unhappy 
and  perverse ;  or,  in  the  expressive  language  of  the  Stoics,  every 
foolish  man  is  a  madman,  he  being  a  madman  who  has  no 
knowledge  of  himself,  nor  of  what  most  closely  affects  him," 

While  the  Stoics  did  not  agree  with  Aristotle  that  anything  is  to 
be  added  to  virtue  to  constitute  happiness  or  the  highest  good,  they 
did  make  a  distinction  respecting  goods.  All  things  are  good,  bad 
or  indifferent.  The  bad  are  the  opposite  of  the  virtues,  as  folly, 
intemperance,  cowardice,  injustice ;  all  others  are  indifferent. 
Among  these  last  some  are  to  be  preferred  as  having  comparative 
value,  and  were  termed  producta  or  praeposita,  viz.,  such  as  the 
primary  objects  of  our  natural  instincts  (prima  naturae),  as  health, 
position,  wealth  ;  their  opposites  being  reiecta.  A  similar  distinc- 


27 

tion  is  made  between  actions.  As  life  belongs  to  the  class  of  things 
indifferent  suicide  is  permissible  as  a  means  of  terminating  it. 

"  Thus  the  Stoics  worked  out  on  ideal  and  absolute  lines  the 
thought  of  righteousness  as  the  chief  and  only  good.  Across  this 
ideal  picture  were  continually  being  drawn  by  opponents  without  or 
inquirers  within  clouds  of  difficulty  drawn  from  real  experience. 
'What,' it  was  asked,  '  of  progress  in  goodness?  Is  this  a  middle 
state  between  good  and  evil ;  or  if  a  middle  state  between  good  and 
evil  be  a  contradiction  in  terms,  how  may  we  characterize  it  ?'  Here 
the  wiser  teachers  had  to  be  content  to  answer  that  it  tended 
towards  good,  was  good  in  possibility,  would  be  absolutely  good 
when  the  full  attainment  cam.e,  and  the  straining  after  right  had 
been  swallowed  up  in  the  perfect  calm  of  settled  virtue. 

4  How  also  of  the  wise  man  tormented  by  pain,  or  in  hunger  and 
poverty  and  rags,  is  his  perfectness  of  wisdom  and  goodness  really 
sufficient  to  make  him  happy  ?'  Here,  again,  the  answer  had  to  be 
hesitating  and  provisional,  through  no  fault  of  the  Stoics.  In  this 
world,  while  we  are  still  under  the  strange  dominion  of  time  and 
circumstance,  the  ideal  can  never  wholly  fit  the  real.  There  must 
still  be  difficulty  and  incompleteness  here,  only  to  be  solved  and 
perfected  'when  iniquity  shall  have  an  end.'  Our  eyes  may  fail 
with  looking  upward  yet  the  upward  look  is  well;  and  the  jibes  upon 
the  Stoic  *  king  in  rags'  that  Horace  and  others  were  so  fond  of,  do 
not  affect  the  question.  It  may  have  been,  and  probably  often  was, 
the  case  that  Stoic  teachers  were  apt  to  transfer  to  themselves  per- 
sonally the  ideal  attributes  which  they  justly  assigned  to  the  ideal 
man  in  whom  wisdom  was  perfected.  The  doctrine  gave  much 
scope  for  cant  and  mental  pride  and  hypocrisy,  as  every  ideal  doc- 
trine does,  including  the  Christian."  Marshall. 

"  The  doctrine,  of  course,  like  every  doctrine  worth  anything,  was 
pushed  to  extravagant  lengths,  and  thrust  into  inappropriate  quar- 
ters, by  foolish  doctrinaires.  As  that  the  wise  man  is  the  only 
orator,  critic,  poet,  physician,  nay,  cobbler  if  you  please  ;  that  the 
wise  man  knows  all  that  is  to  be  known,  and  can  do  everything  that 
is  worth  doing,  and  so  on.  The  school  was  often  too  academic,  too 
abstract,  too  fond  of  hearing  itself  talk.  This,  alas !  is  what  most 
schools  are,  and  most  schoolmasters."  Id. 


28 

(i)       THE    EPICUREANS.        SEE    IX.    26,    NOTE. 

EPICURUS  who  gave  his  name  to  the  school  of  his  founding  came 
from  Samos  to  Athens  at  an  early  age,  and  his  school  dates  from 
about  the  year  306  B.  C.  He  freely  criticised  other  philosophers, 
among  them  Aristotle,  and  even  Democritus,  many  of  whose  views 
he  borrowed.  He  was  greatly  beloved  by  his  disciples,  and  his 
word  was  law  to  them.  The  Epicurean  school  continued  to  the 
fourth  century  after  Christ,  outliving  most  other  systems.  Among 
his  scholars  may  be  named  Metrodorus  and  Hermarchus  who  suc- 
ceeded Epicurus  as  the  head  of  the  school.  Other  Epicureans  were 
Apollodorus,  Zeno  of  Sidon,  Phaedrus  contemporary  with  Cicero,  and 
Philodemus;  and  at  Rome,  Lucretius,  Cassias  the  conspirator,  Atticus 
and  others.  While  Epicurus,  in  the  main,  accepts  the  teaching  of 
Democritus  in  Physics,  in  his  Ethics,  which  is  the  feature  of  greatest 
importance  for  him,  he  follows  Aristippus  and  the  Cyrenaics,  as 
Zeno  followed  Antisthenes.  He  turns  away  therefore  from  Plato 
and  Aristotle  and  goes  back  to  Socrates  and  the  Socratic  school. 

Ethics.  "The  only  unconditional  good,  according  to  Epicurus  is 
pleasure ;  the  only  unconditional  evil  is  pain.  No  proof  of  this 
proposition  seemed  to  him  to  be  necessary  ;  it  rests  on  a  conviction 
supplied  by  nature  herself,  and  is  the  ground  and  basis  of  all  our 
doing  and  not  doing.  If  proof,  however,  were  required,  he  appealed 
to  the  fact  that  all  living  beings  from  the  first  moment  of  their 
existence  pursue  pleasure  and  avoid  pain,  and  that  consequently 
pleasure  is  a  natural  good,  and  the  normal  condition  of  every  being. 
Hence  follows  the  proposition  to  which  Epicurus  in  common  with 
all  the  philosophers  of  pleasure  appealed,  that  pleasure  must  be  the 
object  of  life. 

At  the  same  time,  this  proposition  was  restricted  in  the  Epicurean 
system  by  several  considerations.  In  the  first  place,  neither  pleasure 
nor  pain  is  a  simple  thing.  There  are  many  varieties  and  degrees 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  and  the  case  may  occur  in  which  pleasure  has 
to  be  secured  by  the  loss  of  other  pleasures,  or  even  by  pain,  or  in 
which  pain  can  only  be  avoided  by  submitting  to  another  pain,  or  at 
the  cost  of  some  pleasure.  In  this  case  Epicurus  would  have  the 
various  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  carefully  weighed,  and  in  con- 
sideration of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  which  they  confer, 


29 

would  under  circumstances  advise  the  good  to  be  treated  as  an  evil, 
and  the  evil  as  a  good.  He  would  have  pleasure  forsworn  if  it 
would  entail  a  greater  corresponding  pain,  and  pain  submitted  to  if 
it  holds  out  the  prospect  of  greater  pleasure.  He  also  agrees  with 
Plato  in  holding  that  every  positive  pleasure  presupposes  a  want, 
/.  e.,  a  pain  which  it  proposes  to  remove  ;  and  hence  he  concludes 
that  the  real  aim  and  object  of  all  pleasure  consists  in  obtaining 
freedom  from  pain,  and  that  the  good  is  nothing  else  but  emancipa- 
tion from  evil.  By  a  Cyrenaic  neither  repose  of  soul  nor  freedom 
from  pain,  but  a  gentle  motion  of  the  soul  or  positive  pleasure  was 
proposed  as  the  object  of  life  ;  and  hence  happiness  was  not  made 
to  depend  on  man's  general  state  of  mind,  but  on  the  sum  total  of 
his  actual  enjoyments.  Buf  Epicurus,  advancing  beyond  this  posi- 
tion, recognized  both  the  positive  and  the  negative  side  of  pleasures, 
both  pleasure  as  repose,  and  pleasure  as  motion.  Both  aspects  of 
pleasure,  however,  do  not  stand  on  the  same  footing  in  his  system. 
On  the  contrary,  the  essential  and  immediate  cause  of  happiness  is 
repose  of  mind.  Positive  pleasure  is  only  an  indirect  cause  of 
repose  of  mind  in  that  it  removes  the  pain  of  unsatisfied  craving. 
This  mental  repose,  however,  depends  essentially  on  the  character 
of  a  man's  mind,  just  as  conversely  positive  pleasure  in  systems  so 
materialistic  must  depend  on  sensuous  attractions.  It  was  consist- 
ent, therefore,  on  the  part  of  Aristippus  to  consider  bodily  gratifi- 
cation the  highest  pleasure ;  and  conversely  Epicurus  was  no  less 
consistent  in  subordinating  it  to  gratification  of  mind. 

In  calling  pleasure  the  highest  object  in  life,  says  Epicurus,  we 
do  not  mean  the  pleasures  of  profligacy,  nor  indeed  sensual  enjoy- 
ments at  all,  but  the  freedom  of  the  body  from  pain,  and  the  free- 
dom of  the  soul  from  disturbance.  Neither  feasts  nor  banquets, 
neither  the  lawful  nor  unlawful  indulgence  of  the  passions,  nor  the 
joys  of  the  table,  make  life  happy,  but  a  sober  judgment,  investigat- 
ing the  motives  for  action  and  for  inaction,  and  dispelling  those 
greatest  enemies  of  our  peace,  prejudices.  The  root  from  which  it 
springs,  and,  therefore,  the  highest  good,  is  intelligence.  It  is  in- 
telligence that  leaves  us  free  to  acquire  possession  thereof,  without 
being  ever  too  early  or  too  late.  Our  indispensable  wants  are  sim- 
ple, little  being  necessary  to  insure  freedom  from  pain  ;  other  things 
only  afford  change  in  enjoyment,  by  which  the  quantity  is  not  in- 


30 

creased,  or  else  they  rest  on  a  mere  sentiment.  The  little  we  need 
may  be  easily  attained.  Nature  makes  ample  provision  for  our 
happiness,  would  we  only  receive  her  gifts  thankfully,  not  forgetting 
what  she  gives  in  thinking  what  we  desire.  He  who  lives  according 
to  nature  is  never  poor  ;  the  wise  man  living  on  bread  and  water 
has  no  reason  to  envy  Zeus  ;  chance  has  little  hold  on  him  ;  with 
him  judgment  is  everything,  and  if  that  be  right,  he  need  trouble 
himself  but  little  about  external  mishaps.  Not  even  bodily  pain 
appeared  to  Epicurus  so  irresistible  as  to  be  able  to  cloud  the  wise 
man's  happiness.  Although  he  regards  as  unnatural  the  Stoic's 
insensibility  to  pain,  still  he  is  of  opinion  that  the  wise  man  may  be 
happy  on  the  rack,  and  can  smile  at  pains  the  most  violent,  ex- 
claiming in  the  midst  of  torture,  How  sweet!  [Cf.  xxvi.  73].  A 
touch  of  forced  sentiment  may  be  discerned  in  the  last  expression, 
and  a  trace  of  self-satisfied  exaggeration  is  manifest  even  in  the 
beautiful  language  of  the  dying  philosopher  on  the  pains  of  disease. 
Nevertheless,  the  principle  involved  is  based  in  the  spirit  of  the 
Epicurean  philosophy,  and  borne  out  by  the  testimony  of  the 
founder.  The  main  thing  according  to  Epicurus,  is  not  the  state  of 
the  body,  but  the  state  of  the  mind  ;  bodily  pleasure  being  of  short 
duration,  and  having  much  about  it  to  unsettle  ;  mental  enjoyments 
only  being  pure  and  incorruptible.  For  the  same  reasons  mental 
sufferings  are  more  severe  than  those  of  the  body,  since  the  body 
only  suffers  from  present  ills,  whilst  the  soul  feels  those  past  and 
those  to  come.  In  a  life  of  limited  duration  the  pleasures  of  the 
flesh  never  attain  their  consummation.  Mind  only,  by  consoling  us 
for  the  limited  nature  of  our  bodily  existence,  can  produce  a  life 
complete  in  itself,  and  not  standing  in  need  of  unlimited  duration. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Epicureans,  if  consistent  with  their  princi- 
ples, could  not  deny  that  bodily  pleasure  is  the  earlier  form,  and 
likewise  the  ultimate  source,  of  all  pleasure,  and  neither  Epicurus 
nor  his  favorile  pupil  Metrodorus  shrank  from  making  this  admis- 
sion ;  Epicurus  declaring  that  he  could  form  no  conception  of  the 
good  apart  from  enjoyments  of  the  senses  ;  Metrodorus  asserting 
that  everything  good  has  reference  to  the  belly.  For  all  that  the 
Epicureans  did  not  feel  themselves  driven  to  give  up  the  pre-emi- 
nence which  they  claimed  for  goods  of  the  soul  over  those  of  the 
body."  Zeller. 


31 

Virtue  can  be  as  little  separated  from  happiness  as  happiness 
from  virtue.  Virtue  should  not  be  sought  for  its  own  sake. 

"  Virtue  has  only  a  conditional  value  as  a  means  to  happiness; 
or,  as  it  is  otherwise  expressed,  virtue  taken  by  itself  does  not  render 
a  man  happy,  but  the  pleasure  arising  from  the  exercise  of  virtue. 
This  pleasure  the  Epicurean  system  does  not  seek  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  duty  fulfilled,  or  of  virtuous  action,  but  in  the  freedom  from 
disquiet,  fear  and  dangers,  which  follows  as  a  consequence  from 
virtue. 

Wisdom  and  intelligence  contribute  to  happiness  by  liberating 
us  from  the  fear  of  the  Gods  and  of  death,  by  making  us  independ- 
ent of  immoderate  passions  and  vain  desires,  by  teaching  us  to  bear 
pain  as  something  subordinate  and  passing,  and  by  pointing  the 
way  to  a  more  cheerful  and  natural  life.  Self-control  aids  in  that 
it  points  out  the  attitude  to  be  assumed  towards  pleasure  and  pain, 
so  as  to  receive  the  maximum  of  enjoyment  and  the  minimum  of 
suffering  ;  valor  in  that  it  enables  us  to  overcome  fear  and  pain  ; 
justice  in  that  it  makes  life  possible  without  the  fear  of  Gods  and 
men,  which  ever  haunts  the  transgressor.  To  the  Epicurean  virtue 
is  never  an  end  in  itself,  but  only  a  means  to  an  end  lying  beyond — 
a  happy  life — but  withal  a  means  so  certain  and  necessary  that 
virtue  can  neither  be  conceived  without  happiness  nor  happiness 
without  virtue.  However  unnecessary  it  may  seem,  still  Epicurus 
would  ever  insist  that  an  action  to  be  right  must  be  done  not  ac- 
cording to  the  letter,  but  according  to  the  spirit  of  the  law,  not 
simply  from  regard  to  others,  or  by  compulsion,  but  from  delight  in 
what  is  good. 

The  same  claims  were  advanced  by  Epicurus  on  behalf  of  his 
wise  man  as  the  Stoics  had  urged  on  behalf  of  theirs.  Not  only 
does  he  attribute  to  him  a  control  over  pain,  in  nothing  inferior  to 
the  Stoic  insensibility  of  feeling,  but  he  endeavors  himself  to  de- 
scribe the  wise  man's  life  as  most  perfect  and  satisfactory  in  itself. 
Albeit  not  free  from  emotions,  and  in  particular  susceptible  to  the 
higher  feelings  of  the  soul  such  as  compassion,  the  wise  man  finds 
his  philosophic  activity  in  no  wise  thereby  impaired.  Without  de- 
spising enjoyment,  he  is  altogether  master  of  his  desires,  and  knows 
how  to  restrain  them  by  intelligence,  so  that  they  never  exercise  a 
harmful  influence  on  life. 


3* 

He  alone  has  an  unwavering  certainty  of  conviction ;  he  alone 
knows  how  to  do  the  right  thing  in  the  right  way ;  he  alone,  as 
Metrodorus  observes,  knows  how  to  be  thankful.  Nay,  more,  he  is 
so  far  exalted  above  ordinary  men,  that  Epicurus  promises  his 
pupils  that,  by  carefully  observing  his  teaching,  they  will  dwell  as 
Gods  among  men ;  so  little  can  destiny  influence  him,  that  he  calls 
him  happy  under  all  circumstances.  Happiness  may,  indeed,  de- 
pend on  certain  external  conditions  ;  it  may  even  be  allowed  that 
the  disposition  to  happiness  is  not  found  in  every  nature  nor  in 
every  person ;  but  still,  when  it  is  found,  its  stability  is  sure,  nor  can 
time  affect  its  duration."  Id. 

The  wise  man  may  resort  to  suicide  if  necessary,  but  such  cases 
of  necessity  are  of  very  rare  occurrence.  Epicurus  did  not  favor  the 
Stoic  view  of  suicide.  He  laid  great  stress  on  friendship,  which, 
however,  was  based  on  motives  of  utility.  He  even  calls  it  the 
highest  of  earthly  goods.  "  The  Epicurean  friendship  is  hardly  less 
celebrated  than  the  Pythagorean." 

"  In  spite  of  much  that  may  offend  in  the  doctrines  of  Epicurus 
there  is  much  at  least  in  the  man  which  is  sympathetic  and  attrac- 
tive. What  one  observes,  however,  when  we  compare  such  a  phil- 
osophy with  that  of  Plato  or  Aristotle,  is  first  a  total  loss  of  con- 
structive imagination.  The  parts  of  the  '  philosophy,'  if  we  are  so 
to  call  it,  of  Epicurus  hang  badly  together,  and  neither  the  Canonics 
nor  the  Physics  show  any  real  faculty  of  serious  thinking  at  all.  The 
Ethics  has  a  wider  scope  and  a  more  real  relation  to  experience  if 
not  to  reason.  But  it  can  never  satisfy  the  deeper  apprehension  of 
mankind."  Marshall. 

(j)     RELATIONS  OF  EPICUREANISM  TO  STOICISM. 

"The  arena  of  the  warmest  dispute  between  the  two  schools  is  ethics. 
Yet,  even  on  this  ground,  they  are  more  nearly  related  than  appears 
at  first  sight.  No  greater  contrast  appears  to  be  possible  than  that 
between  the  Epicurean  theory  of  pleasure  and  the  Stoic  theory  of 
virtue ;  and  true  it  is  that  the  two  theories  are  diametrically  oppo- 
site. Nevertheless,  not  only  are  both  aiming  at  one  and  the  same 
end — the  happiness  of  mankind — but  the  conditions  of  happiness 
are  also  laid  down  by  both  in  the  same  spirit.  According  to  Zeno 
virtue,  according  to  Epicurus  pleasure,  is  the  highest  and  only  good ; 


33 

but  the  former  in  making  virtue  consist  essentially  in  withdrawal 
from  the  senses  or  insensibility ;  the  latter  in  seeking  pleasure  in 
repose  of  mind  or  imperturbability,  are  expressing  the  same  belief. 
Man  can  only  find  unconditional  and  enduring  satisfaction,  when 
by  means  of  knowledge  he  attains  to  a  condition  of  mind  at  rest 
with  itself,  and  also  to  an  independence  of  external  attractions  and 
misfortunes.  The  same  unlimited  appeal  to  personal  truth  is  the 
common  groundwork  of  both  systems.  Both  have  expanded  this 
idea  under  the  same  form — that  of  the  ideal  wise  man — for  the  most 
part  with  the  same  features.  The  wise  man  of  Epicurus  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  superior  to  pain  and  want ;  he  enjoys  an  excellence 
which  cannot  be  lost ;  and  he  Jives  among  men  a  very  God  in  intel- 
ligence and  happiness.  Thus,  when  worked  out  into  details,  the 
difference  in  the  estimate  of  pleasure  and  virtue  by  the  Stoics  and 
the  Epicureans  seems  to  vanish.  Neither  the  Stoic  can  separate 
happiness  from  virtue,  nor  the  Epicureans  separate  virtue  from 
happiness." 

"  The  point  of  difference  between  the  two  schools  is  their  view  of 
the  conditions  under  which  certainty  of  consciousness  is  attained. 
The  Stoics  have  to  attain  it  by  the  entire  subordination  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  universal  law.  The  Epicureans,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
of  opinion  that  man  can  only  then  be  content  in  himself  when  he  is 
restrained  by  nothing  external  to  himself.  The  first  condition  of 
happiness  consists  in  liberating  individual  life  from  all  dependence 
on  others  and  all  disturbing  causes.  The  former,  therefore,  make 
virtue,  the  latter  make  personal  well-being  or  pleasure,  the  highest 
good.  By  the  Epicureans,  however,  pleasure  is  usually  conceived 
as  of  a  purely  negative  character,  as  being  freedom  from  pain,  and 
is  referred  to  the  whole  of  human  life.  Hence  it  is  always  made  to 
depend  on  the  moderation  of  desires,  on  indifference  to  outward  ills, 
and  the  state  of  the  senses,  on  intelligence  and  actions  conformable 
with  intelligence,  in  short,  on  virtue  and  wisdom.  Hence,  too,  the 
Epicureans  arrive  by  a  roundabout  course  at  the  same  result  as  the 
Stoics — the  conviction  that  happiness  can  only  be  the  lot  of  those 
who  are  altogether  independent  of  external  things,  and  enjoy  perfect 
inward  harmony."  Zeller. 


34 

(k)       THE    ECLECTICS. 

"  When  criticism  had  demonstrated  the  presence  of  untenable  ele- 
ments in  all  the  great  systems,  the  ineradicable  need  of  philosophical 
convictions  could  not  but  lead  either  to  the  construction  of  new 

systems  or  to  Eclecticism Eclecticism  would  naturally  find 

acceptance  with  those  who  sought  in  philosophy  not  knowledge  as 
such,  but  rather  a  general  theoretical  preparation  for  practical  life 
and  the  basis  of  rational  convictions  in  religion  and  morals,  and  for 
whom,  therefore,  rigid  unity  and  systematic  connection  in  philosoph- 
ical thought  were  not  unconditionally  necessary.  Hence  the  phil- 
osophy of  the  Romans  was  almost  universally  eclectic,  even  in  the 
case  of  those  who  professed  their  adhesion  to  some  one  of  the  Hel- 
lenic systems.  The  special  representative  of  Eclecticism  is  Cicero." 

"  M.  Tullius  Cicero  (Jan.  3d,  106 — Dec.  ;th,  43  B.  C.,)  pursued 
his  philosophical  studies  especially  at  Athens  and  Rhodes.  In  his 
youth  he  heard  first,  Phaedrus  the  Epicurean  and  Philo  the  Aca- 
demic, and  was  also  instructed  by  Diodotus,  the  Stoic  (who  was 
afterwards,  with  Tyrannio,  an  inmate  of  his  house.  Tusc.  V.  39). 
He  afterward  heard  Antiochus  of  Askalon,  the  Academic,  Zeno  the 
Epicurean,  and  lastly  (at  Rhodes)  Posidonius  the  Stoic.  In  his 
latter  years  Cicero  turned  his  attention  again  to  philosophy,  espe- 
cially during  the  last  three  years  of  his  life.  Tusc.  V.  2 

Cicero  defines  the  morally  good  (honestum)  as  that  which  is  intrinsi- 
cally praiseworthy,  in  accordance  with  the  etymology  of  the  word, 
which  to  him,  the  Roman,  represents  the  Greek  x«/6v.  The  most 
important  problem  in  ethics  with  him  is  the  question  whether  virtue 
is  alone  sufficient  to  secure  happiness.  He  is  inclined  to  answer 
this  question,  with  the  Stoics  in  the  affirmative,  though  the  recollec- 
tion of  his  own  weakness  and  of  the  general  frailty  of  mankind  often 
fills  him  with  doubts  ;  but  then  he  reproaches  himself  for  judging 
of  the  power  of  virtue,  not  by  its  nature,  but  by  our  effeminacy. 
Cicero  is  not  altogether  disinclined  to  the  distinction  made  by 
Antiochus  of  Askalon  between  the  vita  beata^  which  is  made  sure 
under  all  circumstances  by  virtue,  and  the  vita  beatissima,  to  which 
external  goods  are  necessary,  although  he  entertains  ethical  and 
logical  scruples  respecting  it,  and  elsewhere  (Tusc.  V.  13)  rejects 
it  ;  but  he  contents  himself  with  the  thought  that  all  which  is  not 


35 

virtue,  whether  it  deserves  the  name  of  a  good  or  not,  is  at  all 
events  vastly  inferior  to  virtue  in  worth,  and  is  of  vanishing  conse- 
quence in  comparison  with  it.  From  this  point  of  view  the  differ- 
ence between  the  Stoic  and  Peripatetic  doctrines  sinks,  in  his  view, 
to  a  mere  difference  of  words,  which  Carneades  had  already  declared 
it  to  be.  Cicero  is  more  decided  in  opposing  the  Peripatetic  doctrine, 
that  virtue  requires  the  reduction  of  the  TtdOy  (translated  by  Cicero 
perturbationes]  to  their  right  proportions ;  he  demands  with  the 
Stoics,  that  the  sage  should  be  without  nddy."  Ueb, 

In  defining  Cicero's  ethical  views  we  may  quote  further  from 
Zeller.  "The  happiness  of  the  virtuous  man — and  this  is  a  very 
marked  feature  in  Stoicism — is  thus  more  negative  than  positive. 
It  consists  in  independence  and  peace  of  mind  rather  than  in  the 
enjoyment  which  moral  conduct  brings  with  it.  In  mental  disquie- 
tude— says  Cicero,  speaking  as  a  Stoic — consists  misery  ;  in  com- 
posure, happiness.  How  can  he  be  deficient  in  happiness,  he  in- 
quires, whom  courage  preserves  from  care  and  fear,  and  self-control 
guards  from  passionate  pleasure  and  desire  ?  How  can  he  fail  to  be 
absolutely  happy  who  is  in  no  way  dependent  on  fortune,  but  sim- 
ply and  solely  on  himself?" 


NOTES. 


1.  i.    Quintus  hie  dies,  Brute,  finem  faciet  Tusculanarum 
disputationum  :   See  INTRODUCTION,  I.  Brute.  M.  Junius  Brutus, 
one  of  the  assassins  of  Julius  Caesar.     Quintilian   says   that  Brutus 
was  more  distinguished  as  a  philosopher  than  as  an  orator.     And 
Cicero  tells  us  in  De  Finibus,  that  Brutus  had  sent  him  (t.  e.,  dedi- 
cated to  him)  a  treatise  De  Virtute.     See  ex  eo  libra,  below.     Like 
Cicero  he  was  an  eclectic,  but  was  a  disciple  of  the  Old  Academy 
save  in  ethics,  in  which  he-agreed,  for  the  most  part,  with  the  Stoics. 
Cf.  VHI.  21,  putat,  and  note. 

Quern  ad  me  accuratissime  scripsisti,=^m  accuratissime 
scriptum  ad  me  misisti.  Exact  meaning  of  accuratissime  ?  ex  multis 
sermonibus  tuis,  from  many  of  your  conversations,  tormenta, 
strokes,  blows,  quod  gravius  magnificentiusque  dicatur  :  Cf. 
VII.  19.  Cave  emm  putes  ullam  a  philosophia  vocem  emissam  clariorem 
ullumve  esse  philosophies  promissum  uberius  aut  mams. 

2.  ea  causa ut  conlocarent :  the  ut  clause  is  in  apposition 

with  ea  causa  and  more  fully  defines  the  motive.     It  is  a   purpose 
clause,     qui  primi :     As  a  matter  of  fact  Socrates  was  the  first  to 
apply  philosophy  to  life,     virtus,  that  is,  the  conception  or  idea  of 

virtue,     subiecta  sub casus :     Cf.  X.  29,  neque  ulla  alia  huic 

verbo subiecta  notio,  where  dat.  follows  the  participle. 

Sin  autem videantur,  (freely),  if  virtue  does  not  rise  superior 

to  fortune  and  is  incapable  of  always  maintaining  itself,  I  fear  that  we 
shall  lose  confidence  in  the  power  of  virtue  to  conduct  us  to  happiness,  and 
resort  to  prayer  for  that  condition. 

Videantur  belongs,  of  course,  to  the  tarn  clause  (videatur)  as 
well  as  to  the  quam  clause.  Cf.  4.  ilia. . .  .omnia. . .  tsubter  se  habet^ 
etc. 

Abbreviations:  Grammars,  A.  Allen  &  Greenough;  H.  Harkness;  R.  Roby; 
Z.  Zumpt. 

T.  Tischer  (Sorof);  D.  Doederlein,  Latin  Synonymes;  Ueb.  Ueberweg;  Zr. 
Zeller. 

Cf.  compare;  s.  v.  sub  verbo;  sc.  or  scil.  scilicet,  namely. 


3.  huic sententiae  :   as   above,  praesidii  ad  beate  vivendum 

in  virtute  satis  est.     extimescere  :  note  the  meaning  of  the  word. 
Cf.  with  vereor.  See  D.    Congruentis,  sharing  in,  sympathizing  with. 
implicatos,  involved  in,  affected  by. 

4.  Castigo,  /  correct,    existimo=*W/V<?.    avunculus  tuus: 
Cato  Uticensis,  the  Stoic  and  the  suicide.     Brutus'  mother,  Servilia, 
was  the  half  sister,  and  his  wife  Porcia,  the  daughter  of  Cato.     de- 
spiciens,  contemnit :    Despicimus  infra  nos  posita,  ut  vulgi  opinio- 
nes  ;  contemnimus,  magna,  metuenda,  ut    pericula,  mortem.     Lamb. 
Despicere,  not  to  value;  contemnere,  not  to  fear.     D. 

venientia  metu maerore  praesentia:  Figure  ?  A.  344  /, 

(2);  H.  562. 

II.  5.  Culpae vitiorum  peccatorumque :  culpa,  guilt  as 

the  state  of  a  responsible  agent,  however  light  the  offense;  vitium, 
either  a  censurable  action  or  quality  or  a  natural  defect;  peccatum, 
strictly  an  indiscreet  transgression  of  the  laws  of  nature  and  reason, 
but  often  having  a  broader  meaning.  We  may  render,  fault,  offenses, 
transgressions,  his  gravissimis  casibus  :  Cicero,  a  sincere  pat- 
riot, was  tossed  about  in  the  conflict  of  the  selfish,  ambitious  pas- 
sions of  his  time,  in  the  civil  war,  and  was  practically  forced  out  of 
public  life.  The  death  of  his  daughter  intensified  his  sorrow,  in 
eundem  portum :  Cicero  listened  to  philosophical  lectures  by 
Phaedrus,  the  Epicurean,  and  by  Philo,  of  the  New  Academy,  as 
early  as  89  B.  C.  when  only  17  years  of  age.  In  79  B.  C.  he  studied 
philosophy  at  Athens.  Diodotus,  the  Stoic,  resided  many  years  in 
Cicero's  house.  Cf.  XXXIX.  113.  sine  te  :  A.  310.  a;  H.  507.  3. 
Note  7.  tu  dissipates  homines,  etc.  The  steps  from  barbarism 
to  civilization  are  noted.  The  social  instinct,  under  the  guidance  of 
philosophy  and  science  (which  were  identical),  leads  to  the  con- 
struction of  dwelling  places  (domiciliis),  to  regard  for  the  marriage 
relation  (coniugiis),  to  written  language  and  oratory  (litter arum  et 
vocurn],  to  civil  (leguni)  and  moral  (morum)  laws,  and  to  training 
(disciplinae).  peccanti  immortalitati,  an  eternity  of  transgression. 
Seneca  says  that  one  day  of  learning  is  worth  the  longest  life  of 
ignorance,  largita. . .  .CS  :  Cf.  dare.  See  Lex.  s.  v. 

6.    tantum  abest  ut ut:  A.  332.  d;  H.  502.  3.    proinde 

ac merita,  as  much  as  it  has  deserved,     parricidio  :  because  of 


39 

parentcm  (parent,  source  of  existence),  before,  percipere,  sc.  earn 
•=philosophiam  ;  to  appreciate. 

III.  7.  Quam  rem,  /.  e.  philosophiam.  Cicero  is  speaking  of 
the  invention  of  the  term  <pdo00(pia  (p/rilosophia)  to  denote  sapientia, 
the  original  Latin  term,  initiorum,  first  principles,  hoc  pulcher- 
rimum  nomen  :  sapere  means  to  taste,  then  to  have  good  taste,  dis- 
cernment, that  is  to  be  wise;  whence  sapientia.  adsequebatur,  ac- 
quired, illos  septem :  Bias,  Chilo,  Cleobulus,  Pittacus,  Periander, 
Solon,  Thales.  Excepting  Thales  these  men  were  deemed  wise 
statesmen  rather  than  philosophers.  Saeculis,  generations.  Ly- 
curgum  :  the  Spartan  legislator  ;  flourished  about  825  B.  C.  He 
is  said  to  have  met  Homer  in  Chios,  or  at  least  to  have  met  with 
the  Homeric  poems  which  he  introduced  into  Sparta.  Homerus 
probably  antedated  Lycurgus.  habitos  CSSC,  were  regarded. 

8.  Atlas:  son  of  Titan  lapetus,  and  brother  of  Prometheus, 
condemned  to  bear  the  heavens  on  head  and  hands.  Prometheus: 
chained  by  Jove  to  Mt.  Caucasus  as  a  punishment.  Cepheus : 
king  of  Ethiopia,  together  with  his  wife  Cassiopeia,  and  daughter 
Andromeda,  and  her  husband  Perseus,  were  placed  among  the  stars 
(stellatus ;  See  Lex.).  Read  the  story  in  the  Mythology  or  Clas. 
Diet.  The  student  should  read  Ovid's  version  and  Kingsley's 

Andromeda,     caelestium,   heavenly  bodies,     divina  COgnitio 

traduxisset :  i.  e.  their  wisdom  (sapientia]  has  been  symbolically 
expressed  by  the  ancients  in  the  myth  of  their  transformation,  in 
rerum  contemplatione  studia  ponebant :  were  devoting  them- 
selves to  the  study  of  the  universe.  Almost  the  entire  sum  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  ancients  is  comprehended  in  this  expression.  It  in- 
cludes philosophy,  science  and  theology.  Lucretius  entitles  his 
work  De  Rerum  Natura,  following  his  master  Epicurus  and  other 
philosophical  writers  among  the  Greeks  who  wrote  Ilept  0uffea)C, 
on  Nature, — of  which  the  Latin  is  but  a  translation.  Pythagorae  : 
Pythagoras,  born  on  the  island  of  Samos  about  580  B.  C.,  migrated 
to  Lower  Italy  and  settled  at  Croton,  529  B.  C., — founded  a  religi- 
ous brotherhood  with  a  politico-philosophical  character  and  is 
thought  to  have  perished  in  the  revolution  it  provoked.  He  left  no 
writings,  for  the  Golden  Sayings — seventy-one  maxims  in  hexameter 
— although  attributed  to  him,  are  not  genuine. 


40 

He  is  supposed  to  have  travelled  a  great  deal  in  his  earlier  life. 
Among  other  views  he  held  the  doctrine  of  the  transmigration  of 
souls  (metempsychosis],  and  that  number  is  the  principle  of  the  uni- 
verse and  of  moral  life.  Heraclides:  born  380  B.  C.  at  Heracles 
in  Pontus,  surnamed  Ponticus.  He  went  to  Athens  and  became  a 
disciple  of  Plato  and  of  Aristotle.  Phliuntem:  Phlius  was  the  chief 
town  of  Phliasia  in  the  northeastern  part  of  the  Peloponnesus. 
eumque:  observe  the  change  from  the  relative  to  the  demonstrative 
in  the  same  sentence.  Cf.  I.  XLIV.  106,  Neque  te  for  neque  qiiam. 
arte:  ars  primarily  signifies  skill  in  combining,  (cf.  arma  and  artus], 
and  then  handicraft,  profession,  art.  Philosophum:  Pythagoras 
is  thus  given  the  credit  of  coining  this  modest  term — lover  of  wis- 
dom. He  said  that  the  name  0o<f>6z,  wise,  used  by  the  older  sages, 

belongs  only  to  deity,     quid: interresset,  what  difference  there 

is. 

9.     mercatum  eum,   that  festival  assemblage.     Mayor  says,  the 

Olympic  games.     Ace.  instead  of  dat.  with  similem.     maximo 

apparatu,  the  most  splendid  representation.  Abl.  accompaniment, 
celebritate,  numerous  concourse;  manner,  lit  peterent:  etc.  com- 
parative clause  of  manner;  subordinate  in  ind.  discourse,  quaestu 
et  lucro:  the  terms  are  similar — the  former  signifying  the  steady 
gains  of  a  regular  occupation  ;  the  latter,  gains  earned  and  deserved. 

visendi perspicerent:    Cf.  I.  XIX.  44  ;  visere,  perspiciendisque. 

The  former  is  the  intensive  from  videre,  the  latter  passes  over  to  the 
idea  of  mental  vision,  contemplation,  mercatus:  gen.  ex  alia 
vita:  The  doctrine  of  the  transmigration  of  souls,  intuerenter, 
contemplate,  spectare,  to  behold,  as  a  theatrical  representation,  id 
CSt  enim,  for  that  is  the  meaning  of.  liberalissimum,  the  most 
noble  occupation;  predicate  for  both  spectare  and  praestare.  omni- 
bus studiis=0*»#/ifatf  aliis  studiis.  in  vita praestare:  as  the 

Greeks  viewed  it ;  the  Romans  were  intensely  practical. 

IV.  10.  rerum:  /.  e.  philosophic  doctrines,  in  Italiam:  to 
Croton.  quae  magna  dicta  CSt:  Graecia  Magna  or  Major  was  a 
name  given,  not  to  Southern  Italy,  but  to  districts  there  settled  and 
inhabited  by  Greeks.  Even  Cumae  and  Neapolis  were  included. 
How  the  designation  originated  is  unknown,  privatim  et  publice 

institutis    et    artibus:  Chiasmus,    for   privatim    belongs    to 

artibus  (disciplina),  publice  to  institutis.     ab  antiqua  philosophia : 


from  Thales,  Pythagoras,  etc.  Socratem;  of  Athens,  469-399 
B.  C.  It  would  be  difficult  to  overestimate  his  influence  on 
philosophy.  Archelaum  :  of  Athens  or  Miletus.  Flourished 
about  450  B.  C.  Said  to  have  made  an  advance  on  his  teacher, 
Anaxagoras,  in  moral  speculation.  Was  surnamed  Physicus.  Anax- 
agorae:  Anaxagoras,  500 — 428  B.  C. — was  a  native  of  Clazomenae, 
but  removed  to  Athens  and  gave  philosophy  a  home  in  that  city. 
He  was  the  friend  and  teacher  of  Pericles  and  Euripides,  and 
Socrates  listened  to  his  teaching.  He  assumed  two  principles — a 
material  principle,  a  medley  of  an  infinite  number  of  "  seeds"  of 
things,  and  a  spiritual  principle — an  independent  intelligence  oper- 
ating on  matter.  Later  philosophers  termed  his  material  elements 
or  "  seeds",  homoeomeria,  i.  e.  particles  of  like  kind  with  them- 
selves and  with  the  whole  that  is  made  up  of  them,  thus  differing 
from  the  atoms  of  Democritus  which  give  rise  to  the  different  quali- 
ties of  their  compounds  by  the  mode  of  composition,  numeri:  Cf. 
I.  X.  20  ;  XVII.  38,  nisi  quid  erat  numeris  aut  descriptionibus  expli- 
candum.  et  before  CUncta  caelestia,  and  generally.  The  Pytha- 
goreans speculated  about  the  "five"  planets  and  the  fixed  stars,  and 
the  Sophists  included  astronomy  in  their  teachings.  Socrates. . . . 
primus:  etc.  /.  e.  Socrates  was  the  first  moral  philosopher,  the  first 
to  direct  his  attention  inward,  to  study  man,  to  make  practical 
application  of  the  Delphic  inscription  "know  thyself".  See  INTRO- 
DUCTION, e  caelo;  /.  <?.,  out  of  the  sphere  of  the  phenomena  of 
nature. 

ii.  Platonis:  429 — 348  B.  C.  The  foremost  philosopher  of 
antiquity,  disciple  of  Socrates  and  founder  of  the  Academy.  See 
INTRODUCTION,  memoria  et  litteris,  by  the  recorded  reminiscences. 
Fig.?  consecrata,  immortalized.  See  Lex.  s.  v.  II.  C.  genera,  sects 
or  schools.  There  may  be  mentioned  the  Cyrenaics,  (Aristippus  of 
Gyrene,  founder);  the  Cynics,  (Antisthenes,  founder);  the  Megarians, 
(Euclides,  of  Megara,  founder).  These  were  called  the  Lesser 
Socratics.  Then  the  Academy,  (Plato,)  and  the  later  Academies, 
(Speusippus,  Xenocrates,  Carneades,  Antiochus);  the  Peripatetics, 
(Aristotle,  Theophrastus,  etc.);  the  Stoics,  (Zcno,  Cleanthes,  Chry- 

sippus).     See    INTRODUCTION,     id:  sc.  genus,     ut tegeremus 

etc.  A.  332.  f;  H.  501.     III.    et quaereremus;  A.  208.^.  2. 

See  IV.  VII.  16.     Carneades:  of  Gyrene — 214 — 1296.  C. — found- 


42 

er  of  the  second  school  of  the  Middle  Academy  at  Athens,  indus- 
triously combated  the  Stoic  doctrines,  especially  their  Theology. 
His  polemics  against  Stoic  dogmatism  was  mainly  negative,  in  har- 
mony with  the  view  that  opinion  is  the  utmost  certainty  in  knowl- 
edge attainable.  Carneades  was  one  of  the  three  Athenian  embas- 
sadors  that  came  to  Rome  in  155  B.  C.  See  INTRODUCTION,  in 
Tusculano:  at  Cicero's  Tusculan  villa,  fecimus . .  .  .lit  disputa- 
remus:  the  circumlocution  adds  emphasis.  A.  332.  e;  H.  498.  II. 
Note  2.  eodem  in  loco:  /.  e.  in  the  so-called  Academy,  a  prome- 
nade in  Cicero's  Tusculan  Villa  made  to  resemble  the  Academy  at 
Athens — Plato's  school.  Cf.  II.  III.  9,  in  Academiam  descendimus. 
est  propositum  de  quo  disputaremus:  Cf.  I.  IV.  7,  Ponere 
iubebam,  de  quo  quis  audire  vellet;  ad  id  aut  sedens  aut  ambulans  dispu- 
tabam. 

V.  12.  videtur:  the  sense  is  that  of  censeo.  The  personal  con- 
struction is  more  common,  as  I.  IV.  9,  Malum  mihi  videtur  esse 
mors.  A.  330.  bj  H.  534, 1.  Note  I.  (I).  Bruto  Meo:  with  reference 
to  his  treatise  De  Virtute.  Cf.  V.  I.  i.  See  also  INTRODUCTION 
for  the  Stoic  view  of  virtue,  quod  mihi  dixi  videri,  of  which  I 
have  expressed  an  opinion,  nempe*.  in  a  question  asking  for  a  more 
precise  statement;  with  negas  we  may  render,  do  you  mean  to  deny? 
Lex.  s.  v.  II.  i.  quidni  or  quid  ni :  used  with  the  subjunctive 
in  a  rhetorical  question.  R.  1614.  cur  non  expects  an  answer. 
Nam  etiam,  etc.  He  denies  that  all  who  live  uprightly  are  happy; 
for  a  person  could  not  be  happy  under  torments  however  upright 
and  courageous. 

13.  CCUleum,  rack.  adspirat,  /.  e.  accedere  temptat.  The 
Stoics  distinguished  between  things  in  our  power  and  things  not  in 
our  power.  Among  the  former  are  the  affections,  desires,  opinions, 
etc.,  among  the  latter  wealth,  rank,  etc.  But  we  can  train  ourselves 
to  regard  the  latter  as  unimportant,  and,  to  that  extent,  they  are  in 
our  power.  The  grand  duty  of  life  is  to  enthrone  reason  by  which 
to  control  every  impulse  and  every  disturbing  cause.  By  reason 
we  must  arrive  at  a  condition  of  perfect  indifference  to  pleasure  and 
pain,  hope  and  fear.  The  wise  man  has  attained  this  ideal  and  is 
perfectly  happy;  but  the  wise  man  is  the  virtuous  man — the  terms 
are  synonymous.  Hence  the  reasoning  of  M.  in  the  text,  who 
maintains  that  virtue  is  sufficient  for  a  happy  life.  Haec  etiam  in 


43 

eculeum quo  vita  non  aspirat  vita;  Simcox  criticises  the 

author's  style  in   this   expression   as  being  affected  by   a  reckless 
earnestness.     He  says: 

"  The  discussion  whether  vita  beata  will  mount  the  rack  with  the  philosopher 
is  a  model  of  the  careless  personification  which  misses  being  picturesque  and  suc- 
ceeds in  being  illogical  ;  and  it  is  one  of  the  praises  of  Latin  literature  that  it  gen- 
erally abstains  from  this  slovenly  sort  of  personification,  and  only  personifies  to 
make  a  direct  and  vivid  appeal  to  the  imagination." 

si  quid  es  facturus;  /.  e.,  if  you  are  to  convince  me  or  to  effect 
anything  in  opposition  to  my  views.  tamquam^^V^/.  nihil  va- 
lent  in  aqua,  do  not  keep  their  strength  when  mixed  with  water. 
velut,  as  for  instance;  stating  an  example  under  a  general  proposi- 
tion, chorus  virtutum  :  so  Horace,  chorus  vatum  scriptorum,  etc. 

14.  hoc;  viz.  possitne  etc.  nudum,  unobscured.  noli  vereri, 
have  no  fear.  Si  enim  nulla  virtus  prudentia  vacat;  Chrysippus, 
the  Stoic,  held  that  the  primitive  virtues  are  prudence,  manly  cour- 
age, justice  and  temperance.  Allophanes  thought  that  there  is  but 
a  single  virtue,  viz.  prudence.  The  Stoics,  generally,  held  that  the 
"  virtues  reciprocally  follow  one  another  and  that  he  who  has  one 
has  all."  Diog.  Laert.  Life  of  Zeno.  In  III.  XVII,  "  What  answer 
will  you  make  to  prudence,  who  informs  you  that  she  is  a  virtue 
sufficient  of  herself  both  to  teach  you  a  good  life  and  also  to  secure 
you  a  happy  one?"  M.  Atilio  (Regulo):  the  hero  of  one  of  the 
most  celebrated  stories  in  Roman  History.  See  Clas.  Diet.  Q. 
Caepione;  Q.  Servilius  Caepio,  defeated  on  the  Rhone  (105  B.  C.) 
by  the  Cimbri,  cast  into  prison  either  for  misconduct  in  this  war  or 
for  sacrilege.  M.  Aquilio;  Consul  101  B.  C.,  defeated  in  88  B.  C. 
and  imprisoned  by  Mithradates,  who  slew  him  by  pouring  molten 
gold  down  his  throat,  ipsa  prudentia:  repeated  for  the  sake  of 
clearness. 

VI.  15.  For  the  reasoning  in  this  Chapter  see  philosophical 
note  in  paragraph  13. 

Atqui  introduces  a  fresh  step  in  the  reasoning,  profligata, 
almost  settled,  motus  turbulent!:  etc.  the  emotions  or  passions — 
grief  (or  pain),  desire  (or  hope),  fear,  pleasure.  They  were  termed 
by  the  Stoics  "  perturbations,"  and  occasion  error  in  thought.  The 
virtuous  man  must  have  right  judgment  and  right  intention,  vitae 
beatae;  Gen.  ignominiam;  through  the  nota  censoria.  See  Diet. 


44 

Antiq.  The  power  of  the  censors  was  very  great,  infamiam,  loss 
of  political  rights.  The  in/amis  was  expelled  from  his  tribe  and  lost 
his  vote  and  right  to  hold  office.  non....sed;  this  expression  is 
not  quite  equivalent  to  non  modo....sed  etiam.  The  emphasis  is 
here  put  on  the  latter  expression,  viz.  potentibus  populis.  quod. . . . 

potentibus  populis contigit,  servitutem;  is  there  an  allusion 

to  the  supremacy  of  Caesar  in  these  words  ?  contigit,  here  of  an 
unfortunate  occurrence — like  accidit. 

1 6.  aegritudine :  sickness  of  both  body  and  mind,  but  in  philo- 
sophical language  usually  of  the  former,    eliditur;    as  a  ship  dashed 
to  pieces  on  the  beach:  shattered,     quo  (que). . .  .eo:  correlatives. 
laetitia ;  exsultans  ;  gestiens  :  laetitia  denotes  joy  as  a  calm  and 
cheerful  expression ;  exsultans  denotes  an  extravagant  outbreak  of 
joy  ;  gestiens,  denotes  a  passionate  uncontrollable  expression  of  joy 

and  triumph,  metus aegritudines libidines laetitiae; 

these  are  the  four  kinds  {genera)  of  perturbations  noted  in  paragraph 
13,  and  again  referred  to  in  note  on  VI.  15.     The  metus  (fear),  and 
aegritudo,   (grief,  pain),   arise   from   an  opinion  of  evil    impending 
(fear)  or  present  (pain).     The  laetitia  or  voluptas  gestiens  (pleasure), 
arises  from  an  opinion  of  present  good,  libido  or  cupiditas  (desire, 
hope),  from  an  opinion  of  future  good.     The  virtuous  man  must  get 
rid  of  all  such   beliefs  and  reach  a  state  entirely  emotionless  and 
without  perturbation  of  any  kind,     languidis  liquefaciunt  volup- 
tatibus,  weakened  by  enervating  pleasures. 

17.  ex  quo=ut  ex  eo.     Cf.  ex  hoc,  I.  XII.  28.     Note  another 
statement,  in  varied  terms,  of  the  four  passions  as  above ;  timor, 
angor,  concupiscat,  voluptate.     See  also  first  sentence  of  next  chapter. 
idemque  si,  etc.,  the  characteristic  clause  is  discontinued  ;  anacolu- 
thon. 

VII.    A.   admits  both  propositions  (alterum alterum;  the 

one.... the  other),  viz.  that  they  who  are  subject  to  no  "perturba- 
tions" are  happy,  and  that  the  ideal  wise  man,  who  is  included  in  this 
class,  is  happy.  quitl=<?m  non,  a  dependent  question  :  R.  1768.  im- 
potenti,  uncontrollable,  integrum  non  CSt,  is  not  open  for  discussion. 
effectum  est:  here  used  with  an  infinitive,  but  often  with  a  consec- 
utive clause. 

18.  ad  earn  rem:  /".  e.  which  they  wish  to  demonstrate,  modo, 
only,  scriptum  est:  as  in  a  text  book,  in  earn;  take  with  conveniunt. 


45 

Quodni  ita   esset si  esset;  a  double  condition,  the  tense  of 

the  latter  being  subject  to  the  law  of  sequence,  si  esset  quaesitum 
satisne,  if  the  question  under  discussion  were  whether,  etc.  hones- 
tum;  "The  Greeks  declare  that  the  beautiful  (ro  xahov)  is  good ; 
Cicero  declared  that  the  honorable  (honestum]  [morally  good]  alone 
is  good.  Where,  therefore,  the  Greeks  had  spoken  of  ro  xodov,  and 
we  should  speak  of  moral  good,  Cicero  speaks  of  honestum,  and 
founds  precisely  similar  arguments  on  it.  This  conception  implies, 
besides  self-regarding  rectitude  the  praise  of  others  and  the  rewards 
of  glory,  and  hence  is  eminently  suited  to  the  public  spirited  men 
for  whom  he  wrote.  To  it  is  opposed  the  base  (turpe),  that  disgrace- 
ful evil  which  all  good  men  would  avoid."  Cruttwell.  Cf.  de  Officiis, 
sive  honestum  solum  bonum  eft,  ut  Stoicis  placet,  etc.,  whether  honestum 
is  the  only  good  as  the  Stoics  hold,  etc.  Also  the  following  from  the 
Acad.  "Zeno  placed  everything  which  could  have  any  effect  in  pro- 
ducing a  happy  life  in  virtue  alone,  and  reckoned  nothing  else  a 
good  at  all,  and  called  that  honorable  (honestum)  which  was  single  in 
its  nature  and  the  sole  and  only  good  (bonum)." 

The  reasoning  in  nihil  bonum sit  bonum,  is,  that  virtue  is 

sufficient  for  a  happy  life  because  there  is  nothing  good  which  is  not 
at  the  same  time  honorable  (morally  good),  and  that  the  contrary  is 
quite  as  true,  viz.  that  nothing  is  good  which  is  not  honorable  be- 
cause virtue  is  sufficient  for  a  happy  life.  The  fuller  process  is  seen 
in  the  next  note.  See  also  VIII.  21,  Ego  enim,  etc.  ante  docuisse: 
/.  e.,  in  the  various  passages  of  his  philosophical  books — as  the  fol- 
lowing from  the  de  Fin. 

"The  conclusions  of  the  Stoics  are  arrived  at  as  follows  :     'Everything  which  is 

good  is  praiseworthy  ;  but  everything  which  is  praiseworthy  is  honorable'; and 

so  the  result  is  that  whatever  is  good  is  also  honorable  (honestum).  In  the  next 
place  I  ask,  who  can  boast  of  a  life  which  is  miserable;  or  avoid  boasting  of  one 
which  is  happy  ?  Therefore  men  boast  only  of  a  life  which  is  happy.  From  which 
the  consequence  follows  that  a  happy  life  deserves  to  be  boasted  of;  but  this  cannot 
properly  be  predicated  of  any  life  which  is  not  an  honorable  one.  From  which  it 
follows  that  a  happy  life  must  be  an  honorable  one. . .  .And  that  man  of  lofty  and 
excellent  spirit — that  magnanimous  and  truly  brave  man  who  considers  all  human 
accidents  beneath  his  notice — ought  to  confide  in  himself,  and  in  his  own  life  both 
past  and  to  come  and  to  form  a  favorable  judgment  of  himself,  laying  down  as  a 
principle,  that  no  evil  can  happen  to  a  wise  man.  From  which  again  the  same 
result  follows,  that  the  sole  good  is  that  which  is  honorable  ;  and  that  to  live 
happily  is  to  live  honorably,  that  is,  virtuously." 


46 

The  virtuous  life  implies  honor  which  is  identical  with  the  highest 
good;  a  life  of  honor  (thus  defined,  which  is  subject  to  no  distrac- 
tions) must  be  a  happy  life.  The  converse  of  which  is  equally  true. 

19.  Propiis et  suis,  peculiar  and  strictly  their  own.   clarior- 

em,  more  noble  i.  e,  than  that  virtue  is  sufficient  for  happiness.  Cf.  I. 
i .  nihil  est  enim   omnium ....  quod  gravius  magnificentiusque  dicatur. 
paruisset;  representing  fut.  perf.  time,  ut  esset. . .  .armatus:  A. 

287  e  ;  H.  495,  II. 

20.  videro;  with  the  force  of  the  future.  Z.  5 1 1.  tantisper,  mean- 
while. Nam  Xerxes;  etc.     Contrasted  with  the  happiness  and  con- 
tentment effected  by  virtue.     This  story  is  related  of  other   Persian 
kings   also,     praemiis,  advantages.     The   force  of  the  preposition 
in  the  compound praemium  is  felt  here,     qai  invenisset:  the  ante- 
cedent  is  often  omitted   especially  when   indefinite,     hoc  firmius 
crederemus:  viz.  that  virtue  of  itself,  unaided  by  pleasures,  suffices 
for  happiness. 

VIII.  21.  habeo  p.  q.  requiram,  I  want  a  little  information. 
eorum:  The  Stoics.  Supply  Us;  Plural  because  both  propositions  are 

contained  in  alterum esse.  ut  quem  ad  modum,  foil.  See  VII. 

1 8,  cui  satis,  etc.  Sic;  scil.  sequdtur.  sic  is  correlative  with  quern  ad 
modum,  ut  introducing  the  result  clause.  Brutus.  See  I.  i.  Aristo; 
Aristus,  of  Ascalon,  an  Academic  philosopher  of  Athens,  brother  of 
Antiochus,  at  one  time  teacher  and  friend  of  Brutus  and  Cicero. 
Antiocho;  Antiochus  of  Ascalon,  a  disciple  of  Philo,  from  whom  he 
differed,  attempted  to  combine  the  Stoic  and  Peripatetic  systems 
with  the  Academic.  He  placed  the  goods  and  virtues  of  the  body 
along  with  those  of  the  soul,  among  the  perfect  goods  and  virtues. 
putat;  sc.  vitam  beatam  virtute  confici. — Brutus  held  against  the  Stoics 
that  external  goods,  and  consequently  evils,  may  exist  and  still  vir- 
tue be  sufficient  for  a  happy  life.  The  Stoics  denied  that  if  any  one 
is  in  actual  evil  he  could  be  happy  ;  and  so  they  restricted  the  terms 
goods  and  evils  closely. 

22.  quid  cuique  consentaneum,  etc.  how  these  views  are  har- 
monized.  alio  loco  ;  sc.  dicam.  saepe ;  In  79  B.  C.  he  spent  six 
months  at  Athens  studying  philosophy  (under  Antiochus),  and 
rhetoric,  nuper;  from  July,  51,  for  a  year,  he  was  proconsul  of 
of  Cilicia,  and  was  honored  by  the  title  of  Imperator  for  his  conduct 
in  a  campaign  against  the  robber  tribes  of  Mount  Amanus.  He 


47 

stopped  at  Athens  on  his  return,  B.  C.  50.  videbatur :  the  personal 
construction  of  the  passive  of  video  is  the  usual  one ;  but  in  the  next 
clause  we  have  sapientem. . .  .posse,  a  new  subject  being  introduced. 
ulla  COrporis  aut  fortunae  mala :  Ct.  infra,  23,  tria  genera 
malorum,  and  XXX.,  85,  Tria  genera  bonorum  maxima  animi,  secun- 
da  corporis,  externa  (i.  e.  fortunae)  tertia,  ut  Peripatetici  nee  multo  vet- 
eres  Academici  secus.  The  bona  have  their  corresponding  mala.  The 
question  that  Cicero  raises  in  the  text  is  whether  evils  other  than 
those  of  the  mind  are  really  evils.  The  Stoics  held  that  external 
good  and  evil  are  matters  of  indifference,  and  apparent  evils  are 
often  blessings,  neque  tamen  beatissimam  :  Antiochus,  like  the 
Peripatetics,  adds  external  goods  to  virtue,  in  order  to  produce  the 
greatest  happiness,  deinde  ex  maiore  parte :  etc.,  that  things 
generally  get  their  names  from  that  which  predominates  in  their 
composition,  genere,  non  numero,  by  quality  (or  character),  not 
by  quantity,  clauderet :  from  claudeo.  Cf.  claudico. 

23.  Nam  et  qui  :  etc,  It  may  be  conceded  that  in  some  cases 
it  is  true  that  things  are  known  from  their  predominant  elements, 
but  the  principle  is  inapplicable  to  happiness,  et,  quod,  and,  as  to 
what.  Z.  626,  627  ;  A.  333.  a\  H.  516.  2  N.  valeat :  characteristic, 
tria  genera  malorum  :  See  note  above,  qui :  the  antecedent 
is  huic.  urgeatur,  oppressed,  cum  vero  tria  —  beatissimam  : 
Cicero  wishes  to  convict  Antiochus  of  inconsistency  (non  constan- 
tissime),  and  reasons  from  A.'s  point  of  view.  A.  holds  that  goods 
(bona)  of  body  (corporis)  and  estate  (fortunae)  must  be  added  to 
virtus  to  produce  the  highest  happiness,  although  virtus  alone  can 
produce  a  less  degree  of  happiness.  Cicero  reasons  that,  if  that  be 
true,  the  presence  of  virtus  accompanied  not  by  the  other  two  classes 
of  blessings,  but  by  their  opposites,  or  evils,  must  be  fatal  to  any 
degree  of  happiness,  to  say  nothing  (non  modo)  of  the  highest  degree. 

IX.  24.  Hoc;  See  last  note.  Theophrastus;  371 — 287  B.  C. 
Born  in  Lesbos,  lived  at  Athens ;  pupil  of  Plato,  then  of  Aristotle 
whom  he  succeeded  as  the  head  of  the  Peripatetic  School;  somewhat 
independent  in  his  views.  He  devoted  himself  especially  to  inves- 
tigations in  natural  science,  and  was  the  founder  of  the  science  of 
Botany,  as  Aristotle  was  of  that  of  Zoology.  He  advocated  Aris- 
totle's view  that  external  goods  are  a  necessary  concomitant  of  vir- 
tue, and  an  essential  to  happiness.  Cic.  says  of  him  that  "he  stripped 


48 

virtue  of  its  beauty  and  made  it  powerless  by  denying  that  to  live 
happily  depended  solely  on  it,"  Acad j  again,  "  And  this  point 
[whether  happiness  is  wholly  in  the  power  of  a  wise  man,  or  wheth- 
er it  can  be  undermined  or  taken  from  him  by  adversity],  is  the 
especial  subject  of  the  book  of  Theophrastus,  on  a  Happy  Life  ;  in 
which  a  great  deal  is  attributed  to  fortune  ;  and  if  that  theory  is 
correct,  then  wisdom  cannot  make  life  happy."  de  Fin.  Susti- 
nere  non  potuit,  could  not  heartily  maintain  (advocate),  although  a 
Peripatetic,  desiring  to  be  consistent.  Compare  the  views  of  An- 
tiochus,  as  given  in  the  preceding  chapter,  with  those  of  Theophras- 
tus, in  the  preceding  note.  Nam  cum  statuisset  —  sentiret; 
unlike  Antiochus,  he  could  hardly  predicate  any  happiness  under 
such  circumstances.  Consequentia ....  prima,  conclusions .... 
premises.  elegaLntissimus=sufaitisstmusy  most  precise.  T.  primum; 
the  corresponding  sentence  is  vexatur  idem,  in  the  following  para- 
graph (25).  in  CO  libro,  in  respect  to  that  book,  rotam,  wheel  of 
torture.  The  bracketed  words,  found  in  some  Mss.  are  supposed  to 
be  an  ancient  gloss. 

25.     Cui   concesserim;    equivalent  to   a  condition,     dolores 

corporis naufragia  fortunae;  two  of  the  three  classes  of  evils. 

huic  succensere;  the  answer  implied  is  no,  because  he  is  consist- 
ent ;  Antiochus  is  not  consistent.  Callisthene:  In  his  book  on 
Callisthenes.  The  latter  was  his  friend  and  fellow-pupil  under  the 
instruction  of  Aristotle.  He  was  also  a  fellow-pupil  and  historian 
of  Alexander  the  Great.  He,  however,  refused  to  pay  that  monarch 
homage  as  to  a  divinity,  and  was  by  him  thrown  into  prison,  where 
he  died  in  328  B.  C.  at  the  age  of  32.  He  was  a  relative  of  Aris- 
totle. Vitam  regit  fortuna  non  sapientia :  Theophrastus  de- 
parted somewhat  from  Aristotle's  ethical  teachings.  Aristotle  (See 
INTRODUCTION)  held  that  the  highest  happiness  consists  in  activity 
of  the  reason,  /.  e.  in  philosophy  ;  that  somewhat  of  external  pros- 
perity, although  very  little,  is  needed  for  the  putting  forth  of  that 
activity  which  constitutes  happiness  ;  that  virtue  is  habit  character- 
ized by  deliberate  choice  which  is  determined  by  reason,  and  as  the 
prudent  man  would  determine  it.  Thus  stress  is  laid  on  reason  and 
wisdom  as  the  condition  of  a  happy  life.  Theophrastus  seems  to 
have  made  less  of  the  transcendence  of  reason,  and  to  have  assigned 
much  weight  to  fortune  as  an  element  of  happiness. 


49 

The  verse  (Iambic  Trimeter)  is  probably  from  Ennius'  Penthesilca. 
languidius,  with  less  spirit,  in  COrpore,  depending  on  the  body. 

26.  Epicurum  :  342-268  B.  C.  Founder  of  the  Epicurean 
school  at  Athens,  which  flourished  there  for  more  than  200  years, 
and  much  longer  in  other  cities.  Epicurus  was  born  in  the  Attic 
deme  of  Gargettus,  but  his  early  life  was  passed  at  Samos.  It  was 
not  until  304  B.  C.  that  he  came  to  Athens,  where  he  gave  his  lec- 
tures in  "  the  Garden"  surrounded  by  his  friends.  His  death  oc- 
curred in  268  B.  C.  after  very  great  sufferings,  through  which  and 
to  the  last  he  maintained  a  calm  mind  and  a  serene  spirit.  In  his 
Ethics  he  taught  that  happiness  is  the  highest  good — happiness 
found  in  pleasure — not  the  pjeasure  of  the  moment,  (although  Cicero 
often  inclines  so  to  interpret  it),  but  the  enduring  condition  of  pleas- 
ure. In  its  essence  this  pleasure  is  freedom  from  pain, — the  great- 
est of  evils.  But  pleasure  of  mind  is  a  greater  good  than  the  nega- 
tive pleasure  of  freedom  from  bodily  pains.  Virtue  contributes  to 
this  higher  pleasure  by  regulating  the  appetites  and  passions  and 
banishing  fear.  Virtue  is,  therefore,  desirable,  not  for  its  own  sake, 
but  for  the  pleasure  it  thus  secures.  "  Virtue  can  be  as  little  sepa- 
rated from  happiness  as  happiness  from  virtue."  Zr.  Wisdom  is 
the  cardinal  virtue,  enabling  us  to  calculate  the  probable  conse- 
quences of  our  actions  in  regard  to  pleasure  or  pain.  If  the  judg- 
ment be  right  a  man  need  trouble  himself  but  little  about  external 
mishaps.  Antisthenes  :  b.  444  B.  C.  Founder  of  the  Cynic  and 
indirectly  of  the  Stoic  schools, — pupil  and  friend  of  Socrates,  carried 
to  the  extreme  the  ascetic  views  of  his  master.  See  INTRODUCTION. 
Antisthenes  held  that  virtue  is  sufficient  for  happiness,  and  can  be 
taught,  and,  after  acquisition,  cannot  be  lost ;  that  the  wise  man  is 
superior  by  reason  of  his  self-sufficiency  while  the  masses  are  fools 
and  slaves.  In  conduct,  their  views  had  for  their  result  shabbiness 
of  dress,  mendicancy,  indecency  of  manner  of  life,  etc.  Antisthenes 
"wore  no  garment  except  a  cloak,"  **  renounced  all  diet  except  the 
simplest. ...  was  stern  and  bitter  in  his  language."  Diogenes,  his 

disciple,  was  a  greater  extremist  than  his  teacher,  fortunam 

sapienti :  that  fortune  has  very  slight  influence  on  the  wise  man. 

isne  :  /.  <?.  Epicurus,  cum  dolorem sed  solum  malum 

dixerit :  Cicero,  to  be  just,  should,  perhaps,  include  in  dolorem,  pain 
of  soul  as  well  as  of  body.  Their  summum  bonum  was  the  "  freedom 


50 

of  the  body  from  pain  and  the  soul  from  confusion."  Still  they  held 
bodily  pleasure  to  be  the  foundation  of  all  other  pleasures. 

27.  Metrodorus:  d.  277  B.  C.  Disciple  of  Epicurus,  and  who 
sensualized  his  philosophy.  He  says,  "  All  good  is  concerned  with 
eating."  See  XXXVII.  109,  note.  Occupavi  :  /  have  anticipated. 
adspirare  :  See  Lex.  s.  v.  B.  Aristo  :  of  Chios,  a  Stoic  and  dis- 
ciple of  Zeno  ;  flourished  about  260  B.  C.  Zeno :  a  native  of 
Cittium  in  Cyprus.  Founder  of  the  Stoic  school.  He  was  greatly 
honored  by  the  Athenians.  See  INTRODUCTION,  spe  :  that  it  will 
thus  continue,  isto . . . . bono  :  i.  e.  firma  corporis  affectio,  etc. 
iam,  instantly. 

X.  28.  istorum  hominum ;  Epicureans  ;  contemptuous,  ve- 
lut :  belongs  to  the  illustration  following,  and  not  to  the  single  sen- 
tence. 

29.  cumulata,  full,  perfect,     si  mala  ilia  ducimus:    The 
Stoics  do  not  regard  these  as   evils,  and  Cicero  here  holds  the  same 
view.     They  regarded  as  indifferent  those   things  that    are   "neither 
beneficial   nor    injurious,    such   as    life,    health,   pleasure,    beauty, 
strength,  riches,  good  reputation,  nobility  of   birth,  and  their  contra- 
ries,   death,  disease,   labor,    disgrace,  weakness,    poverty,   and  bad 
reputation,  baseness  of  birth   and  the  like."     Diog.  Laert.    Life  of 
Zeno.     The  bad  are  the  vices — the  opposite    of   the   virtues ;  folly, 
intemperance,  cowardice  and  injustice,     in  his  tot  et  tantis  :  malis 
is  purposely  omitted  because  of  the   distinction   pointed  out  in  the 
last  note,     praestare,  to  be  responsible  for  the  doctrine. 

30.  communibus  magistris  ;  as  Aristus  and  Antiochus.     See 
VIII.    21,   and   note.     Aristotle;    See   INTRODUCTION.     Aristotle 
was  born  B.  C.  384,  at  Stageira  in  Thrace.     He  was  for  many  years 
a  disciple  of  Plato,  but  afterward  the  head  of  an  independent  school. 
He  developed  opposition  especially  to  Plato's  theory  of  Ideas.     For 
eight  years  prior  to  the  founding  of   his    school — the  Lyceum — he 
was  at  the  court  of  Philip,   king  of  Macedonia,  as  the  tutor  of  his 
son — afterward  Alexander  the  Great.     From  his  habit   of  walking 
up  and  down  the  shady  avenues  while  conversing  with  his  pupils  on 
the  problems  of  philosophy,  his  school  received  the  name  Peripatet- 
ic.    He  died  in  322  B.  C.  See  an   interesting   article  in  the  Century 
magazine  for   July,  1892,  on  the  discovery  at   Eretria   of   what  the 
author   and  discoverer,  Charles  Waldstein,  supposes  to  be  the  tomb 


of  Aristotle.  Aristotle's  writings  are  numerous, — both  scientific  and 
philosophic.  He  is  regarded  as  the  originator  of  Logic,  Grammar, 
Rhetoric  in  its  scientific  aspect,  Literary  Criticism,  Natural  History, 
Physiology  and  Psychology.  He  first  treated  of  the  History  of 
Philosophy,  and  of  the  forms  of  government  existing  at  that  time. 
His  was  one  of  the  greatest  intellects  the  world  has  known.  Speu- 
sippo:  See  INTRODUCTION.  Speusippus,  the  son  of  Plato's  sister, — 
succeeded  his  uncle  as  the  head  of  the  Academy  and  was  himself 
succeeded  by  Xenocrates — 396-314,  B.  C. — and  he  in  turn  by  Polemo, 
d.  273  B.  C.  titulus  hie  ;  sc.  sapientis.  inducant  animum,  let 
them  determine.  So  mo  gen  sie  sich  entschliessen.  T.  se  neque 

fortunae ducant  in  bonis ;  a  succinct  statement  of  Stoic 

doctrine,  neque  (nee) -que  :  This  combination  occurs  only 

occasionally.  Z.  338.  The  -que,  from  its  nature  (Z.  333),  has  here 
an  adversative  force,  sibi ;  This  word  is  necessary  for  limiting  the 
omnia,  and  with  \\.=omnia  sua,  all  so  far  as  it  is  of  interest  to  them. 

31.  Nunc,  now,  however;  under  these  circumstances,  quae 

viri  and  quae  volgus  are  contrasted,  qua  gloria.=cuius 

ret  gloria  j  i.  e.  sapientis.  si  dis  placet,  please  the  gods,  or,  with 
God's  help.  Ironically  used,  si  ipse  SC  audiret,  //  he  would  be 
consistent.  Quam  hoc  suave  est ;  Cf.  II.  VII.  17,  (Epicurus] 
affirmat  enim  quo  dam  loco  "  si  uratur  sapiens,  si  crucietur," — expectas 
fortassedumdicat;  "  patietur,  perferet,  non  succumbet  /'  magna  me- 
hercule  laus  et  eo  ipso,  per  quern  iuravi,  Hercule  digna  ;  sed  Epicuro, 
homini  aspero  et  duro,  non  est  hoc  satis  ;  in  Phalaridis  tauro  si  erit, 
dicet ;  "  Quam  suave  est!  quam  hoc  non  euro!"  Suave  etiam  ?  an 
parum  est,  si  non  amarum  ?  ex  perpetuitate  atque  constantia, 
from  the  continuity  and  consistency  of  their  teachings. 

XI.  32.  quartum  de  Finibus :  Thus  Quintilian,  in  T.  Livii 
primo  ;  IX.  2.37.  The  allusion  is  to  Chapter  XX.  In  the  fourth 
book  de  Finibus,  the  New  Academy  assails  Zeno  and  the  Stoics.  In 
Chap.  XX.  occurs  this  passage : 

"Nor  did  he  (Zeno)  think  those  things  deserving  of  being  valued  less  which  he  him- 
self denied  to  be  goods  than  they  who  did  consider  them  as  goods.  What,  then, 
did  he  wish  to  effect  by  having  altered  these  names  ?  At  least  he  would  have 
taken  something  from  their  weight  and  would  have  valued  them  at  rather  less  than 
the  Peripatetics,  in  order  to  appear  to  think  in  some  respects  differently  from  them, 
and  not  merely  to  speak  so."  etc. 


52 

hoc  :  object  of  ostendere,  and  has  the  nihil '. . .  .inter esse  clause  as 
appositive.  verborum  novitatem :  See  note  above.  Quod  si, 
etc.  If  they  differ  only  in  words,  agreeing  in  fact,  and  if  Zeno  can 
consistently  hold,  etc.,  then  the  Peripatetics  can  consistently  hold 
the  same. 

33.  tabellis  obsignatis,  from  sealed  writings,  i.  e.,  in   strictest 
form.  Cf.  ex  syngrapha  agere.     nos  :  /.  e.,  of  the  Middle  Academy  to 
whose  sceptical  doctrine,  that  certainty  is  unattainable,  Cicero  sub- 
scribed.    He  boasts  of  the  freedom  of  his  school  (soli  sumus  liberi), 
whereby  he  can  advocate  any  doctrine  he  may  fancy  at  the  time  (in 
diem).     He  cares  nothing  for  inconsistencies.     See  INTRODUCTION  ; 
The  Middle  Academy,     de  COnstantia  :     in  the  preceding  Chapter 
—respecting  Epicurus,     verumne :  the  adj.   is  the  predicate  with 
sit,  whose  subject  is  the  clause,  bonum  esse  s.  q.   h.  esset.     quod  ho- 
nestum  esset;  thus  excluding  so-called  external  goods.     Historical 
tense  because  of  time  past,  /".  e.  of  Zeno,  (placuerit).     Read  si  ita 
esset  for  ni  ita  esset  ;  if  this  view   (of  Zeno)   be   correct  j   if  we 
admit  it.    totum  hoc  beate  vivere ;   object  of  poneret.    si  ita 
esset ...  .poneret:     The  tense  is  imperfect  through  the  influence 
of  the  preceding  honestum  esset.     This  sentence  has  been  variously 
emended.     The  reading   ni  for  si,  num.  for  turn,  with  ponerent  for 

poneret,  is  one  emendation.     Another  reads  si poneretur,  inserting 

volui  before  ut,  etc.     Heine  thinks  that  volui  is  implied  in  poneret 
which  he  changes  to  ponentur.     If  we  read  si  ita  esset. . .  .poneret,  the 
meaning  is  :  Conceding  his  view,  whether  then  he  makes  the  happy 
life  entirely  dependent  on  virtue,  as  a  matter  of  fact.     If  we  read  ni 
ita  esset. . .  .poneret,  it  would  mean  :     If  his  view  be  incorrect,   and 
there  are  other  goods  besides  the  honestum,  whether  then  he  will  rest 
happiness  entirely  on  virtue.     That  is  consistent  with  what  follows, 
for  that  was  the  position  of  Brutus.     See  below,     turn  ut,  etc.,  is 
dependent  on  verum,  true  /  /.  e.,  whether  it  is  true  then  that,  etc.,  and 
poneret  expresses  result  after  verum  sit. 

34.  viderit ;  probably  a  fut.  pf.   R.  1585.     For  the  opinion  of 
Brutus,  see  VIII.  21.    beatissimus  ;  Cf.  VIII.,  22,  23. 

XII.  advena  ;  Zeno  was  a  native  of  Cittium  in  Cyprus,  origin- 
ally a  colony  from  Phoenicia.  Cicero  speaks  of  Zeno  as  a  Poenulus, 
Phoenician,  verborum  opifex;  Cf.  de  Fin.  III.  II.  5,  "Zeno  too, 
their  chief,  was  not  so  much  a  discoverer  of  new  things  as  of  new 


53 

words."  See  note  in  XI.  32,  and  INTRODUCTION,  insinuasse  se : 
Cicero  also  uses  the  verb  without  the  reflexive  in  the  same  sense. 
a  Platonis  auctoritate  :  "Their  (the  Stoic's)  doctrines  con- 
tained little  that  was  new,  seeking  rather  to  give  a  practical  applica- 
tion to  the  dogmas  which  they  took  ready  made  from  previous  sys- 
tems." In  Ethics  they  largely  followed  the  Old  Academy  as  well  as 
Socrates  and  the  Cynics,  velut ;  Cf.  V.  13,  note,  in  Gorgia  :  in 
Plato's  dialogue  entitled  Gorgias.  Archelaum :  King  of  Mace- 
donia (413-399  B.  C.),  and  son  of  Perdiccas  II.  He  obtained  the 
throne  by  slaying  his  half-brother.  A  patron  of  art  and  literature, 
his  place  was  adorned  with  splendid  paintings  of  Zeuxis,  and  men  of 
eminence,  as  Euripides,  were  entertained  by  him. 

35.  Haud  SCio:  not  so*definite  in  its  negative   answer  as  nescio. 
an  tu,  etc.  A.  211.  b  ;  H.  353.  2.  N.  4.    quam  sit  doctus,  quam 
vir  bonus  :  Socrates  aimed  to  establish  an  objective  rule  of  practi- 
cal life.     This  standard  he  saw  in  knowledge  with  which  he  identified 
virtue,     in  CO  :  that  is,  in  this  condition   of  knowledge  and  virtue. 
iniustus  :    justice  with  Socrates  was  a  crowning  virtue.     So  also 
with  Plato,  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics. 

36.  in   Epitaphio  :   the  funeral   oration    of   Pericles   over  the 
Athenians,  at  the  close  of  the  first  year  of  the  Peloponnesian   war  ; 
in  Plato's  Menexenus.     See  Timayenis,  History  of  Greece,  Vol.  I.,  p. 
283.     apta  :  depending  upon,  (in  this  sense,  only  in  Cic.)     Used  both 
with  ex  as  here  and  without  it  as  in  XIV.  40,  rudentibus  apta  fortuna. 
See  Lex.  s.  apo.  B.     SUSpensa,  depend,  rest  on.     In  this  sense  very 
rare.     Cf.  with  apta  ex  in  last  note,  and  pendere  ex  in  this  sentence. 
praecepto  :    /.  e.,  in  se  ipso  omnem  spent  reponet  sui.      Cf.   X.  30, 
omniaque  sibi  in  sese  esse  posita.     "The  wise  man  [of  the  Stoics]  is  he 
who,  being  perfect  in  his  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  the  universe, 
above  all  passion,  and  completely  governed  by  reason,  is  perfectly 
self-contained  and  self-satisfied." 

XIII.  The  argument  of  the  Chapter  is  this  :  Everything  in  na- 
ture is  destined  to  the  complete  development  of  its  kind.  All  im- 
plicitly follow  the  law  of  nature.  Each  has  its  peculiar  excellencies 
which  abide  with  it.  Man's  superior  gift  is  his  spiritual  nature,  soul 
and  mind,  the  perfect  development  of  which  constitutes  virtue ; 
wherein  man  reaches  the  perfection  .of  his  kind,  which  must  be 
synonymous  with  happiness. 


54 

37-     hieme  :  temporal,    fundat,  produces  abundantly,    quantum 
sit :     Subj.  by  attraction. 

38.  Take  etiam  with  facilius.     Observe  the  variety  of  distribu- 
tive  terms,   alias. .  ..alias,  quasdam. . .  .quasdam,   (Chiasmus   also); 
par  tint. . .  .partim,  alias,  quasdam,  non  nullas.     praecipui :  Gen.  par- 
titive,     etsi,    although  j    corrective.      See  Lex.   s.  v.  II.      habent 
aliquem  comparationem,  that  admit  of  comparison,    decerptus 
ex  mente  divina  :     A  Stoic  tenet.     Plato  had  borrowed  this  doc- 
trine from  Pythagoras.  Cf.  Cat.  M.  XXI.  78. 

39.  absoluta  ratio  :     The  Stoics  enthroned  reason,  and  sought 
to  bring  every  impulse  under  its  control,     quod  est  idem  virtus  : 
"He  who  has  a  right  judgment  and  right  intention  is  perfectly  virtu- 
ous,  he  who  is  without  right  judgment   and   intention  is  perfectly 
vicious."    et  hoc  quidem  mihi  cum  Bruto,  etc.     So  far  they 
agree,  but  Cicero  and   the   Stoics  hold   that   this  (virtus)  suffices  for 
vita  beatissima,  the  others  that  other  goods   must  suppliment  virtus 
to  bring  about  this  result.     The   Stoics  say,  that   if  anything  not  in 
man's   power   were  allowed   to  influence   his  happiness,   it   would 
detract  from  the  absolute  worth  of  virtue. 

40.  tripertito  :  Cf.  VIII.  23,  note,  and  X.  29.  30,  and  notes. 
XIV.     istorum  :  of  those  goods,     non  sane,  not  very;  softens  the 

negation ;  sane  non  would  strengthen  it.  rudentibus  apta  ;  Cf. 
XII.  36,  apta  and  note.  A  knot  in  a  rope  was  all  that  intervened 
between  safety  and  possible  destruction. 

41.  volumus,  we  hold /  implying  that  the   opinion    is    open  for 
discussion,     saeptum  atque  munitum,  constitute  together  a  sin- 
gle member  of  the  series.     Why  ?     A.  208.  b.  i  and  2  ;  H.  554.  I.  6. 
parvo  metu  praeditus  ;  praeditus  is  used  with  qualities  both  good 
and    bad — more    commonly   the   former,     parva  metuit ;  T.    has 
parvo  metu  est.    alia  ....  nisi,  else  than.     See  Lex.  s.  ahus  I.  B.     Say 
the  Stoics,  "  bravery  is  fearless  obedience  to  the  law  of  reason,  both 
in  boldness  and  endurance."     Zr.     procul  in  the  sense  of  liber  ^  as 
frequently  in  Livy. 

42.  Qui  autem,  further  how.     securitatem,  freedom  from 
care,     aegritudinis,  anxiety,  grief.     Cf.  VI.   16,   note,     celsus   et 
erectus,  noble  and  elevated,     omnia  sibi;  See   X.    30,   note,     tali 
animo  ;    characteristic.      civitas    universa  ;  as    Lacedaemon  or 
Sparta,  (Lacedaemonif).    fortitudinem,  temperantia  :  two  of  the 


55 

four  virtues  which  most  Stoics  held, — the  others  being  prudence 
and  justice.  See  V.  14,  note,  commotionum,  emotions  or  passions. 
aegritudine,  metu,  libidine,  insolent!  alacritate  ;  Cf.  VI.  15, 
and  note  on  motus  turbulenti  ;  also  XV.  43  ;  XVI.  48,  sine  metu,  etc. 
alacritate,  ecstacy,  rapture.  Cf.  XV.  43,  laetitia  gestiens. 

XV.  43:     quod  aegritudo,  etc.    pain   and  fear  are  classed  as 
fancied   evils,   pleasure  and   desire  as  imagined  goods,  in  each  case 
the  one  a  present  evil  or  good,  the  other  a  future.     We  must  get  rid 
of  such  beliefs  and  arrive  at  a  state  of  indifference  to  them,  is  the 

Stoic   teaching.     See   VI.    16,   note,     in  bonorum errore=/Vz 

bonis  opinatis.     The  author  varies  the  expression.     We  have  follow- 
ing the  famous  chain  argument  of  the  Stoics.     Atque  etiam  omne 
bonum,  etc.     See  VII.   \%~ante  docuisse,   note,     praedicandum, 
extolled.  .  , 

44.  quibus  abundantem:   A.   248.  c.   2;  H.  421.  II.    licet 
esse  :  for  licet  with  inf.  with  subject  ace.     See  A.   331.   /.  N.  3  ;  H. 

538- 

45.  iniustus,  etc.     Note  the  enumeration  of  the  vices,  the  oppo- 
site of  the  highest  virtues,  and  cf.  note  on  fortitudinem,  etc.  in  XIV. 
42.     atque  nullo  :  the  atque  has  a  climacteric  effect,  and  in  fact. 
See  Lex.  s.  v.  I.  B.  b.     videamus  ne  :  Cf.  I.   XXXIV.   83,  and  R. 
1656.     sola  is  not  to  be   taken   with   quae,   but  with  the  predicate, 
beatum  — beata  vita  for  sake  of  variety,     quid)  how.     Etenim,  etc. 
Cf.  XV.  43. 

XVI.  46.  minima,  of  slight  value,  color  suavis,  a  fine  complexion. 
Anticlea ;     a   slip  for   Euryclea,   the  nurse  of  Ulysses.     Anticlea 
was   his  mother.     Ulixi  :  Cf.   I.  XLI.   98;  also  A.   43.   a  j  H.  68. 
Lenitudo,  etc.     A  catalectic  trochaic    tetrameter   or   septenarius, 
from  the  Niptra  of  Pacuvius,  imitated  from   Sophocles.     The  death 
of  Ulysses  was  the  subject,     gravitate,   dignity,   moral  earnestness. 

aut  gravius  aut  grandius  :  paronomasia.     Cf.  Salvus sanus, 

XXI.  62. 

47.  At  enim  :  the  enim  introduces  a  reason  for  the  objection 
implied  in  at.  The  reply,  partly  concessive,  frequently  has  et  quidem, 
or  quidem  as  here.  R.  1623.  praecipua :  The  Stoics  regarded 
everything  that  was  not  positively  good  or  evil  (virtue  or  vice)  as 
indifferent  (media).  But  among  things  indifferent  there  are,  on 
comparison,  necessarily  preferences.  Some,  such  as  health,  wealth, 


56 

talent,  rank,  were  regarded  as  having  comparative  value,  and  were 
classed  as  praecipua,  producta,  praeposita  j  their  opposites  were 
termed  reiecta,  remota,  reiectanea.  The  media,  indifferentia,  as  a  spe- 
cial class,  became  thus  limited  to  those  things  which  could  not  in- 
fluence choice,  hi  autem  :  the  Peripatetics.  Socratica  ilia  con- 
clusione  I  only  the  first  part  of  the  conclusion  is  from  Socrates. 
The  second  part,  Adfectus  autem,  etc.,  Cicero,  or  his  Greek  author- 
ity, has  added. 

48.  etenim:  A.  156.  d;  H.  554.  V.  2.  alacritate=/Kw/i*// 
alacritate,  XIV.  42.  See  note.  Refert  autem  omnia  ad  beate 
vivendum  :  not  in  the  sense  of  making  happiness  the  end  to  be 
attained,  but  of  regarding  it  as  the  concomitant  of  virtue.  The 
vita  laudabilis  is  the  vita  honesta—vita  beata  j  and  in  the  vita  honesta 
resides  virtus,  the  summum  bonum. 

XVII.  49.  'E.t—atqui.  See  Lex.  s.  v.  E.  in  aliqua  vita,  in 
some  kinds  of  life,  gloriandum  ;  gloriari  with  a  direct  object  (ex- 
cept cognate  ace.)  is  rare  and  post-clas.  The  gerundive  is  thus 
used  here.  See  also  next  paragraph,  beata  vita  glorianda est. 

Epaminondas ;  The  famous  Theban  statesman  and  general. 
Died  362  B.  C.  He  was  the  hero  of  Leuctra  and  Mantinea,  and  in 
his  life,  both  public  and  private,  characterized  by  the  utmost  integ- 
rity, he  practised  the  lessons  of  philosophy  of  which  he  was  an  ar- 
dent student.  Consiliis,  etc.  Pausanias  gives  the  epigram  in  full. 
est  attonsa  ;  Greek  Ixelparo.  Africanus :  A.  Maior,  (234-183 
B.  C.).  A  sole,  etc.  The  distich  is  from  Ennius  and  is  quoted  by 
Seneca,  Ep.  XVIIL  5,  where  two  more  verses  are  given :  "  Si  fas 
endo  plagas  caelestum  ascender e  cuiquam  est,  Mi  soli  caeli  maxima  porta 
patet.  The  meter  is  the  elegiac,  supra  ;  instead  of  this  another 
writer  quotes  ad  usque.  Maeotis:  Gen.,  for  Maeotidis.  The  s  does 
not  make  "position."  Lake  Maeotis,  now  the  Sea  of  Azov,  aequipe- 
rari :  sc.  me. 

51.  libra  ilia  Critolai ;  Critolaus,  a  Peripatetic  philosopher, 
was  one  of  the  three  Athenian  embassadors  to  Rome  in  155  B.  C. 
For  the  allusion  in  libra  compare  the  following  from  de  Fin.  V. 
XXX.  91,  where  Piso  is  setting  forth  the  Peripatetic  doctrines  in 
opposition  to  the  Stoic  ;  "  I  will  venture  to  call  goods  whatever  is 
in  accordance  with  nature ....  and  I  will  place  that  noble  quality, 
virtue  (virtutis  amplitudinem),  in  the  other  pan  of  the  balance,  so  to 


57 

speak.     Believe  me    that   pan    will    outweigh    (deprimet)    earth    and 

seas,     animi  bona corporis  et  externa  ;  See   XXX.   85,  and 

X.  22,  ullo  corporis  aut  fortunae  mala,  and  note,  tantum  propen- 
dere,  press  down,  so  heavily,  illam  lancem  ;  /.  e.  containing  the 
bona  animi.  deprimat,  weigh  down^  i.  e.  force  up  the  scale  con- 
taining bona  corporis  et  externa.  Critolaus  had  probably  first  used 
this  figure. 

XVIII.  Xenocratem  :  See  X.  30.    exaggerantem=<?^/<7/&#- 

tem.     Cf.  XXX.  85  ;  also  see  XIII.  39,  note. 

52.  formido,  etc.  sc.  cadit.     formido,  dread,  overpowering  the 
understanding ;    timiditas,    fearful-ness    as    an    habitual    quality ; 
ignavia,  a  blamable  inaptitude  for    any   noble  action  ;  metus,  feart 
as  from  reflection.     See  D.  s.  vereri  /  Cf.    also   pavor,  consternation, 
a   being    disheartened.       ergo :    sc.    in   eum   etiam    cadit.      Atrei : 
Atreus,  king  of    Mycenae,  was  the  son  of  Pelops  and  father  of  Aga- 
memnon and  Menelaus.     Proinde  :  a   dissyllable  here.     The  verse 
is  an  iambic  trimeter  from  Accius,  and  is   probably  from  the  Atreus 
quae,  and  these  qualities. 

53.  ut  nihil  (ace.)   paeniteat  :  sc.   sapientem.     A.    221.    cj   H. 
408.  Ill;  Z.  442.     Cf.  XXVIII.   8 1,  quod  paenitere  possit.     omnia 
profluenter :    sc.  se  habebunt.     absolute=/*r/ii&.     igitur :  A. 
156.  k;  H.  554.  IV.  3  ;   Z.  357. 

XIX.  From  this  point  to   Chapter   XXIV.  are  given  illustrations 
to  show  that  vice  is  productive  of  misery,  virtue  of  happiness. 

54.  C.  Laelii  :   Caius  Laelius  Sapiens,  the  intimate  friend  of  the 
younger  Africanus,  was  consul  in  B.  C.  140.     cum  repulsa  :  In  141 
B.  C.  he  was  defeated   for    the    office.     This    sentence    might   have 
ended  with  quattuor  Cinnae  consulatibus  to  give  the  author's  meaning. 
But    after   the    parenthesis    he    changes    the    form,    sed  tamen,    etc. 
An  anacoluthon.     malles  te, . .  .consulem  :  double  ace.  with  esse 
omitted,  as  often. 

Cinnam  :  L.  Cornelius  Ciima  was  an  adherent  of  the  party  of 
Marius  and  consul  in  the  years  87,  86,  85  and  84  B.  C.  In  his  first 
consulship  he  sought  to  recall  Marius  from  exile,  but  failed  and  fled 
to  escape  the  vengeance  of  his  colleague  Cn.  Octavius  and  the  Sen- 
ate, and  was  deposed.  But  he  collected  an  army  and,  with  Marius, 
laid  siege  to  Rome.  The  capture  of  the  city  was  followed  by  mur- 


58 

ders  and  proscriptions.  Catulus,  the  noble  colleague  of  Harms  in 
the  battle  against  the  Cimbri,  was  one  of  the  victims  whose  death 
the  latter  demanded,  as  related  in  this  chapter  (56).  Cinna  was 
assassinated  by  his  soldiers  in  84  B.  C. 

55.  video  cui  committam :  Cicero's  friend  was  doubtless  in 
political  sympathy  with  him.     colleg'ae   sui  :  emphasized  by  posi- 
tion before  the  proper  name.     Cn.  Octavii ;     He  was  one  of  the 
first  victims.     His  head  was  cut  off  and  suspended  from  the  Rostra. 
P.  Crassi ;  surnamed  Dives.     Father  of  the  triumvir  ;  took  his  own 
life.     L.   Caesaris ;  L.  Julius  Caesar  Strabo,  consul  in  90  B.  C., 
censor  in  89  with  Crassus  as  his  colleague ;  great  uncle  of  M.  Anto- 
nius,  the  triumvir.     M.  Antonii  ;  the  orator,  grandfather  of  the  tri- 
umvir; consul  in  99  B.  C.  His  head  was  suspended  from  the  Rostra. 
C.  Caesaris :  surnamed  Strabo  Vopiscus,   was   a  brother  of  the  L. 
Caesar  mentioned  above.     He  was  famous  as  an  orator  and  is  one 
of  the  speakers  in  Cicero's  de  Oratore.  Specimen,  ideal.  Cf.  I.  XIV. 
32,  specimen  naturae,     liceret,  it  was  lawful,     sermonis  errore; 
Cicero  shows  that  the  term,  licere,  may  be   used  of  what  is  legally 
right  or  permitted,  although  morally  wrong. 

56.  cum communicavit ;     After  defeating  the  Teutoni  and 

Ambrones  at  Aquae  Sextiae  in  his  fourth  consulship,  Marius  joined 
the  proconsul  Q.  Lutatius  Catulus,  and  they  jointly  gained  a  great 
victory  over  the  Cimbri  at  Campi  Raudii,  near  Vercellae.     This  was 
in  101   B.  C.,  in  the  5th  consulship  of  Marius.     Moriatur;     See 
note  on  Cinnam,  (54).     He  is  said  to  have   suffocated  himself  with 

the  fumes  of  charcoal,     sex consulatus  ;  107  and  104-100  B. 

C.     He  was  a  seventh  time  consul  in  86  B.  C.,  but   died  on  the 
eighteenth  day  after  entering  on  his  office,     obruere,  dim  or  destroy 
the  glory  of. 

XX.  57.  Dionysius ;  the  Elder,  b.  430  B.  C.  He  became  sole 
general  in  405  and  began  his  reign  of  tyranny,  which  continued  until 
his  death  in  367.  in  victu  temperantiam  :  and  yet  his  death  is 
said  to  have  been  caused  by  excessive  feasting,  veritatem,  the 
true  state  of  the  case,  omnia  SC  posse,  that  he  had  unlimited  power. 
Elliptical. 

58.  alius  alio  modo  ;  He  was  born  in  a  private  station.  Plotius 
says  he  was  a  mule-driver,  Diodorus  Siculus,  that  he  was  a  clerk. 
aequalium  familiaritatibus,  familiar  intercourse  with  his  contem- 


59 

poraries.  consuetudine  propinquorum,  intimate  association  with 
his  kinsmen,  credebat— yfofcw  habebat.  The  direct  object  is  ex- 
pressed, ex  familiis  locupletium,  from  the  family-servants  of  the 
rich,  servos ;  attracted  into  the  relative  clause,  quibus  ;  etc. 
He  had  manumitted  them  and  termed  them  "new  citizens."  ton- 
dere :  used  absolutely,  artificio,  employment;  abl.  manner,  ton- 
Striculae  j  Other  authors  mention  female  barbers  ;  for  example, 
Plaut.  True.  II.  4.  51.  ferrum,  a  razor. 

59.  duas  uxores  :  after  the  death  of  his  first  wife  he  married 
the  two  here  named  at  about  the  same  time,  possibly  the  same  day. 
civem  suam ;  sister  of  Dion,  who  was  in  high  favor  with  Dionysius, 
and  for  a  time,  later,  supplanted,  as  tyrant,  the  younger  Dionysius, 
his  nephew.     Locrensem  ;  the  Locris  of  which  Doris  was  a  native 
was  situated  in  the  south-eastern  part   of  the  country  of  the  Bruttii. 
Her  son,  the   younger  Dionysius,  made  himself  tyrant  of  the  place 
when  he  was  expelled  from  Syracuse.     Cubiculari  lecto  :  probably 
the  edifice  or  pavilion  in   which  his  bed  stood,     cubiculari  is  from 
cubicularis — instead  of  cubicularius,  the  usual   form,     coniunxisset 
=coniungendo  effects  set. 

60.  pila  ludere  :  Playing  ball  was  a  favorite  sport  and  exercise 
with  both  Greeks  and   Romans.     The  Emperor  Augustus  used  to 
play,  and  men  getting  along  in  years  would  play  for  the  purpose  of 
warding  off  old  age.     Every  complete  gymnasium  had  a  room  de- 
voted to  this  exercise,  and  special  teachers  gave  instruction  in  ball- 
playing.     Foot-ball  was  a  favorite  game  at  Sparta.     The  base-ball 
of  these  days  was  unknown  then.    See  Diet.  Antiq.  s.  pila.  poneret, 
laid  aside,     impotentium,   incapable  of  self-control.    Cf.  impotenti, 
VII.  17. 

6 1 .  illdicavit,  declared  his  judgment. 

XXI.  Damocles ;  Horace  alludes  to  the  story  in  Od.  III.,  I. 
copias,  riches,  opes,  power,  pulcherrimo  textili  stragulo: 
The  conjunction  between  the  adjectives  is  omitted  because  the 
textili  stragulo  express  a  single  idea,  ministrare  :  the  proper  word 
for  waiting  or  serving  at  table. 

62.  QfortS—suffimenta;   effect  for  cause.     deftuebatlt=sensim 
ddabebantur.     Cf.    Liv.    II.    20,     moribundus   (de    equo)    ad  terram 
defluxit.     satisne:     The-ne=nonne.     A.  210.  d.     aliqui :   the  adj. 
form  here  properly  used,     integrum erat  ut,  etc.  A.  332  ;  H, 


6o 

501.2;  Z.  623.  Cf.  VII.    iTttntegrum  non  est.     Salvus sanus  : 

paronomasia. 

XXII.  63.    in  Pythagoriis  duobis  illis:   Damon  and  Phintias. 
See  de  Fin.    II.   XXIV.  79.  where  Cicero  also   alludes  to  the  friend- 
ship of  Orestes  and  Pylades.     adscriberer  :    Force  of  the  imperf. 

subjunc.?  miserum,  afflicting,     docto,  educated.    Musicorum 

perstlldiosum  :    On  account  of  the   parenthesis  the  sentence  is  in- 
complete,     musicorum  is  neuter.     Cf.    I.    XXIV.   57,  si  geometrica 
dedicisset.     poetam  etiam  tragicum :     He   is  said  to  have  con- 
tended repeatedly  at  Athens  for  the  prize  of  tragedy,  but  obtained 
only  second  and  third  prizes  until  just  before  his  death,   when  he 
won  the  first  prize  at  the  Lenaea,  an   Attic  festival  of  Dionysus'  or 

Bacchus,  with  a  play  entitled  "The  Ransom  of  Hector."  in  hoc 

genere  :  poets,   neminem:    A.  202. /.  2  ;  H.  457.  i.   cum  Aqui- 
nio :    A  bad  poet,  also  mentioned  by  Catullus  14.  18.     omni  cultu 
et  victll  humano,  of  all  refinement  and  social  intercourse  with  men. 

XXIII.  64.     Archytae :  Archytas  of  Tarentum,  (fl.  B.  C.  400- 
365  ?)  was  a  Pythagorean  and  a  friend  of  Plato  who  was   probably 
indebted  to  him  for  some  of  his  views.     He  was  distinguished  as  a 
general  and  a  statesman.     Like  all  Pythagoreans   he   gave  much  at- 
tention to  mathematics    and  became   eminent  as  a  mathematician. 
His  wooden  flying  dove  was  the  wonder  of  the  ancients,     humilem 
homunculum  ;  Archimedes  (287-212  B.  C.)  was  of  humble  origin 
and  poor.     Sil.  Ital.  XIV.  342,  says 

Vir  fuit  Isthmiacis  decus  immortale  colonis, 
Ingenio  facile  ante  omnes  telluris  alumnos, 
Nudus  opum,  sed  cui  caelum  terraeque  pater  ent. 

He  aided  materially  in  defending  Syracuse  by  his  engines,  but 
was  slain  by  a  Roman  soldier  at  the  taking  of  the  city.  He  was  the 
first  to  ascertain  the  ratio  of  the  radius  to  the  circumference  and  of 
the  cylinder  to  the  sphere,  and  that  a  body  dipped  in  water  loses  as 
much  weight  as  that  of  the  water  displaced.  He  invented  the  pulley, 
the  endless  screw,  an  orrery,  showing  the  motions  of  the  heavenly 
bodies,  etc.  Some  of  his  writings  are  still  extant,  a  pulvere  et 
radio  ;  The  mathematicians  used  to  strew  a  table  with  sand  (pulvis) 
and  in  this  draw  their  figures  with  a  rod  (radius).  Cf.  de  Nat.  Deo- 
rum,  II.  18.48,  nunquam  eruditum  ilium  pulverem  attigistis,  you  have 


6i 

never   taught  mathematics,     ego  quaestor  :     In  75  B.  C.  under  the 

praetor  of  Lilybaeum,  Sex.  Paducaeus.     spheram cum   cylin- 

dro  ;  Archimedes  first  discovered  the  relation  which  the  cubic  con- 
tents of  the  sphere  bears  to  those  of  the  cylinder. 

65.  ad  portas  Achradinas;  Achradina  was  one  of  the  five  parts 
or  towns  of  which  Syracuse  consisted,  and  occupied  the  high  ground 
of  the  peninsula  north  of  Ortygia.     Other  readings  are  Agragianas 
and  Agragentinas,  meaning  the  "Agragentine"  gate   at   Syracuse   in 
the  direction  of  Agrigentum.     animum   adverH==a«fiwadfctfr//.    In 
the  classical  period  these  words  are  usually  contracted    to  animad- 
verti.     erant  autem  ;  the  autem  is  transitional,  now. 

66.  ad  adversam  basim,  to  the  front  of  the  pedestal,    exesis, 
effaced.     Graeciae= Magnae  Graeciae.     unius  acutissimi ;     Ob- 
serve how  the  superlative  is  strengthened  by  unius.     See  also  unus 
suavissimus  in  this  same  paragraph,     homine  Arpinati ;     Cicero 
was  born  at  Arpinum  in  Latium.     cum  humanitate,   with  liberal 
culture,    actionemque,  and  their  employments,    cum  oblectatione 
sollertiae,  with  the  pleasure  that  comes  from  a  consciousness  of  skill. 
in  caede  e,  t  iniuriis  ;     Zeugma.     For  alebatur  supply  versabatur. 

67.  eius  ;  /.  e.,  of  the  mind,    igitur ;  Note  the  position  of  igitur. 
existere,  proceeds,  arises. 

XXIV.  68.  moventia,  motives.  The  quasi  softens  the  unusual 
expression  ;  moventia,  springs  of  action,  intellegentiamque,  and 
understanding,  nobis ;  Dat.  A.  232.  a  ;  H.  388.  fingatur,  con- 
ceived of,  imaged,  tardis  enim  mentibus :  Dat.  Cf.  XXXV.  100, 
huic  vitae.  Cicero  uses  this  verb  (as  if  comitem  esse)  with  the  dat.  in 
only  three  instances,  triplex  ille  animi  fetus ;  Physics,  ethics, 
dialectics  ;  /.  e.  a  knowledge  of  all  branches  of  philosophy,  unus 
. . .  .alter. . .  .tertius  :  more  common  in  Cic.  than/n'wjw,  secundus, 
tertius.  Cf.  I.  XVII.  40,  una,  altera. 

69.  cum  his. . .  .curis ;  i.  e.  the  problems  of  philosophy,  and  the 
pleasure  experienced  in  their  investigation,  ut,  for  example,  per- 
spexerit,  viderit :  time  future  to  that  expressed  in  adfici  necesse 
est,  which  is  future  in  sense,  eius  ipsius  ;  /.  e.  totius  mundi.  Sep- 
tem  alia  ;  the  five  planets  and  the  sun  and  moon,  rata,  fixed, 
unalterable.  SUStineantur  ;  change  of  tense  from  perfect  to  pres- 
ent ;  a  common  usage,  qua  gravitate  ;  depends  on  delata.  It  is 
better  to  omit  the  in  and  connect  the  qua  with  gravitate. 


62 

XXV.  7°-  1°  paragraphs  70  and  71  the  pleasures  of  the  study 
of  moral  philosophy  are  set  forth,  praecepta,  enjoined,  ilia  COg- 
nitio  :  See  I.  XXII.  52.  compleatur  :  Bentley  emends  completur. 
The  subjunctive  must  be  explained  as  result  ;  the  indicative  would 
state  it  as  a  fact  simply,  illius  aeternitatis  imitandi  :  The  imi- 
tandi  may  possibly  stand  for  imitandae,  which  would  make  the  con- 
struction regular.  Cf.  A.  298.^-  H.  542.  I.  Note  i.  Tischer  reads 
aeternitatem.  illius  :  sc.  mentis,  in  brevitate  vitae  conlocatam, 
confined  to  this  short  life.  Conlocatam  refers  back  to  cogitatio,  while 
the  thinking  mind  is  in  fact  the  subject  of  putat.  ex  aliis  aptas, 
depending  upon  (arising  front]  others.  The  expression  is  Ciceronian. 
See  Lex.  s.  v.  I.  B.  quibus  refers  to  rerum;  fluentibus  to  the 
constant  changes  in  things. 

71.  intuens  means  attentive  contemplation,  SUSpiciens  implies 
here  respect.     c\teriQr*==t£rrestria.      genera  partesque  :  pars, 
not  species  stands  opposed  to  genus.     Cf.  III.  XI.  24.     extremum 
in    bonis=summum   bonum.     ultiTnum=summum.     Cf.    de  Fin.  I. 
IV.  n,  "  quid  sequatur  natura,  ut  summum  ex  rebus   expetendis,  quid 
fugiat  ut  extremum  malorum" 

72.  tertia  :  /.  e.  Logic.     The  gender   is   due   to  the  concluding 
words  of  the    sentence,     genera   dispertit  :  See    note    on  genera 
partesque,  71.     perfecta  concludit  :  states   the  conclusion  syllogis- 
tically.     ratio,  art.     Transeat,  etc.     A  Stoic  view  and  opposed  to 
the  Epicurean.     Epicurus  and   Metrodorus   thought    it  folly  to  take 
part  in  public  life,     contineri   prudentia,  firmly  established  through 
his  prudence,    iustitia  :  Abl.    in  suam  domum:  Not  the  home 
but  the  locality  is  designated.     Hence  the   preposition,     tarn  var- 
iisque  ;  the  -que  is  necessary  because  tarn   variis   expresses  a  single 
idea,     paene,  I  may  say.     cultu  atque  victu  :  Cf.  XXII.  63,  note. 
Fortuna  ipsa  cedat  :   Cf.  Parad.  V.  I.    34,    cut   quidem    (sapienti} 
etiam,  quae  vim  habere  maximam   dicitur,  fortunam  ipsa  cedit.     bea- 


XXVI.  73.  in  viola,  of  one  bedded  on  violets,  in  rosa  :  Cf. 
Hor.  Od.  I.  5,  i.  an  Epicuro,  etc.  The  antithesis  to  this  clause 
might  have  been  ceteris  pJiilosophis  idem  dicere  non  licebit?  But  Cicero 
takes  up  the  matter  afresh  in  75,  sed  cum  is  dicat  etc.  ut  habet  SC 
res  :  /.  e.  when  one  considers  only  the  matter  itself,  dolore  de- 
finiat,  etc.  The  pleasure  that  with  Epicurus  is  the  chief  good  is 


63 

"  freedom  of  the  body  from  pain  and  the  soul  from  confusion." 
honesta  turpia  :  asyndeton  in  opposition.  Z.  782.  R.  2204  (b). 
Cf.  A.  208.  b;  H.  636.  I.  i ;  also  I.  XXVI.  64,  supera  in/era,  etc. 
aut  leve  aut  asperum  in  corpore  sentiatur :  Epicurus  reduces 
all  knowledge  to  touch  ;  for  he  holds  that  the  senses  are  the  only 
source  of  knowledge,  and  these  give  us  a  true  perception  of  that 
which  comes  into  contact  with  them.  Lucretius  teaches  that  the 
sense  of  taste  is  agreeable  when  it  is  acted  on  by  smooth  atoms  and 
disagreeable  when  the  atoms  are  rough,  huic . . . .  ferarum  :  The 
expression  is  abbreviated  as  in  I.  I.  2,  ilia. . .  .sunt  conferendd.  obli- 

visci sui,  to  forget  his  own  chief  tenet. 

74.    ilia:  such  as  the  Stoics  provide,    recordatione prae- 

teritorum  voluptatium  :  Cf.  XXXI.  88. 

"  While  the  Cyrenaics  maintained  that  bodily  pleasures  and  pains  were  the  keen- 
est, Epicurus  claimed  these  characteristics  for  the  pleasures  of  the  mind,  which 
intensified  the  present  feeling  by  anticipations  of  the  future  and  recollections  of  the 
past.  And  thus  the  wise  man  might  be  happy  even  on  the  rack."  Marshall,  Hist» 
Gk.  Phil. 

"  Listen. . .  .to  the  words  of  Epicurus  when  dying  ;  and  observe  how  inconsistent 
is  his  conduct  with  his  language.  '  Epicurus  to  Hermarchus  greeting  :  I  write  this 
letter',  he  says,  '  while  passing  a  happy  day,  which  is  also  the  last  day  of  my  life. 
And  the  pains  of. ...  and  bowels  are  so  intense  that  nothing  can  be  added  to  them 
which  can  make  them  greater.'  Here  is  a  man  miserable  if  pain  is  the  greatest 
possible  evil.  It  cannot  possibly  be  denied.  However,  let  us  see  how  he  proceeds. 
*  But  still  I  have  to  balance  this  a  joy  in  my  mind,  which  I  derive  from  the  recol- 
lection of  my  philosophical  principles  and  discoveries,  But  do  you. . .  .protect  the 
children  of  Metrodorus.'  After  reading  this  I  do  not  consider  the  death  of  Epami- 
nondas  or  Leonidas  preferable  to  his. . .  .The  deaths  of  generals  are  glorious,  but 
philosophers  usually  die  in  their  beds.  But  still  Epicurus  says  when  dying,  '  I 
have  a  joy  to  counterbalance  these  pains.'  I  recognize  in  these  words,  O  Epicurus, 
the  sentiments  of  a  philosopher,  but  still  you  forgot  what  you  ought  to  have  said. 
For,  in  the  first  place,  if  those  things  be  true,  in  the  recollection  of  which  you  say 
you  rejoice,  that  is  to  say,  if  your  writings  and  discoveries  are  true,  then  you  can 
not  rejoice,  For  you  have  no  pleasure  here  which  you  can  refer  to  the  body.  But 
you  have  constantly  asserted  that  no  one  ever  feels  joy  or  pain  except  with  refer- 
ence to  his  body.  '  I  rejoice,'  says  he,  '  in  the  past.'  In  what  that  is  past  ?  If 
you  mean  such  past  things  as  refer  to  the  body  then  I  see  that  you  are  counterbal- 
ancing your  agonies  with  your  reason,  and  not  with  your  recollection  of  pleasures 
which  you  have  felt  in  the  body.  But  if  you  are  referring  to  your  mind,  then  your 
denial  of  there  being  any  joy  of  the  mind  which  cannot  be  referred  to  some  pleas- 
ure of  the  body,  must  be  false.  Why,  then,  do  you  recommend  the  children  of 
Metrodorus  to  Hermarchus  ?  In  that  admirable  exercise  of  duty,  in  that  excellent 


64 

display  of  your  good  faith,  (for  that  is  how  I  look  upon  it),  what  is  there  that  you 
refer  to  the  body  ?  de  Fin.  II.  xxx. 

Some  texts  have  voluptatum.  Arpinati  nostro  :  sz.fundo.  Arpi- 
num — the  birthplace  of  Cicero — lies  in  a  mountainous  district  near 
the  junction  of  the  Fibrenus  and  Liris.  mala  praesentia  prae- 
teritae  voluptates;  chiasmus. 

75.  iis  qui existimant ;  /.  e.  the  Stoics  and  many  adherents 

of  the  New  Academy.  The  sentiment  semper  beatum  esse  sapientem 
is  consistent,  not  with  the  view  of  Epicurus,  but  with  that  of  the 
Stoics, — that  virtue  is  alone  sufficient  for  a  happy  life,  balbutire  : 
for  they  held  that  happiness,  although  found  only  in  virtue,  is  in- 
creased by  external  goods.  Cf.  VIII.  23,  and  IX.  24,  and  notes. 
in  Phalaridis  taurum  ;  Cf.  II.  VII.  17,  in  Phalaridis  tauro  si  erit, 
dicet  j  Quam  suave  est,  quam  hoc  no n  euro  !  The  sense  of  the  last 
two  sentences  is  this  :  Epicurus  is  inconsistent  in  saying  that  happi- 
ness can  exist  with  pain,  for  he  holds  pain  to  be  the  sole  evil ;  he  en- 
croaches on  the  ground  of  the  Stoics  who  hold  pain  to  be  indifferent ; 
while  the  Peripatetics  and  the  adherents  of  the  Old  Academy  (see 
last  note,  balbutire^)  are  as  inconsistent  as  Epicurus,  for,  as  external 
goods  are  essential  to  happiness,  pain  must  destroy  it.  Let  them, 
then,  allow,  as  do  the  Stoics,  that  happiness  consists  in  virtue  alone  ! 

XXVII.  76.  tria  genera  bonorum  :  See  VIII.  23.  laqueis, 
subtleties.  See  XVI.  47,  note,  sint  sane  ilia,  etc.  Cicero  will 
concede  more  than  the  Stoics,  viz.  that  external  and  corporal  goods 
are  actual  goods  in  proper  subordination  to  those  of  the  mind  (ilia 
divina].  sumenda,  taken  for  use.  The  term  is  a  technical  term  of 
the  Stoics,  its  opposite  being  reiidenda.  [ut]  ;  if  the  ut  be  permit- 
ted to  stand,  there  is  an  anacoluthon,  the  author  intending  to  close 
his  sentence  with  a  result  clause,  as  beatus  aut  potius  beatissimus  di- 
cendus  sit,  or  something  like  this.  Dolorem  vero,  etc.  A  suggested 
objection  which  he  meets  in  the  next  paragraph  (77).  Is:  dolor. 
huic. . .  .sententiae  :  scil.  sapientem  beatissimum  esse.  contra 
mortem,  etc.  See  in  INTRODUCTION  I,  the  subjects  of  the  five 
books,  wherein  Cicero  has  labored  to  prove  that  death,  pain,  grief 
and  other  mental  perturbations  are  not  evils.  In  this  book  we  have 
the  final  proposition  which  naturally  follows,  viz.  that  virtue  is  of 
itself  sufficient  for  a  happy  life,  and  the  sole  criterion  of  the  wise 


65 

man.  ardentCS  faces  :  So  in  II.  XXV.  61,  cumque  quasi  faces  ei 
dolor  is  admoverentur. 

77.  Pueri  Spartiatae laniati;Cf.   II.  XIV.   34,   Spartae 

vero  pueri  ad  aram  [of  Diana    Orthia\    sic   verberibus   accipiuntur,  ut 
multus  e  visceribus  sanguis  exeat,  non  nunquam   etiam,  ut,  cum  ibi  essem, 
audiebam,  ad  necem-  quorum  non  modo  nemo  exclamavit,  umquam,  sed  ne 
ingemuit  quidem.     Quid  ergo  ?   hoc  pueri  possunt,    viri  non  poterunt  ? 
et  mos  valebit,  ratio  non  valebit  ?     Cf.  II.    XX.   46.     prius  ;  with    the 
sense  of potius.    barbaria  ;  sc   terra,    qui  sapientes  habentur; 
called  by  the  Greeks  -fo^oao^taru.^  the    Brahmins.     Caucasi :  the 
name  is  given  to  the  extension  of   the  Caucasus  even  to  India, — /.  e. 
the  Hindoo  Coosh  or  the  Hirnalaya  Mts. 

78.  Mulieres  vero  :  answers  to  the  primum  ei  of  the  preceding 
sentence.    So  in  I.  XIII.  $Q,primumj  and  Maximum  vero  (XIV.  31). 
The  custom  referred  to  is  said  to  exist  still  despite  the  efforts  of  the 
English   authorities  and  the    missionaries,     ilia   victa :  as    though 
there  were  but  two.     An  indication  of  careless   composition,     um- 
bris,  dreamy  lives,     privatatis  erroribus,  with  their  own  perversely 
erroneous  views,     ibim  aut  aspidem,  etc.     The  same  animals  were 
not  reverenced  alike  in  all  parts  of  Egypt.     The  crocodile  might  be 
killed  with  impunity  in  some  parts.     The  ibis  and  the  cat  were  held 
sacred  everywhere. 

79.  montivagOS  ;  found  only  here  in  prose.     The  whole  pas- 
sage is  poetical,     vulnera  excipiant ;  accipiant  would  imply,  "  wil- 
lingly" receive,    ambitiosi laudis  studiosi :  Nom.    The  latter 

phrase  is  our  "  ambitious",  the  former  means  eagerness  for  honor- 
able public  station. 

XXVIII.  80.  illuc  unde  deflexit :  viz.  to  the  subject  suggest- 
ed in  the  question  with  which  chapter  XXVI.  begins  ;  whether  a 
wise  man  can  be  happy  in  the  midst  of  pain,  etc,  nec=^  non,  and 
the  non  negatives  consistet  and  resistet.  consistet,  will  it  stop  short; 
opposed  to  prosecuta  as  is  resistet  below,  ut  ante  dixi  :  See  V.  13. 

foedius deformius  ;  The  foedus  offends  the  natural  feelings, 

causing  aversion ;  the  defcrmis  offends  the  finer  sensations,  causing 
dislike — opposed  \.n  formosus ;  turpis  offends  the  moral  feelings.  D. 

8r.  quod  poenitere  possit ;  Cf.  XVIII.  53.  The  quod\*  nom., 
and  expresses  an  indefinite  object  of  emotion.  R.  1329.  Cf.  A.  221.  c. 
where  the  quod  is  expressly  given  as  an  ace.,  and  with  this  agrees 

9 


66 

Tischer.     H.    410.    IV.    nihil  invitum,    splendide omnia : 

observe  the  Chiasmus.  The  emphasis  is  thus  strengthened,  nihil 
. . . .  admirari,  to  be  disturbed  by  nothing;  by  this,  meaning  anything 
that  could  disturb  the  sage's  serenity.  The  reader  will  recall  the 
Nil  admirari  of  Horace.  Epist.  I.  6.  i. 

82.  senserint=/W/V^z;m«/.  congruere vivere:  subject  of 

esse.    Note  the  Chiasmus,    vita  beata  (sit):    Nom.     quo   modo 
nunc  est,  as  the  matter  now  stands  ;  i.  e.  according    to    our   conclu- 
sions to  this  point. 

XXIX.  impetrarim   libentur  ut :  Anacoluthon.    We  should 
have,  following  the  ut,  a  purpose    clause    like    id  me  doceas,  quern  ad 
modum,  etc.,  but,  as  often,  for  clearness'  sake,  after  a  long  interven- 
ing clause,  Cicero  begins   anew,   id  velim  audire.     nulla   vincula, 
etc.  refers  to  Cicero's  adherence  to  the  teachings  of  the   Middle  or 
New  Academy.     See  XI.  33,  note,  and  83  below.     He    dislikes  the 
Stoic  dogmatism,     paulo  ante:    XXVI.  75.     his  :  *'.  e.  Peripateticis 
et  veteribus  Academids.    contra  istam   sententiam  :  /.  e.  their 
fundamental  teaching,  that  the  wise  man  is   always  beatus  but  not 
always  beatissimus.     conclusa  :  sc.  sunt. 

83.  habetur  in  omnes  partes,  considers  the  views  of  all.    ut 

iudicari  ;  i.e.    can  be  judged  solely  on   its  merits,  no  great 

name  giving  it  credence,     hoc  velle  ut   . .  .virtus  satis  habeat ; 
Brachylogy  for   ut   a    nobis    demonstretur    virtutem ....  habere.      de 
finibus  ;  sc.  bonorum  et  malorum.     See  XXX.  84.     quod  quidem  ; 

The  relative   refers   to  the  clause,  virtus  satis praesidii,  which  is 

repeated   in   the   illud   below.     Carneadem  :     See    IV.    n,  note. 
See    INTRODUCTION.      sed  is;    sc.    id    egit,    as   implied   in    what 
follows.    Ut  contra  Stoicos,  as  (i.  e.  since),  it  was  against  the  Stoics. 
He  vehemently  opposed  the  dogmatism  of  the  Stoics,  and  held  that 
probability  is  the  utmost  that  can  be  attained.     See  INTRODUCTION. 
quod  quidem — exarserat  is  really  parenthetic,    posiverunt: 
an  archaic  form. 

84.  ut possit ;  depends  on   quaeramus.     quasi  decretum  ; 

The  word  decretum  as  a  philosophical  term  in  the  sense  of  dogma, 
was  new  to  the  Romans ;  hence   the   quasi.     Cf.  Acad.  II.  IX.  29, 
Quoniam  enim  id  haberent  Academici  decretum — sentitis  enim  iam  hoc  me 

dicer  e^  etc. 

XXX.  Hieronymus  ;  Of  Rhodes,  about  300-260  B.  C.,— was  a 


disciple  of  Aristotle,  and  is  classed  as  a  Peripatetic,  although  Cicero 
says  of  him,  de  Fin.  V.  V.  14,  "I  do  not  know  why  I  should  call 
him  a  Peripateiic,  for  he  defined  the  highest  good  to  be  freedom 
from  pain."  naturae  primis  bonis  ;  Cicero  in  de  Fin.  V.  VII.  18, 
says, 

"Some  people  consider  the  first  desire  to  be  a  desire  of  pleasure,  and  the  first 
thing  which  men  seek  to  ward  off  to  be  pain,  others  think  that  the  first  thing 
wished  for  is  freedom  from  pain,  and  the  first  thing  shunned,  pain  ;  and  from  these 
men  others  proceed,  who  call  the  first  goods  natural  ones  ;  among  which  they 
reckon  the  safety  and  integrity  of  all  one's  parts,  good  health,  the  senses  unimpaired, 
freedom  from  pain,  strength,  beauty,  and  other  things  of  the  same  sort,  the  images 
or  which  are  the  first  things  in  the  mind,  like  the  sparks  and  the  seeds  of  the 
virtues." 

85.  tria  genera  bonorifm  :  See  VIII.  22,  note;  also  IX.  25, 
note.  Dinomachus  et  Callipho  :  Of  these  philosophers  little  is 
known.  Cicero  condemns  their  theory  in  de  Off.  III.  XXIII.  119, 
as  follows  ;  "who  supposed  that  they  could  reconcile  the  antagonis- 
tic views  of  the  Stoics  and  the  Epicureans,  by  uniting  the  honorable 
(virtue)  with  pleasure,  like  uniting  man  with  beast."  indolentiam, 
freedom  from  pain.  Diodorus  :  of  Tyre,  a  disciple  of  Critolaus, — 
about,  1 10  B.C.  Aristonis:  See  XVIII.  27,  note.  He  differed 
from  Zeno  in  considering  all  the  indifferent  (d8td<popa)  as  equally 
indifferent.  Cf.  XVI.  47,  note.  Pyrrhonis  ; — about  320  B.  C. — 
A  native  of  Elis  and  founder  of  the  Sceptical  or  Pyrrhonian  School 
of  Philosophy.  He  was  probably  influenced  by  the  views  of  Democ- 
ritus.  He  left  no  writings,  but  his  pupil  Timon  of  Phlius  wrote  vol- 
uminously. ''When  the  Academy  became  sceptical  there  was  no 
room  for  an  independent  Pyrrhonist  school,  but  it  revived. . .  .when 
the  Academy  became  identified  with  an  eclectic  dogmatism  under 
Antiochus."  Pyrrho  held  that  the  wise  man  cares  nothing  for  the 
indifferent  (ddtdyopa),  Herilli:  Herillus  of  Carthage,  a  disciple  of 
Zeno,  hence  a  Stoic.  He  held,  however,  that  knowledge  (scientia) 
is  the  highest  good,  evanuerunt ;  Cic.  in  de  Off.  I.  II.  6,  says  : 
Atistonis,  Pyrrhonis,  Herilli  tarn  pridem  eocplosa  sententia  est.  Later 
these  views,  permeated  by  a  new  principle,  were  revived  with  much 
greater  energy  in  the  Christian  Church,  obtinere,  maintain.  Cf. 
I.  XII.  26.  explicata,  (adj.)  clear.  Cf.  Cic.  Plane.  2.  5,  causa  fad- 
Us  atque  explicata.  praeter  Theophrastum^^^  Theophrasto, 
the  more  common  method  of  expression  in  prose.  For  the  views  of 


68 

T.  see  IX.  24.  25,  notes,  licet  :  /.  e.  as  their  principles  permit  them 
to  do.  exaggerent :  See  XVIII.  51,  and  note,  ex  conlatione, 
in  comparison  (with  virtue].  COnterere  :  as  if  to  tread  under  foot. 
In  contrast  with  ad  caelum  extulerunt.  quamquam . . . . sint :  A. 
311.  a\  H.  515.  III.  N.  I.  i. 

XXXI.    86.    propendere:    See  Lex.  s.  v.  II.  A.  Cf.  XVIII.  51. 

87.  horum:  Peripatetics  and  Academics.  Virtue,  with  these, 
is  the  "greater  part,"  the  absolute  essential  to  a  happy  life,  taurum  : 

See  XXVI.  75.  Aristotele,  etc.  See  X.  30,  note,  minis 

COrmpta :  Zeugma ;  the  corrupta  goes  properly  with  blandintentis , 
but  we  need  some  such  word  as  territa  for  minis,  minis  aut  blan- 
dimentis  :  Bentley's  emendation  for  minimis  blandimentis.  com- 
plectitur  :  as  in  I.  III.  5,  orator  em  (=eloquentiam)  complexi  sumus. 
longe  et  retro  ponenda.  This  is  the  ms.  reading.  Some  editors 
omit  the  et,  others  change  it  to  ei,  the  retro  ponenda=postponenda. 
habere  SC angustius,  are  in  greater  straits,  i.  e.  hampered,  be- 
cause virtue  is  not  with  them  so  essential  to  a  happy  life,  desertum 
ilium  Carneadem:  His  views  respecting  the  chief  good,  XXX.  84. 
were  not  adopted  by  the  later  Academics.  Antiochus,  e.  g.  starts 
with  the  Stoic/rwHfl  naturae,  but  defining  the  highest  good  as  life  in 
accordance  with  man's  perfect  nature,  he  includes  in  it  bodily  and 
external  goods  as  well  as  perfection  of  reason,  and  while  virtue  is 
deemed  sufficient  for  happiness,  it  does  not  suffice  for  the  highest 
happiness.  For  this  other  goods  are  necessary.  We  must  not  allow 
too  much  weight  to  external  goods,  neither  can  we  ignore  them  alto- 
gether, nemo  est  enim  eorum  quin  bonorum :  There  are 
several  different  readings  here,  as  nemo  est  enim  qui  eorum  bonorum; 
nemo  est  enim  quin  eorum  bonorum  ;  nemo  est  enim  quin  veronim  bono- 
rum ;  nemo  est  enim  eorum  qui  bonorum.  With  our  reading  the  nemo 
eorum  refers  to  those  mentioned  in  the  preceding  sentence,  ani- 

mum esse  iudicem  ;  The  thought  here  and  in  the  following  is, 

that,  whatever  maybe  thought  by  the  different  schools  of  the  relative 
importance  of  the  three  classes  of  goods, — goods  of  the  mind,  of  the 
body  and  external  goods, — all  agree  that  the  mind  is  the  judge  ;  and 
so  all  schools  approximate  the  Stoic  view  that  goods  of  the  mind 
(virtues)  are  the  sole  goods — all  others  being  indifferent  ;  for  the 
mind  will  interpret  and  soften  bodily  and  external  evils  even  for  the 


69 

Epicurean  whose  standard  of  happiness  is  pleasure,  so  that  he  can 
be  happy  in  pain,  ea,  quae  bona  malaque;  /.  e.  corporis  externaque. 

88.  quis:   Who  of  these  just   named,     voluptarium  :  Cf.    II. 
VII.  1 8,  Epicurus,  homo,  ut  scis  voluptarius.     enim  diem   quo  mo- 
ritur  beatum  appellat :  See  XXVI.  74,  note,    memoria  et  re- 
COrdatione  :  reminisd  denotes  an  act  of  the    mind  as  momentary, 
like  in  memoriam  revocare;  whereas  recordari  denotes  it  as   of   some 
duration,  like    revocata   in   memoriam  contemplari.     D.     confutat  : 
note  the  primary  meaning  of  this  word,     ita  sentit,   lit . . . .  putet  : 
Pleonasm.     Z.  749,   750;  so    XXXIII.    95,    sic. . .  .praecipit,  ut.... 
putet.     sensum  exstinctum,  consciousness   is  destroyed.     Death  is 
annihilation,  a  dispersion  of  the  atoms  constituting  the  soul,    certa, 
fixed  tenets,     consolatur  ;  itsed  with    objects   personal  and  imper- 
sonal; in  the  latter  case  as  here =&«*/. 

89.  isti  grandiloqui :  the  Stoics.     Cicero   was  not   in  perfect 
harmony  with  their   ethics.     Cf.    XXXII.    90,   nostrates  philosophi. 
paupertatem  :  considered  here  as  an    evil — dreaded  by  the  many, 
regarded  with  indifference  by  the  philosopher.     Hence  Neque  tamen, 

etc.     Neque quisquam    philosophorum  ;  [The   wise   man] 

"  like  Epicurus  can  live  on  bread   and  water  and  at  the  same  time 
think  himself  as  happy  as  Zeus."     Zr. 

XXXII.  de  tenui  victu  :  Cf.  III.  XX.  49,  tenuem  victum  antefert 
copioso.  Cicero  criticises  his  view  as  inconsistent,  omnia  philosopho 
digna,  sed  cum  voluptate  pugnantia.  quae  res:  /.  <?.  amort,  ambitioni, 
etc. 

90.  Scythes  Anacharsis  :    The  importance  of  the  adj.  gives  it 
first  place.  Cf.   Collegae  sui  consulis,  Cn.  Octavii,  XIX.  55.    Anacharsis 
was  brother  of  a  Scythian  king  and  came  to  Athens  about  594  B.  C. 
He  made  the  acquaintance  of  Solon.  The  Greeks  admired  his  intelli- 
gence and  wisdom  and  the  simplicity  of  his  life.     His  brother  slew 
him  on  his  return    home,     nostrates  philosophi :  In    distinction 
from  foreigners  like    Anacharsis  ;  with    special    reference    to    the 
Epicureans,     facere  :  See  Lex.  s.  v.  II.  E.    Illius  epistola:  there 
are  several  letters  extant  bearing  his  name,  all  of  which  are  regarded 
as  spurious.     Scythicum  tegimen :  Cf.    Justin.   II.   2,     (Scythae) 
pellibus  ferinis  aut  murinis   utuntur.     quietum,    contented,    at    ease. 
quibus  es  delectatus :  Greek  o?c  Ivrpixpare. 

91.  Xenocrates  :  See  X.  30,  note,     talenta  :  the  word  means 


70 

"the  balance"  and  "the  thing  weighed."  It  was  the  highest  measure 
of  weight  among  the  Greeks,  and  came  to  designate  a  sum  of  money 
consisting  of  coins  equal  to  it  in  weight  and  value.  The  Attic  talent 
is  usually  meant.  The  reference  is  to  silver,  gold  being  rarely 
issued.  The  talentum  contains  6,000  drachmae.  The  drachma  be- 
fore the  time  of  Solon  contained  6.03  grains=i  s.  i  d.  After  Solon 
•  it  retained  the  same  value  as  a  weight,  but  as  a  coin  it  sunk  to  4.366 
grs.=about  8d.  The  talentum,  therefore,  was  worth  about  ^"200, 
and  was  not  a  coin.  The  largest  coin  was  of  the  value  of  ten 
drachmae.  Athenis  praesertim  :  Athens,  after  the  war  with 
Philip,  was  poor  in  comparison  with  the  Greek  cities  in  Italy  and 
Asia  Minor,  tantum  ;  evidently  restrictive  here.  See  Lex.  s.  v. 
II.  B.  minas  ;  the  mina  (100  drachmae)  was  1-60  of  the  talentum, 
£3,  6s.  8d. 

92.  Diogenes;  412-393  B.C. — pupil  of  Antisthenes.  He  was 
captured  by  pirates  and  sold  as  a  slave  to  a  gentleman  of  Corinth, 
who  freed  him.  His  interview  with  Alexander  the  Great,  was  at 
Corinth,  and  the  latter  is  said  to  have  admired  him  so  greatly  as  to 
have  said,  "  If  I  were  not  Alexander,  I  should  wish  to  be  Diogenes." 
See  INTRODUCTION,  ut  Cynicus  ;  /.  e.  as  was  natural,  he  being  a 
Cynic,  eum  and  eius  as  well  as  illi  and  ille  refer  to  regem  Persa- 
rum,  the  reflexive  sufficiently  distinguishing  the  speaker. 

XXXIII.  93.  diviserit  ;  "Desires  of  the  ist  class  aim  at  the 
removal  of  pain  ;  those  of  the  2d  at  the  diveisification  of  pleasure; 
and  those  of  the  3d  at  the  gratification  of  vanity,  ambition,  and 
empty  conceits  generally."  Cicero  in  de  Fin.  II.  IX.  criticises,  with 
some  severity,  this  classification,  paene  nihilo  ;  Abl.  price. 
neque  necessitatem  modo  sed  ne  naturam  quidem  attinge- 
rent,  and  have  to  do  neither  with  necessity  nor  nature,  i.  e.  are  neither 
necessary  nor  natural.  neque—et  non,  and  a  second  non  is  implied 
in  this  combination.  A.  149. Vy  H.  552.  II.  Observe  the  changes 
of  tense  in  this  paragraph — the  writer  at  one  time  thinking  of  the 
existing  philosophy,  and  at  another,  taking  the  standpoint  of  its 
author. 

94.  eaeque  voluptates  :  /'.  e.  of  the  first  and  second  classes. 

extenuatur,  are  disparaged,  quarum  genera copiam  :  the 

meaning  of  the  author  is  not  entirely  clear.  Some  editors  omit  non 
before  contemnunt\  but  this  clause  stands  in  opposition  to  the  words 


funditus  eiiciendas  putavit,  which  applies  to  the  third  class  of  pleas- 
ures, and  so  seems  to  require  the  negative  in  contrast.  Taking 
copiam  in  the  sense  of  facidtatem  we  may  understand  the  sense  to 
be  that  the  Epicureans  disparage  individual  pleasures  of  the  first 
and  second  classes,  (/.  e.  think  them  not  worthy  of  much  effort) 
while  not  rejecting  the  classes ;  but  they  seek  them  when  they  may 
be  easily  obtained  and  are  harmless,  (v.  non  obsit,  infra.)  See  IN- 
TRODUCTION. THE  EPICUREANS,  non  genere  aut  loco  aut  or- 
dine,  not  by  family,  or  rank,  or  station,  figura  properly  denotes 
shape  in  its  mathematical  relation,  whereas  forma  is  the  aesthetical 
conception  of  the  same.  See  D.  s.  Figura.  The  tropical  meaning 
quality  or  nature  is  best  here. 

95.  optandam   [et]    expetendam  ;    better   optandam   expeten- 
damque.     Both   words    signify    a    wish, — the   latter,  in  addition,  the 
effort,  through  other?,  to  realize   one's  wish,     compensatione  :  the 
tropical  use  of  this  noun  is  confined  to  Cicero,  voluptatemfugiat; 
"  He  would  have   pleasure   foresworn    if  it    would    entail  a  greater 
corresponding  pain."     tamen  ;  rarely  found  at  the  end  of  a  sen- 
tence. 

96.  tam  diu,  dum  ;  with  tam  diu — the  correlative  is  often  quam 
diu,  sometimes  dum  or  quam  alone,  or   even  quoad,     sentiret,    iun- 
geretur ;  Bentley  and  others  emend  sentiat,  iungetur;  but  it  is  not 
uncommon  to  find  a  change   in   the   tenses   of  the   subjunctives  de- 
pendent on  a  present  indicative  [here  praecipii\   which  may  be  con- 
sidered  historical,     memoria  ;  the  abl.   without   cum  is  common 
with  the  participles  iunctus  and  coniunctus  /  not  so  with  the  verbs. — 
With  the  statements  in  paragraphs  95  and  96  compare  the  following: 

"  He  [Epicurus]  admits  that  every  pleasure,  without  distinction,  is  a  natural  and 
therefore  a  good  thing,  and  that  every  pain  is  an  evil,  but  demands  that,  before 
deciding  in  favor  of  a  given  pleasure  or  against  a  certain  pain,  we  weigh  its  conse- 
quences, and  that  we  then  adopt  or  reject  it  according  to  the  preponderance  of 
pleasure  or  pain  in  the  result."  Ueb. 

"  Pleasure  and  pain,  further,  are  either  mental  or  bodily.  The  more  powerful 
sensations  are  not,  as  the  Cyrenaics  affirmed,  bodily  but  mental  ;  for  while  the 
former  are  confined  to  the  moment,  the  latter  are  connected  with  the  past  and  fu- 
ture, through  memory  and  hope,  which  thus  increase  the  pleasure  of  the  moment." 
Id.  See  INTRODUCTION,  See  also  XXVI.  74,  note. 

XXXIV.    97.    advictum: 


72 

"  Epicurus  then  recommends,  with  special  emphasis,  moderation,  the  accustom- 
ing of  one's  self  to  a  simple  manner  of  life,  abstinence  from  costly  and  intemperate 
enjoyments,  or,  at  most  only  a  rare  indulgence  in  them,  so  that  health  may  be 
preserved  and  the  charm  of  pleasure  may  remain  undiminished."  Ueb. 

desideriis condiri.  Cf.  the  proverb    "  fabas   indulcet  fames," 

hunger  sweetens  beans  or  "appetite  is  the  best  sauce."  Darius:  Co- 
domannus  (?),  last  king  of  Persia,  336-331  B.  C.  was  conquered  by 
Alexander  the  Great.  The  same  story  is  related  of  Artaxerxes. 
See  in  Plutarch's  Lives,  Artaxerxes.  PtolemaeilS.  Ptolemaeus  I., 
Soter  (?)  son  of  Lagus,  reigned  323-285  B.  C.  He  accompanied 
Alexander  the  Great.  Later  he  attacked  Jerusalem  on  the  Sabbath 
day  and  thus  made  himself  master  of  the  city,  cibarius. . .  .panis. 
Cf.  Isid.  Orig.  XX.  2,  Pants  cibarius  est,  qui  ad  cibum  servis  datur,  nee 
delicatus;  called  by  Celsus  hordeaceus.  contentius;  from  contendere. 

opsonare . . .  famem;  Cf.  de  Fin.  II.   XXVIII.   90,   Socratem 

audio  dicentem  cibi  condimentum  esse  famem, 

98.  philitiis  ;    or  pheiditiis,  the  Spartan  name  for  the  Syssitia  or 
daily  public  meals  of  the  Spartans  and   Cretans.     The  meals  were 
confined  to  men  and  youth,  who  were  obliged  to  attend  them.     The 
guests  were  divided  into  messes  of  about  fifteen  members  each.   The 
principal  dish  was  meat  cooked  in  blood  with  a  seasoning  of  salt  and 
vinegar  (called  black  broth  [v.  infra]  ),  with  barley  bread  and  wine. 
Temperance  was  strictly  enforced.     These  meals  served  the  purpose 
of  uniting  the  citizens  closely  by  ties  of  union  and  intimacy,  strength- 
ening the  feeling  of  nationally.     At  sparta  the  messes  were  formed 
into  corresponding  military  divisions,  and  fought  more  bravely  than 
would  mere  chance  comrades.     See  Diet.  Antiq.  s.  Syssitia.    Diony- 
sius ;  the  Elder.    Quae  tandem ;  sc.  condimenta.    ad  Euro t am, 
along  the  Eurotas.     Bentley's   emendation   for  the  ms.   reading,  ab 
Eurota.      ex  bestiis  ;  for  ex  bestiarum  more,  a  case  of  abbreviated 
comparison,     ut  quicquid  obiectum  est ;  for  ut  aliquid  obiectum 
est,  quicquid  est. 

99.  a  Xenophonte  :  in  the  Cyropaedia.  Cf.  de  Fin.  II.  XXVIII. 
92.     COpia  facili,  by  the  facility  with  which  they  are  obtained.     Cf. 
copiam,  XXXIII.  94.     siccitatem,  firmness  (of  body)',  freedom  from 
gross  humors.     See  Lex.  s.  v.  B.  3. 

100.  turn  intelleges ;  is  connected  in  thought  with  Adde 

adde,  as  well  as  with  confer. 


73 

XXXV.  Timotheum  ;  Son  of  Conon,  and  a  distinguished  Athe- 
nian general;  appointed  to  a  public  command  in  378  B.  C.  Died 
in  exile,  epistola  Platonis ;  among  Piato's  writings  are  included 
thirteen  letters,  which  are  universally  regarded  as  spurious.  The 
seventh  and  eighth  were  perhaps  written  by  Plato's  disciples.  The 
former  is  the  most  famous  of  them  (here  termed  praeclara]  and 
relates  to  the  assassination  of  Dion  (353  B.  C.),  between  whom  and 
the  younger  Dionysius  he  had  tried  to  effect  a  reconciliation,  his 
third  visit  to  Syracuse  (about  360  B.  C.)  having  been  fruitlessly 
made  with  that  object.  Cf.  XX.  59,  civem  suam,  note.  Hst.... 

epistola ad propinquos:  note  the  omission  of  scripta.  Quo 

cum  venissem:  referenced  to  his  first  visit  to  Syracuse,  about 
389  B.  C.  when  he  incurred  the  displeasure  of  the  elder  Dionysius, 
and  is  said  to  have  been  sold  by  him  into  slavery,  ferebatur:  See 
Lex.  s.  fero,  II.  7.  Italicarum  Syracusiarumque  mensarum : 
These  were  in  Greece  proverbial  for  luxury.  The  word  Sybarite, 
derived  from  Sybaris,  a  Greek  town  in  Italy,  has  come  into  our  lan- 
guage as  a  synonym  of  luxury  and  voluptousness.  Syracusiarumque; 
There  are  three  adjective  forms  from  Syracusae,  viz  :  Syracusanus, 
Syracosius  (Greek)  and  Syracusius.  The  latter,  used  here,  is  rare 
and  is  found  but  twice  in  Cicero.  The  second  is  a  collateral  form 
of  the  third, — and  is  poetic,  bis  in  die  ;  A.  256.  a;  H.  429.  I. 
comitantur  huic  vitae.  Cf.  XXIV.  68,  note. 

1 01.  temperari,  to  be  organized.  Cf.  I.  X.  21,  temper atione.  Sar- 
danapalli  •  according  to  Ctesias  and  Diodorus  Siculus,  Sardana- 
pallus  was  the  last  King  of  the  Assyrian  (Syrtae=Assyriae)  empire 
and  destroyed  himself  in  876  B.  C. 

The  story  as  told  by  Ctesias  is  that  he  was  effeminate  and  licentious  and  after 
suffering  a  siege  of  two  years  collected  all  his  treasures  and  his  wives  on  an  immense 
pyre  and  perished  with  them  in  the  flames.  Rawlinson  thinks  that  the  Sardana- 
pallus  of  Ctesias  represents  both  Asshur-dani-pal,  and  Asshur-emit-ilin  (according 
to  him  the  Saracus  of  Abydenus),  in  whose  time  Assyria  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Medes.  On  the  accession  of  the  former,  667  B.  C. ,  the  empire  was  at  the  height  of 
its  glory  and  magnitude.  His  buildings  were  without  rival  for  size  and  splendor  ; 
his  palaces  were  richly  adorned  with  the  precious  metals  and  sculpture,  and  Assyr- 
ian culture  reached  its  culminating  point.  The  libraries  at  Nineveh  were  the  finest 
that  had  ever  existed,  and  learned  men  were  attracted  to  the  court.  Many  valua- 
ble cuneiform  inscriptions  belong  to  this  reign.  It  is  also  said  of  Saracus  that  he 
burned  himself  in  his  palace  on  the  revolt  of  Nabopolassar,  father  of  the  Nebuchad- 
rezzar of  the  Scriptures. 

10 


74 

Haec  babeo  ;  Cic.  quotes  but  two  of  the  six  verses  of  which  the 
inscription  consists.     Strabo  gives  it  entire,     iacent ;  are  lost. 

102.  cur=cui  ret,  to  which  corresponds  the  reply  in  the  datives 
sigm's,  tdbulis,  ludis.  ubi=gua  in  re.  paupertas  ;  corresponds  to 
tenues  homines,  men  of  slender  means.  See  below,  putlgit  aliquid  : 
conscience  troubles  them,  because  most  of  these  works  of  art  found 
in  Roman  houses  and  villas  were  forcibly  or  secretly  taken  from 
Greek  cities  and  temples. 

XXXVI.  103.  popularis  offensio,  unpopularity.  In  §106  the 
same  is  expressed  in  the  words,  offensam  populi  voluntatemj  opposed 
to  gratia  popularis  or  aura  popularis,  or,  as  below,  commendatio  in 
vulgus.  Cf.  Hor.  Arbitrio  popularis  aurae.  vide  ne;  a  modest 
form  of  expression.  Cf.  I.  XXXIV.  83.  Z.  534.  leviculus,  somewhat 
vain.  Found  only  here  in  this  sense.  Quid  hoc  levius  :  Pliny 
the  younger,  Epist.  IX.  23,  takes  a  diiferent  view  of  the  case  ;  De- 
mosthenes iure  laetatus  est,  quod  ilium  anus  Attica  ita  noscitavit  j 
Our6$  £<TTI  Ayfjioadevrfi.  apad  alios;  See  Lex.  s.  apud.  B.  2.  d. 
non  multum  ipse  secum;  elsewhere  Cicero  speaks  much  more 
considerately  and  justly  of  Demosthenes,  e.  g.  Or.  VII.  23,  hoc  nee 
gravior  exstitit  quisquam  nee  callidior  nee  temperantior . 

104.  Democritus;  A    Greek   philosopher   born    at   Abdera   in 
Thrace — about   460   B.  C., — the   founder,   with   Leucippus,  of  the 
Atomic  theory  of  Greek  philosophy.     Although  he  traveled  a  great 
deal,  it  is  not  certain  that  he  was   ever   at  Athens.     However  Vale- 
rius Maximus  writes  :  [Democritus]  Athenis  compluribus  annis  mora- 
tus ....  ignotus  illi  urbi  vixit,  quod  ipse   in   quodam   volumine  testatur. 

a  gloria afuisse,  indifferent  to  fame.    An  tibicines,  etc.  Cf.  I. 

XIV.  31,   Ergo  arbor  es   seret . . .  .vir   magnus ...  .non  seret ?     mill  to 
arte  maiore;  A.  344.^.  and  b.  note;  H.  561.  III.    aliquid  esse; 
aliquid  in  this  use= aliquid  magnum.     See  Lex.  s.  v.  II.  C.  i.     Cf.  I. 
XX.  45.     ambitiones,  canvassing  for   office.     How    does   ambitus 
differ  from  ambitio  ?    ante  quam  poenitere  coepit ;  Cicero  re- 
flects bitterly  on  his  own  experience. 

105.  est;  often  used    alone   to    introduce   quotations=.fm^z# 
est.     Heraclitum  ;  Heraclitus,  of  Ephesus — about    535-475    B.  C., 
called  "  the  Obscure. "     He   held  that  the  ultimate  principle   of  all 
existence  is  fire,  and  that  all  things  are  in  a  constant  flux  or  flow. 


75 

Plato  and  especially  the  Stoics  were  indebted  to  Heraclitus.  Frag- 
ments of  his  great  work  "On  Nature"  have  come  down  to  us. 
Hermodoro:  Hermodorus  is  said  to  have  gone  to  Rome  after  his 
expulsion,  and  to  have  assisted  the  decemvirs  in  drawing  up  the 
laws  of  the  Twelve  Tables,  451  B.  C.  unus;  adds  emphasis.  Cf. 
unus  quisque  and  unus  with  superlatives,  excel  lat,  sit;  A.  266;  H. 
483.  exsuperantiam;  occurs  only  here  in  Cicero.  Aristides; 
" the  Just" — fl.  490-471  B.  C., — was  the  political  opponent  of  The- 
mistocles.  He  was  ostracized  but  recalled,  and  died  very  poor  but 
highly  honored.  Graecorum  quam  nostra;  sc.  exempla.  con- 
trahunt,  have  dealings,  intercourse;  a  business  term  but  used  beyond 
the  sphere  of  business,  iis  litteris;  in  same  construction  as  otio 
litterato. 

XXXVII.  106.  credo  :  ironical  as  in  XXXV.  102.  paulo 
ante  dictus  est:  At  XXXVI.  103.  abesse  patria;  Cicero  usually 
repeats  the  preposition.  He  uses  abesse  to  designate  his  banishment 
from  Rome,  bonis:  A.  220.  b,  i,  and  252.  note;  H.  410.  III. 

107.  parum  multa;  Cf.  I.  XLV.  iog,parumdiu.  rerum  natu- 
ram ;  /.  e.  the  reality.  Xenocrates  ;  See  X.  30,  note.  He  ac- 
companied Plato  to  Syracuse,  and  was  sent  on  repeated  embassies 
to  Philip  of  Macedonia.  He  was  a  native  of  Chalcedon.  Grantor; 
of  Soli  in  Cilicia,  an  Academic  philosopher  and  disciple  of  Xeno- 
crates— about  300  B.  C.  His  most  celebrated  work  was  "On  Grief," 
of  which  Cicero  made  much  use  in  his  Consolatio.  Cf.  I.  XLVIII. 
115.  Arcesilas  :  A  native  of  Pitane  in  Aeolis,  and  founder  of  the 
second  or  Middle  Academy.  Fl.  250  B.  C.  A  disciple  of  Theo- 
phrastus,  Polemo  and  Grantor.  Lacydes  :  A  native  of  Cyrene  and 
successor  of  Arcesilas  as  president  of  the  Academy  at  Athens.  Died 
215  B.  C.  Aristoteles;  See  X.  30,  note.  Theophrastus ;  See 
IX.  24,  note.  Zeno  ;  See  IX.  27,  note.  Cleanthes :  A  disciple 
and  the  successor  of  Zeno  263  B.  C.,  born  at  Assos  in  Troas.  His 
Hymn  to  Zeus  is  still  extant.  It  is  given  in  full  in  Ueberweg,  and 
the  translation  in  Peter's  "Specimens  of  Ancient  Poets,"  and  in 
Cocker's  "  Christianity  and  Greek  Philosophy."  Chrysippus  :  One 
of  the  greatest  of  the  Stoics,  born  at  Soli  in  Cilicia  in  280  B.  C.;  a 
disciple  of  Cleanthes,  and  the  first  to  put  Stoicism  on  a  sound  ration- 
al basis.  He  is  called  the  second  founder  of  the  school,  and  it  was 
said  that  "  without  Chrysippus  the  Stoa  had  not  existed."  Anti- 


76 

pater :  Another  Stoic,  born  at  Tarsus,  and  fl.  144  B.  C.  Carne- 
ades:  See  IV.  n,  note.  Panaetius  :  A  Stoic,  native  of  Rhodes, 
disciple  of  Antipater,  at  Rome  the  friend  of  Laelius  and  the  younger 
Scipio  Africanus.  Died  at  Athens  about  in  B.  C.  Clitomachus: 
A  Carthaginian,  disciple  of  Carmades  at  Athens,  and  his  successor 
as  the  head  of  the  Middle  Academy,  B.  C.  129.  Philo  :  of  Larissa, 
a  disciple  of  Clitomachus.  He  settled  in  Rome  B.  C.  88,  and  Cicero 
listened  to  his  lectures.  Antiochus  :  See  VIII.  22,  note.  Posi- 
donius:  A  Stoic,  from  Apamea  in  Syria, — B.  C.  135, — studied  under 
Panaetius  at  Athens.  He  traveled  widely  and  then  settled  in 
Rhodes,  where  Cicero  attended  his  lectures.  Afterwards  he  came 

to  Rome.    At  enim  sine  ignominia adficere  sapientem  ; 

This  reading  of  the  best  mss.  is  plainly  incomplete.  Various  read- 
ings have  been  proposed.  Other  mss.  have  non  before  sine  and  the 
word  poterit  is  found  in  a  few.  The  word  ignominia  may  have  oc- 
curred twice  in  the  original  and  an  early  copyist  failed  by  oversight 
to  repeat  it,  the  error  being  perpetuated.  Hence  Orelli's  emenda- 
tion,  '  At  enim  sine  ignominia'  Ignominia  poterit  afficere  sapientem? 
May  not  the  reading  possibly  be,  At  enim  non  sine  ignominia  afficere 
poterit  sapientem,  where  exsilium  is  supplied  from  above  as  subject  of 
potent?  Heine  suggests  that  the  omission  might  be  supplied  thus: 
'  At  emm  sine  ignominia  \horum  exilium  fuit.'  '  An  poterit  quicquam 
ignominid\  afficere  sapientem'  Tischer  reads,  ''At  enim  sine  ignominia' 
An  potest  exsilium  ignominia  adficere  sapientem  ?  At  enim  :  the 
enim  introduces  a  reason  for  the  objection  implied  in  at.  non 
Oportet :  What  kind  of  obligation  denoted  by  oportet?  See  D.  s. 
Necesse  est. 

108.  queant  :  denotes  ability  as  the  consequence  of  complete 
qualification.  D.  s.  Posse.  Cf.  Barbari. . .  .ferro  decertare  acer- 
rime  possunt)  aegrotare  viriliter  non  queunt;  and  infra,  XLI.  118,  quas 
ferre  nequeas.  Patria  est,  etc.  From  the  Teucer,  a  tragedy  of 
Pacuvius.  What  is  the  story  of  Teucer,  son  of  Telamon  ?  Cf.  Hor. 
Od.  I.  7,  vs.  21-32.  Cf.  also  Pub.  Syr.  patria  tua  est  ubicumquevixeris 
bene.  The  sentence  became  a  proverb  with  the  Greeks  and  Romans. 
Mundanum  :  a  word  coined  by  Cicero,  and  occurring  as  an  adjec- 
tive in  late  Latin.  The  apothegm  here  stated  is  frequently  quoted, 
and  is  sometimes  attributed  to  other  philosophers.  T.  Albucius  : 
A  careful  student  of  Greek  literature ; — satirized  by  Lucilius.  He 


77 

was  praetor  in  Sardinia  in  105  B.  C.;  was  afterwards  condemned  for 
extortion.  He  retired  to  Athens  and  pursued  the  study  of  philoso- 
phy. An  adherent  of  the  Epicurean  school.  Epicuri  legibus : 
Epicurus  taught  that  the  "  wise  man"  should  not  entangle  himself 
in  the  affairs  of  state. 

109.  in  patria:  See  IX.  26,  note.  Metrodorus  :  A  native  of 
Lampsacus  (some  say  of  Athens),  a  distinguished  disciple  of  Epicu- 
rus. Metrodorus  made  happiness  consist  in  having  a  well-consti- 
tuted body;  a  good  digestion  was  his  test  of  happiness.  See  IX. 
27,  note.  Plato,  Polemo :  natives  of  Athens.  Xenocrates, 
Arcesilas  :  strangers  who  had  moved  to  Athens.  Damaratus  : 
the  Doric  form  for  Demaratus;  a  noble  of  Corinth,  who,  when  Cyp- 
selus  overthrew  his  clan,  657*8.  C.,  fled  to  Etruria  and  settled  at 
Tarquinii.  tyrannum  Cypselum  :  reigned  from  658  to  628  B.  C. 
For  the  origin  of  his  name  see  Clas.  Diet. 

XXXVIII.  no.  sollicitudines  :  has  reference  to  fiiture  evils, 
aegritudines  to  present  ills.  How  does  the  latter  word  differ  in 
meaning  from  aegrotatio  ?  traductis  animis :  The  Epicureans 
taught  that  every  being  naturally  seeks  to  acquire  happiness  which 
is  synonymous  with  pleasure,  that  virtue  is  the  only  sure  path  to 
happiness,  and  that  the  wise  man  possesses  virtue  and  is,  therefore, 
always  happy.  Yet,  virtue  is  not  the  chief  good,  but  pleasure,  and 
the  former  is  chosen  for  the  sake  of  the  latter,  in  pluribus  bonis 
esse,  abounds  in  good  things,  ut  sapiens  semper  beatus  sit : 
after  speaking  at  length  of  blindness  and  deafness  in  the  following 
paragraphs,  Cicero  resumes  the  thread  of  thought  here  broken  off  in 
paragraph  1 19. 

in.  aspectu  :  aspectus  differs  from  conspectus,  as  the  active  from 
the  passive.  D.  non  versari  in,  are  not  concerned  with  ;  i.  e.  not 
the  eyes  but  the  mind  receives  pleasure  in  the  sight  of  a  pleasing 
object,  while  with  the  senses  of  taste,  smell,  touch  and  hearing  the 
organs  of  sense  are  the  seat  of  pleasure,  in  OClilis  tale  nihil  fit  : 
a  change  is  here  made  to  the  direct  discourse,  animus  accipit 
quae  videmus  :  Cf.  I.  XX.  46,  animum  et  videre  et  audire.  But 
with  the  Epicureans  all  sensation  is  reduced  to  touch — it  is  produced 
by  the  impact  upon  the  various  organs  of  sense,  of  infinitely  small, 
film-like  emanations  from  bodies,  non  ferme=/^#  fere,  not  easily. 


78 

adhibet  OCUlos  advocates,  avails  himself  of  (needs)  the  aid  of  the 
eyes. 

112.  Antipatri:  Antipater  is  said  to  have  been  a  disciple  of 
Aristippus,  the  founder  or  the  Cyrenaic  school.  Not  the  Antipater 
mentioned  in  paragraph  107.  See  notes,  est  quidem  :  Editors 
now  write  est  id  quidem,  as  required  by  the  Latin  idiom.  When 
an  opposition  between  two  predicates  occurs,  quidem  is  never  added 
to  the  verb  or  adjective  unless  the  subject  in  the  form  of  a  pronoun 
is  repeated,  obscenius  :  A.  93,  a  ;  H.  444.  I.  Appium  :  Appius 
Claudius  Caecus  was  of  a  proud  aristocratic  family.  When  censor 
(312  B.  C.)  he  built  the  Appian  aqueduct  and  commenced  the  famous 
Appian  way.  He  was  consul  in  307  and  in  296.  In  280  he  was 
carried  into  the  Senate  house,  and  in  an  eloquent  speech  persuaded 
the  senate  to  reject  the  terms  of  peace  proposed  by  Pyrrhus  and 
brought  by  Cineas.  Cf.  Cat.  M.  6.  16  and  n.  37.  C.  Drusi :  This 
Drusus,  distinguished  as  a  jurist  and  an  orator,  was  a  brother  of  M. 
Livius  Drusus  who  was  the  ablest  of  the  Roman  demagogues  and 
patron  of  the  Italians.  Pueris  nobis  :  In  what  year  was  Cicero 
born?  When  die?  Cn.  Aufidius  :  Was  quaestor  in  1196.  C., 
tribunus  plebis  in  114,  and  praetor  in  108.  Cf.  de  Fin.  V.  XIX.  54, 
Equidem  e  Cn.  Aufidio,  praetoris,  erudito  homine,  oculis  capto,  saepe 
audiebam,  quum  se  lucis  magis  quam  utilitatis  desiderio  moveri  diceret. 

Graecam historiam  :  "Of  his  Graeca  historia  we   possess   no 

fragments;  but  there  is  no  doubt  it  treated  of  the  history  of  Rome." 
Teuffel. 

XXXIX.  113.  Diodotus  :  A  teacher  of  Cicero,  especially  in 
dialectics;  died  in  the  year  59  B.  C.  at  Cicero's  house,  and  left  the 
latter  a  property  worth  about  a  hundred  thousand  sesterces,  (nearly 
$50,000).  Learned  Greeks  enjoyed  the  literary  society  of  distin- 
guished Romans,  and  became  members  of  Roman  families  for  that 
purpose,  often  instructing  the  children  although  in  no  need  of  such 
means  of  support,  domui :  the  locative  form  of  domus  in  the  fourth 
declension.  A.  70.  g.  quod  credibile  vix  esset :  There  is  an 
ellipsis  of  the  condition,  if  I  had  not  myself  witnessed  it.  cum .... 

versaretur  et  cum uteretur,    cumque legerentur 

turn tuebatur  :  A.  326,  b  ;  H.  521.  2.  2).    Note  i.    Pythag- 

oreorum    more :       The    Greeks    gave   considerable   attention    to 
music,  while  with  the  Romans  there  was  little  if  any  native  develop- 


79 

ment  of  it.  The  early  Romans  knew  nothing  of  stringed  instru- 
ments, the  short  and  slender  Latian  flute  with  four  holes  being  their 
sole  musical  instrument.  The  Greeks  had  a  number  of  instruments. 
Pythagoras  studied  music  scientifically  and  discovered  the  numerical 
relations  of  the  octave,  the  fifth  and  the  fourth.  The  Pythagorean 
school  continued  the  investigations.  Aristoxenus  (see  I.  X.  20),  a 
pupil  of  Aristotle  and  a  Pythagorean,  was  the  greatest  authority  on 
music  among  the  ancients.  It  may  be  added  that  the  mathematician 
Euclid  and  the  astronomer  Ptolemaeus  wrote  on  music,  legeren- 
tur=recitarentur.  munus  tuebatur,  attended  to  the  duties  of  a 
teacher.  Cf.i.  XLV.  109,  virtutis  functus  est  munere.  Asclepiadem: 
Asdepiades  of  Phlius, — 300  B.  C. — friend  and  disciple  of  Menedemus 
of  Eretria,  who  founded  the  Eretrian  school.  The  teachings  of  this 
school  are  little  known  but  are  said  to  resemble  those  of  the  Megar- 
ian  school.  The  latter  united  the  views  of  the  Eleatics  with  the 
ethical  and  dialectical  principles  of  Socrates.  Cf.  Acad.  II.  XLII. 
129,  A  Menedemo  autem,  quod  is  Eretria  fuit,  Eretriad  appellati, 
quorum  omne  bonum  in  mente  positum  ac  mentis  acie,  qua  verum  cerne- 
retur.  puero  ut  uno  esset  comitatior:  The  allusion  is  to  the 
custom  of  the  wealthy  being  escorted  by  friends  and  clients.  As- 
clepiades,  although  without  such  attendance,  says  in  jest  that  his 
blindness  has  added  another  to  his  attendants,  namely  a  boy  to  lead 

him  about,     ut esset  comitatior  :     A  result  clause.     Cicero 

frequently  employs  comitatus  in  a  passive  sense,  si  liceat:  sc.  para- 
sitari  or  mendicare.  Many  Greek  scholars  at  Rome  stood  in  the 
relation  of  parasites  to  wealthy  Romans.  Cicero  would  not  degrade 
them. 

114.  luminibus  amissis :  This  is  doubtful.  The  tradition  is 
that  he  deprived  himself  of  sight  in  order  that  he  might  the  better 
concentrate  his  thoughts  on  philosophic  study,  scilicet  :  concess- 
ive, bona  mala:  See  XXVI.  73,  note.  R.  2204.  magna  parva: 
not  in  the  sense  of  size,  aspectu  OCUlorum,  the  sense  or  power  of 
sight.  Cf,  I.  XXX.  73,  aspectum  omnino  amitterent ;  and  XXXVIII. 
III.  oculorum  is  a  subjec.  gen.  ille. . . .  peregrinabatur  :  sc.  animo. 
His  knowledge  was  extensive ;  no  Greek  before  Aristotle  was  as 
learned  ;  and  he  left  works  on  physics,  ethics,  astronomy,  mathe- 
matics, art,  and  literature,  of  which  scanty  fragments  remain.  The 
lively  and  attractive  style  of  his  writings  is  praised.  Homerum 


8o 

caecum  fuisse  ;  The  tradition  that  Homer  was  blind  in  his  old 
age  may  have  arisen  from  the  fancy  that  the  blind  singer  in  the 
Odyssey  was  a  prototype  of  Homer,  and  because  the  author  of  the 
hymn  to  the  Delian  Apollo,  (supposed  by  the  ancients  to  be  Homer), 
represented  him  as  blind.  picturam  ;  Lucian  calls  Homer 
^O.&pufTOS  TCOV  fpa<f>sa)v,  the  best  of  painters. 

115.  Anaxagoras  ;  See  IV.  10.  Anaxagoras  died  in  quasi  ban- 
ishment at  Lampsacus.  He  gave  philosophy  a  home  at  Athens,  and 
is  above  all  distinguished  as  the  first  philosopher  to  introduce  a 
spiritual  element  beside  the  material — a  sort  of  dualism.  Cf.  I. 
XLIII.  104.  Tiresiam  ;  The  blind  soothsayer  of  Thebes.  His 
blindness  is  variously  accounted  for.  He  possessed  the  gift  of  proph- 
ecy, and  figures  in  the  wars  of  the  Seven  against  Thebes  and  the 
Epigoni.  Polyphemum  :  Cicero  seems  to  be  in  error  in  referring 
this  story  to  Homer  as  it  does  not  occur  there.  There  were  different 
conceptions  of  the  Cyclopes,  (round-eyed  ones)  among  the  ancients. 
Hesiod  makes  them  the  sons  of  Uranus  and  Gaea,  and  three  in 
number,  with  a  single  eye  in  the  forehead.  They  later  forged  Jove's 
thunderbolts.  Homer  represents  them  as  living  a  pastoral  life,  and 
a  later  age  placed  them  in  Sicily  and  identified  them  with  the  Cy- 
clopes of  Hesiod.  Polyphemus  appears  in  Homer  as  suffering  the 
deprivation  of  his  eye  by  the  cunning  device  of  Odysseus.  A  later 
legend  made  him  the  lover  of  the  nymph  Galatea,  and  the  poets 
Philoxenus  and  Theocritus  have  made  the  story  famous.  Propertius 
says,  "quin  etiam,  Polypheme,  fera  Galatea  sub  Aetna  ad  tua  rorantes 
carmina  flexit  equos."  It  was  a  third  variety  of  Cyclopes  that  built 
the  Cyclopean  walls  at  Mycenae,  Tiryns,  Argos,  etc.  colloquentem 
facit  eiusque  laudare  fortunas  :  Observe  the  two  constructions 
after  facit,  in  the  sense  of  representing.  Z.  618.  Note;  A.  292.  e; 
H.  535.  I.  4,  and  see  Lex.  s.  v.  B.  4  (7-).  fortunas  ;  For  other  in- 
stances of  the  use  of  the  plural  for  the  sing,  of  this  word,  see  Lex. 
s.  for  tuna,  2.  B.  fin. 

XL.  116.  surdaster  :  a  form  of  the  diminutive,  of  rare  occur- 
rence. This  word  occurs  only  here.  Cf.  oleaster,  parasitaster ,  pi- 
naster, and  our  poetaster.  See  Roby,  vol.  I.  889.  M.  Crassus  : 
surnamed  Dives,  the  triumvir.  He  was  a  shrewd  speculator,  and 
had  the  reputation  of  being  avaricious,  male  audiebat:  The  word 


8i 

audire  has  here  the  sense  "  to  be  named,  or  styled  somehow"  (as  Greek 
dxouw).  Thus  male  audtre=to  be  in  ill  repute,  to  hear  evil  of  one's 
self  =xaxa)<;  dxoueev.  Cicero  plays  upon  words  ;  for  being  a  little 
deaf  (surdaster),  male  audiebat  would  be  true  of  Crassus  in  two  senses. 
See  Lex.  s.  audio  II.  D.  Epicure!  :  This  word  is  found  in  all  mss. 
Wolf  rejects  it.  It  may  be  simply  one  of  Cicero's  thrusts  at  the 
school  whose  teachings  he  opposes.  Cf.  I.  III.  5,  6.  omnesque 

[id] Surdi :    id  is  omitted  in   some  mss.     If  it  stands,  it  makes 

with  surdi  an  anacoluthon.  A  better  reading  is  item  in  place  of  fd, 
and  remove  the  brackets  from  surdi.  legendis  his  :  his=cantibus, 
i.  e.  the  words  or  verses. 

117.  paulo    ante ;  At  ^XXXVIII.    in.    secum   loqui :  See 
XXXVI.    103.      captus  sit=privatus  sit.     See   Lex.   s.  capio  I.  B. 
i.  e.     primum ;    correlative    to    sin  forte,     quid    est....quod 
laboremus  ;  A.  320;  H.  503.  I.  Note  2,    portus  enim  praesto 
est  ;  Cf.  I.  XXX.  74.     In  the  Stoic  ethics  life  is  regarded  as  among 
things  indifferent,  suicide  is  permitted  as  a  rational  means  of  termi- 
nating it,  but  only  by  the  sage,     ibidem  ;  at  the  time  when  suffer- 
ing most.     This  word  is  omitted  by  some  editors,  and  Bentley  omits 
as  a  silly  gloss  quoniam  mors  ibidem  est,  and  T.   brackets  the  words. 
Others  insert  quidem  after  quoniam.     nihil  sentiendi ;  Cf.  I.  XLIII. 
102,  de  nihil  sentiendo.     Theodorus  :  of  Cyrene,  designated  as  the 
Atheist,  a  disciple  of  Aristippus,  the  founder  of  the  Cyrenaic  school. 
See  INTRODUCTION.     He  went  to  Athens  and  later  to  Alexandria, 
finally  returning  to  Cyrene.     While  in  the  service  of  Ptolemy,  king 
of  the  Macedonian  dynasty  in  Egypt,  he  was   sent  as  an  embassy  to 
Lysimachus,   king   of   Thrace,    who   threatened    to    crucify  him  on 
account  of  his  freedom  of  speech.     Cf.  I.  XLIII.   102.     vero ;  iron- 
ical.    Cantharidis  vim  ;  the  cantharis  was  used  by  the  ancients 
as  a  poison.     It  is  a  question  whether  it   was    the  same  insect  that 
is  now  known  by  that  name — the  Spanish  fly — which  is  bruised  and 
used  as  a  vesicatory.     Cic.  says,  C.  Carbo,  accusante  L.  Crasso,  Can- 
tharidas  sumpsisse  dicitur.     Ad.  Fam.  IX.  21.3. 

1 1 8.  Paulus  ;  L,    Aemilius  Paulus  Macedonicus  (230-160  B.C.) 
was  one  of  the  most  upright  of   the  Roman  nobles.     In  his  second 
consulship,  168  B.  C.,  he  defeated   (on   June   2d)   at  Pydna,  the  last 
king  of  Macedonia,  Perses.     The  triumph  of  Paulus  was  celebrated 


82 

Nov.  3oth,  167,  and  before  the  triumphal  car  walked  the  captive 
king  and  his  children.  Persi  J  Perses  was  cast  into  a  dungeon  after 
the  triumph  of  Paulus,  but  was  released  at  the  intercession  of  the 
latter  and  permitted  to  end  his  days  in  an  honorable  captivity  at 
Alba.  Perses  is  declined  as  an  a  or  e  stem,  but  Sallust  and  Tacitus 
write  the  gen.  Persi,  and  Cicero  and  Livy  have  the  same  form  for 
the  dative.  In  this  passage  some  editors  have  Persae,  and  Roby  I. 
482,  remarks,  "  The  name  of  the  Macedonian  king  Perseus  had  an  e 
stem  used  in  Cicero,  and  an  eu  stem  used  in  Livy.  Other  writers 
generally  follow  Livy." 

XLI.  obtinetur,  is  observed;  not  obtinet  because  this  verb  is 
never  neuter  in  Cicero.  See  Lex.  aut  bibat  and  abeat :  The 
Greek  has  y  nWe  ^  oxide,  either  drink  or  depart,  and  the  German  sauf 
oder  lauf.  inquit:  indefinite  subject,  violentiam  vinolentorum  : 
A  play  upon  words.  Cf.  III.  XXVII.  64,  Pueros  vero  matres.... 
castigare . . . .  solent,  nee  verbis  solum,  sed  etiam  verberibus.  Haec 
eadem  :  See  XXXVIII.  no,  and  II.  VI.  15.  Hieronymus  :  of 
Rhodes,  a  Peripatetic.  See  XXX.  84.  He  held  that  the  highest 
good  consists  in  freedom  from  pain,  cf.  II.  VI.  15  ;  while  Aristotle 
taught  that  complete  happiness  results  from  the  rational  and  virtuous 
activity  of  the  soul,  together  with  the  presence  of  certain  external 
goods.  See  IX.  25,  note. 

119.  ut  virtus  per  se  ipsa  nihil  valeat :  What  was  the  Epi- 
curean view  of  the  relation  of  virtue  to  pleasure  ?     profectis  :  from 
proficiscor.  Dat.     Quorum  alii:  The  Peripatetics  and  the  Academ- 
ics.    See  XVI.  47  ;  XXVI.  75  and  notes,    alii  autem  :  The  Stoics. 
See  VIII.  22  ;  X.  29,  note. 

120.  honorarius  arbiter :  i.e.  chosen  by  the  parties  and  not 
by  the  praetor.     For  the  functions,  etc.  of  the   arbiter   see  Morey's 
Outlines  of  Roman  Law,   pg.   390.     Carneades  :  See   XXIX.    83, 
note.    commoda=praeaj>ua.    See  XVI.  47,  note,  causam  esse 
discrepandi:  Cf.  XXVI.  75,  note,    hunc  locum,  this  point; i.e. 
respecting  the   summum  bonum,  and  that  a  wise  man  lives  happily. 
ceterarum  disciplinarum  :  Of  other  schools  than  those  just  men- 
tioned, which  in  re  if  not  in  verbis  agreed  with  one  another.    VOCC= 
sententia. 

121.  eundum  :     To   the   city   from   his   Tusculan    villa,     ubi, 
wherein— hoiv.     cuicuimodi  :    Roby   I.    382;  A.    105,  £.  Note;H. 


83 

187.  4-  Note,  alteros  quinque:  He  had  already  written  and  dedi- 
cated to  Brutus  the  five  books  De  Finibus  Bonorum  et  Malorum. 
lacessiti :  Cic.  may  refer  to  Brutus'  work,  De  Virtute,  which  was 
dedicated  to  him.  See  I.  i.  profuturi  simus dixerim  :  Ob- 
serve the  change  of  number.  It  is  not  probable  that  Cicero  intended 
to  include  Brutus  in  the  plural  verb  any  more  than  in  the  nostris 
following. 

Without  doubt  Cicero  alleviated  very  materially  his  personal  sor- 
rows and  his  political  anxieties  by  the  congenial  diversion  of  philo- 
sophical study  and  composition. 


([UNIVERSITY 


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